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   The	  efficacy	  of	  United	  States	  (U.S.)	  military	  forces	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  condition	  of	  
jointness,	  which	  enables	  members	  of	  different	  military	  services	  to	  overcome	  their	  cultural	  and	  
experiential	  prejudices	  and	  operate	  interdependently.	  	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  
Phase	  (JPME)	  II,	  offered	  through	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College	  (JFSC),	  is	  the	  principal	  mechanism	  
within	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  to	  reduce	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  held	  by	  military	  
officers	  and	  to	  cultivate	  the	  optimal	  joint	  perspectives	  and	  attitudes	  associated	  with	  jointness.	  	  
The	  JFSC	  employs	  three	  different	  methods	  for	  delivering	  JPME	  II—Resident,	  Satellite,	  and	  
Hybrid—yet	  it	  remains	  unknown	  whether	  significant	  differences	  exist	  between	  them	  regarding	  
their	  effectiveness	  in	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  explores	  the	  
following	  question:	  What	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  by	  the	  various	  JPME	  II	  course	  
delivery	  methods	  provided	  by	  JFSC?	  	  To	  provide	  an	  answer,	  the	  study	  first	  considered	  the	  
nature	  of	  organizational	  culture,	  the	  origin	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  and	  how	  intergroup	  
contact	  can	  reduce	  such	  prejudice.	  	  Second,	  it	  considered	  each	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  method	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory	  to	  develop	  related	  hypotheses,	  and	  employed	  
analysis	  of	  variance	  and	  multiple	  regression	  techniques	  using	  JFSC	  archival	  longitudinal	  survey	  
data	  collected	  from	  students	  attending	  each	  delivery	  method.	  	  The	  results	  of	  analysis	  
	  
	  
demonstrate	  that,	  while	  each	  method	  contributes	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  
significant	  and	  possibly	  consequential	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  delivery	  methods	  in	  terms	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  “The	  U.S.	  military	  must	  continue	  to	  develop	  leaders	  who	  understand	  jointness	  in	  order	  
to	  fight	  as	  a	  joint	  force.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  the	  nation	  needs	  the	  strength	  created	  
when	  all	  armed	  services	  work	  together.”	  
-­‐	  Congressman	  Ike	  Skelton	  
	  
The	  very	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (U.S.)	  military	  rests	  on	  a	  fulcrum	  called	  
jointness.	  	  Not	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  World	  War	  has	  the	  U.S.	  employed	  military	  force	  
during	  conflict	  purely	  in	  the	  form	  of	  individual	  and	  independent	  military	  service	  components.	  	  
In	  that	  time,	  however,	  General	  Eisenhower,	  the	  Supreme	  Allied	  Commander,	  possessed	  a	  vision	  
that	  only	  through	  a	  single,	  unified	  commander	  vested	  with	  authority	  over	  all	  assigned	  forces	  
and	  across	  all	  warfighting	  domains	  could	  hope	  to	  realize	  greatest	  military	  efficacy.1	  	  Eisenhower	  
articulated	  a	  vision	  for	  jointness,	  though	  it	  would	  not	  be	  realized	  to	  an	  appreciable	  degree	  until	  
four	  decades	  later.	  	  The	  Goldwater	  Nichols	  Defense	  Reorganization	  Act	  of	  1986	  (GNA)	  was	  
watershed	  legislation	  enacted	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  string	  of	  recent	  military	  failures	  
attributable	  in	  part	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  different	  military	  services	  to	  work	  together	  
cooperatively	  and	  coherently.2	  	  In	  the	  years	  following,	  the	  meaning	  and	  implications	  of	  
jointness,	  which	  the	  act	  aimed	  to	  more	  strongly	  instill	  in	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  
of	  continuing	  debate	  and	  interpretation.	  	  Though	  a	  commonly	  accepted	  and	  descriptive	  
definition	  of	  jointness	  remains	  elusive,	  the	  value	  of	  jointness	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  war	  fighting	  is	  a	  
widely	  accepted	  truth	  within	  the	  defense	  establishment.	  	  This	  attitude	  has	  taken	  hold	  despite	  a	  
lack	  of	  empirical	  research	  specifically	  examining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  joint	  education	  programs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  Opening	  Remarks	  to	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  Staff	  College,	  February	  1,	  1948.	  
2	  These	  failures	  include	  Operation	  EAGLE	  CLAW	  (1980	  Iran	  Hostage	  Rescue),	  Operation	  URGENT	  FURY	  (1983	  
Invasion	  of	  Grenada),	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  general.	  
2	  
	  
to	  instill	  the	  joint	  perspective	  and	  attitude	  necessary	  for	  true	  jointness	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  officers	  
from	  the	  different	  military	  services.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  nature	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  
contemporary	  security	  environment	  have	  transformed	  considerably	  since	  1986,	  making	  
jointness,	  as	  manifested	  by	  strategically	  minded,	  critically	  thinking,	  joint	  warfighters,	  all	  the	  
more	  important.	  
	  
Jointness,	  Joint	  Acculturation,	  and	  Inter-­‐service	  Prejudice	  
The	  GNA	  recognized	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  officers	  proficient	  in	  their	  own	  service,	  the	  
military	  needs	  high-­‐quality	  officers	  competent	  in	  joint	  matters,	  which	  is	  defined	  in	  law	  as	  those	  
subjects	  related	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  national	  military	  strategy,	  planning	  for	  contingencies	  
and	  emerging	  crises,	  command	  and	  control	  of	  joint	  forces,	  national	  security	  planning	  with	  other	  
agencies,	  and	  combined	  operations	  with	  forces	  from	  allied	  nations.3	  	  Competency	  in	  joint	  
matters,	  however,	  hinges	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  jointness,	  defined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  research	  
as	  the	  military	  circumstance	  enabled	  by	  trust	  and	  understanding	  transcending	  the	  core	  beliefs	  
and	  assumptions	  of	  any	  particular	  service	  and	  exemplified	  by	  the	  effective	  integration	  and	  
employment	  of	  the	  different	  service	  capabilities	  and	  competencies	  within	  a	  unified	  command	  
structure.4	  	  This	  definition	  is	  critical	  because	  it	  establishes	  that	  jointness	  is	  nonexistent	  if	  not	  
recognized	  and	  accepted	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  military	  officers—it	  does	  not	  rest	  merely	  on	  a	  
collection	  of	  doctrine,	  platforms,	  and	  capabilities	  from	  the	  different	  military	  services.	  	  Rather,	  it	  
relies	  on	  the	  trust	  and	  understanding	  between	  officers	  from	  different	  services	  and	  signifies	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Definitions,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2015a):	  §668.	  	  
4	  This	  definition	  is	  developed	  and	  presented	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
3	  
	  
alternative	  assumptions	  and	  beliefs	  exist	  beyond	  those	  inculcated	  by	  the	  organizational	  culture	  
of	  any	  particular	  service.	  	  	  
To	  achieve	  a	  condition	  of	  true	  jointness,	  military	  officers	  must	  move	  beyond	  the	  
strongly-­‐instilled	  cultural	  beliefs	  of	  their	  respective	  service	  and	  adopt	  new	  values	  and	  beliefs	  
that	  amplify	  their	  appreciation	  for,	  and	  reinforce	  the	  trust	  they	  place	  in,	  colleagues	  from	  other	  
services.5	  	  A	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  are	  essential	  to	  achieving	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  
coordination	  and	  harmonized	  integration	  of	  service	  competencies	  and	  capabilities	  during	  
conflict.	  	  This	  psychological	  change	  is	  termed	  “joint	  acculturation”	  and	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  
process	  of	  understanding	  the	  separate	  Service	  cultures	  (and	  other	  organizations)	  resulting	  in	  
joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  common	  beliefs,	  and	  trust,	  which	  occurs	  when	  diverse	  groups	  
come	  into	  continuous	  direct	  contact.”6	  	  In	  1989,	  Congressman	  Ike	  Skelton	  described	  the	  process	  
of	  joint	  acculturation	  as	  “the	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  rapport	  that	  develop	  when	  students	  
from	  all	  services	  study	  in	  mixed	  seminars	  and	  share	  the	  ideas,	  values,	  and	  traditions	  of	  their	  
services,	  when	  they	  solve	  joint	  military	  problems	  together,	  and	  when	  preconceived	  notions	  
about	  the	  nature	  of	  and	  solution	  to	  problems	  of	  warfare,	  learned	  during	  service	  training	  and	  
education,	  are	  challenged	  daily.”7	  	  Without	  a	  cohesive	  culture	  of	  shared	  values	  transcending	  
service	  interests	  and	  inspiring	  joint-­‐minded	  warfighters	  to	  think	  as	  a	  team,	  service	  parochialism	  
will	  often	  mute	  genuine	  jointness.	  	  Indeed,	  service	  parochialism	  generates	  tremendous	  tension	  
between	  the	  vibrant,	  powerful	  cultures	  of	  the	  services	  and	  the	  joint	  community	  responsible	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  his	  1992	  book,	  Organizational	  Culture,	  Edgar	  Schein	  describes	  in	  detail	  the	  nature	  and	  composition	  of	  
organizational	  cultures	  and	  also	  the	  power	  of	  organizations	  to	  recruit,	  select,	  and	  promote	  their	  members,	  which	  
provides	  powerful	  cultural	  reinforcement,	  making	  any	  transition	  difficult.	  
6	  This	  definition	  is	  also	  developed	  and	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
7	  .	  U.S.Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  [1989]:	  64.	  
4	  
	  
the	  employment	  of	  military	  force.	  	  Optimal	  employment	  of	  military	  force	  during	  conflict	  
dictates	  that	  the	  separate	  services	  operate	  not	  in	  a	  de-­‐conflicted	  manner	  but	  in	  an	  integrated	  
or,	  ideally,	  interdependent	  relationship.	  	  The	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  military	  officers	  from	  
different	  services	  helps	  realize	  this	  end.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize,	  however,	  that	  joint	  
acculturation	  represents	  volitional	  behavior	  on	  the	  part	  of	  military	  officers,	  and	  officers	  cannot,	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  joint	  education,	  be	  forced	  to	  adopt	  a	  joint	  perspective	  and	  attitude	  and	  to	  
share	  common	  values	  with	  officers	  from	  other	  services.	  	  Such	  change	  is	  voluntary	  and	  is	  
inhibited	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  prejudices	  and	  discrimination	  demonstrated	  by	  officers	  from	  the	  
different	  services.8	  	  Such	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  result	  primarily	  from	  deeply	  instilled	  service	  
cultural	  beliefs	  and	  from	  personal	  experience.	  	  Accordingly,	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  
enabled	  by	  a	  situation	  and	  environment	  that	  deliberately	  minimizes	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
held	  by	  officers.	  
Within	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (DoD),	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  (JPME)	  is	  
the	  primary	  means	  to	  provide	  expertise	  in	  the	  integrated	  employment	  of	  land,	  sea,	  and	  air	  
forces.	  	  More	  importantly,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  to	  achieve	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  
described	  by	  Skelton.	  	  Current	  legislation	  prescribes	  two	  key	  graduated	  phases	  for	  joint	  
education:	  	  JPME	  I	  and	  JPME	  II.9	  	  The	  first	  phase	  is	  delivered	  by	  each	  of	  the	  military	  services	  to	  
their	  early	  to	  mid-­‐career	  officers,	  who	  receive	  this	  coincident	  with	  additional	  service-­‐specific	  
education.	  	  The	  second	  phase	  is	  delivered	  principally,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  by	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  
Staff	  College	  (JFSC)	  to	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  career	  officers	  of	  all	  services	  and	  in	  an	  exclusively	  joint	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Rupert	  Brown	  and	  Hanna	  Zagefka,	  "The	  Dynamics	  of	  Acculturation:	  An	  Intergroup	  Perspective,"	  Advances	  in	  
Experimental	  Social	  Psychology	  44	  (2011),	  129-­‐84.	  
9.	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services:	  10.;	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  Program	  of	  
Instruction,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2015b):	  § 2155.	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context.	  	  An	  important	  milestone	  in	  the	  professional	  development	  of	  military	  officers	  is	  to	  
become	  designated	  as	  a	  Joint	  Qualified	  Officer	  (JQO),	  which	  signifies	  that	  the	  officer	  has	  not	  
only	  accumulated	  a	  prescribed	  amount	  of	  experience	  in	  a	  joint	  assignment	  but	  has	  also	  
received	  credit	  for	  attending	  JPME	  II.	  	  Such	  designation	  indicates	  that	  the	  officer	  is	  educated,	  
trained,	  and	  experienced	  in	  joint	  matters	  and	  able	  to	  enhance	  the	  joint	  warfighting	  capability	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  through	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  joint	  requirements	  including	  multi-­‐service,	  
interagency,	  international,	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  perspectives.10	  	  Unlike	  JPME	  I,	  however,	  law	  
requires	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  in-­‐residence	  and	  for	  a	  specific	  duration,	  presently	  set	  at	  10	  
weeks.	  	  However,	  these	  requirements	  are	  subject	  to	  interpretation	  within	  the	  defense	  
establishment.11	  	  An	  important	  distinction	  regarding	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  the	  JFSC	  
and	  those	  offered	  by	  other	  institutions	  is	  that	  JFSC	  is	  specifically	  charged	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  
Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  to	  instill	  in	  its	  graduates	  the	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  
This	  places	  special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  attending	  the	  JFSC.	  	  
Presently,	  the	  JFSC	  employs	  three	  joint	  staff-­‐accredited	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods.	  	  The	  
first	  is	  the	  Joint	  and	  Combined	  Warfighting	  School	  (JCWS),	  which	  is	  a	  10-­‐week	  resident	  program	  
at	  the	  JFSC.	  	  The	  second	  is	  the	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program	  (NRSP),	  which	  is	  nearly	  identical	  
to	  the	  10-­‐week	  JCWS	  approach	  but	  delivered	  off-­‐campus	  at	  the	  location	  of	  a	  major	  joint	  
command.	  	  The	  third	  method	  is	  the	  recently	  renamed	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  program	  conducted	  by	  JFSC	  
primarily	  for	  reserve	  component	  officers.	  	  This	  program	  employs	  a	  blended	  approach	  of	  online	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  DoDI	  1300.19	  -­‐	  DOD	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  (JOM)	  Program	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  March	  4,	  2014).	  	  
11	  The	  chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  recently	  accredited	  a	  hybrid	  program	  employing	  a	  blend	  of	  distance	  
education	  and	  resident	  techniques	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  Phase	  II.	  	  This	  decision	  stemmed	  from	  an	  interpretation	  
of	  recent	  amendments	  to	  law	  regarding	  “programs	  offered	  through”	  the	  JFSC,	  though	  such	  language	  was	  added	  
specifically	  to	  authorize	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  Satellite	  program	  by	  the	  JFSC.	  See	  CJCSI	  1800.01E	  
Change	  1.	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and	  resident	  education	  conducted	  over	  40	  weeks	  and,	  because	  of	  its	  recent	  accreditation	  for	  
delivery	  of	  JPME	  II,	  this	  program	  is	  also	  expected	  to	  begin	  accepting	  active	  component	  officers	  
in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  Though	  each	  program	  is	  accredited	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  Phase	  II,	  considerable	  
differences	  exist	  between	  them	  in	  practice,	  and	  such	  could	  be	  consequential	  to	  creating	  the	  
situation	  and	  environment	  that	  can	  minimize	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  to	  enable	  optimal	  joint	  
acculturation.	  	  At	  present,	  the	  defense	  establishment	  lacks	  any	  awareness	  of	  how	  effectively	  
these	  programs	  minimize	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  much	  less	  whether	  they	  are	  achieving	  optimal	  
joint	  acculturation	  of	  students	  attending	  them.	  	  This	  begs	  the	  following	  question:	  Do	  the	  
various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  
prejudice	  among	  military	  officers?	  	  This	  study	  seeks	  to	  provide	  an	  answer.	  	  
	  
Why	  the	  Differences	  Between	  Delivery	  Method	  Outcomes	  Matter	  	  
There	  is	  growing	  interest	  within	  the	  defense	  establishment	  in	  reevaluating	  the	  statutory	  
approach	  to	  producing	  JQOs.	  	  Pressures	  to	  increase	  throughput,	  reduce	  cost,	  and	  expand	  
accessibility	  of	  joint	  education	  are	  increasingly	  leading	  to	  more	  creative	  approaches	  for	  the	  
delivery	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  This	  is	  most	  recently	  evident	  in	  proposals	  to	  amend	  GNA	  legislation	  by	  
removing	  the	  prescribed	  duration	  of	  the	  resident	  JCWS	  program,	  and	  also	  by	  recent	  decisions	  
to	  expand	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  through	  the	  use	  of	  distance	  learning	  and	  satellite	  JFSC	  
campuses.12	  	  	  Such	  initiatives	  may	  indeed	  increase	  the	  opportunities	  for	  military	  officers	  to	  
receive	  JQO	  designation	  and	  plausibly	  achieve	  greater	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  
JPME.	  	  But	  pursuing	  alternative	  delivery	  approaches	  with	  little	  awareness	  of	  their	  efficacy	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012,	  Public	  Law	  112–81,	  (2011):	  Sec	  552(b).	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overcoming	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  could	  have	  adverse	  implications	  for	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  
of	  officers,	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  center	  of	  GNA	  legislation	  and	  the	  chairman’s	  direction	  regarding	  
JPME	  Phase	  II.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  such	  initiatives	  may	  actually	  represent	  a	  disservice	  to	  the	  
cause	  of	  jointness.	  
The	  outcomes	  of	  this	  study	  are	  consequential	  to	  gaining	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  
to	  inculcate	  joint	  perspectives	  and	  attitudes	  in	  military	  officers	  slated	  to	  serve	  in	  joint	  
assignments,	  specifically	  those	  in	  the	  unified	  military	  commands	  responsible	  for	  the	  planning	  
and	  employment	  of	  military	  force	  in	  pursuit	  of	  U.S.	  national	  interests.	  	  Without	  assessing	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  delivery	  methods	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  we	  cannot	  
understand	  if	  alternate	  delivery	  methods	  represent	  an	  improvement	  to,	  or	  degradation	  of,	  the	  
joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  relative	  to	  the	  principal	  method	  of	  in-­‐resident	  attendance	  to	  
JCWS.	  	  By	  extension,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  carries	  implications	  for	  military	  operational	  
effectiveness	  and	  the	  imperative	  to	  reduce	  service	  parochialism	  within	  a	  joint	  context.	  	  To	  date,	  
there	  has	  been	  no	  formal	  research	  examining	  if	  differences	  exist	  in	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  
outcomes	  of	  the	  various	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  delivery	  methods,	  and	  this	  work	  seeks	  to	  address	  a	  
portion	  of	  this	  void.	  	  
The	  nation	  also	  finds	  itself	  in	  a	  period	  of	  fiscal	  austerity	  that	  is,	  in	  some	  respects,	  
unprecedented,	  and	  the	  defense	  budget	  is	  slated	  to	  absorb	  considerable	  cuts	  for	  the	  remainder	  
of	  the	  decade.	  	  Undoubtedly,	  joint	  education	  programs	  effecting	  joint	  acculturation	  will	  come	  
under	  careful	  scrutiny.	  	  Since	  this	  research	  seeks	  to	  distinguish	  the	  delivery	  methods	  by	  their	  
efficacy	  in	  producing	  positive	  attitudinal	  change	  in	  officers,	  the	  findings	  are	  expected	  to	  
influence	  subsequent	  decisions	  regarding	  investments	  in	  joint	  education	  and	  changes	  in	  the	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delivery	  approach.	  	  The	  intent	  of	  GNA	  legislation	  regarding	  the	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  requirements	  is	  in	  
large	  part	  to	  effect	  joint	  acculturation	  through	  sustained	  interaction	  among	  students	  who	  are	  
physically	  proximate	  to	  each	  other.	  	  Since	  the	  delivery	  methods	  exhibit	  differences	  not	  only	  in	  
the	  amount	  of	  social	  contact,	  the	  academic	  setting,	  and	  student	  composition,	  the	  findings	  may	  
also	  provide	  some	  indication	  of	  which	  aspects	  of	  the	  acculturation	  experience	  are	  most	  
consequential	  to	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  among	  military	  officers.	  	  
Individual	  differences	  also	  matter	  and	  officers	  receiving	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  regardless	  of	  delivery	  
method	  will	  each	  have	  a	  unique	  experience	  and	  outcome.	  	  Though	  differing	  widely	  in	  degree,	  
every	  officer	  harbors	  prejudices	  toward	  members	  of	  the	  other	  services,	  and	  the	  direction	  and	  
depth	  of	  this	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  their	  professional	  
background.	  	  This	  study	  will	  also	  examine	  how	  these	  differences	  in	  professional	  background	  
relate	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  three	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  delivery	  methods	  in	  minimizing	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  The	  findings	  from	  this	  study	  may	  offer	  
joint	  education	  insights	  important	  to	  any	  state	  possessing	  a	  standing	  military	  comprised	  of	  
more	  than	  one	  branch	  of	  service	  and	  where	  acculturation	  represents	  the	  means	  toward	  greater	  
military	  efficacy	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  hindered	  by	  distinct	  and	  independent	  service	  cultures.	  	  
Indeed,	  such	  may	  be	  the	  case	  with	  China,	  where	  recent	  GNA-­‐style	  reforms	  within	  the	  military	  
are	  creating	  joint	  command	  structures	  similar	  to	  the	  combatant	  commands	  employed	  by	  the	  
U.S.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Chinese	  military	  is	  likely	  to	  face	  challenges	  involving	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  inter-­‐
service	  rivalry	  that	  crippled	  many	  U.S.	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  decades	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  
GNA.13	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Phillip	  C.	  Saunders	  and	  Joel	  Wuthnow,	  "China's	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols?	  Assessing	  PLA	  Organizational	  Reforms,"	  Joint	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Assessing	  the	  Outcomes	  of	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  Delivery	  Methods	  
To	  answer	  the	  research	  question,	  this	  study	  will	  employ	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  to	  
establish	  the	  impact	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  by	  the	  various	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  delivery	  methods	  
offered	  by	  the	  JFSC.	  	  Specifically,	  it	  will	  employ	  a	  three-­‐group,	  pre-­‐test/post-­‐test	  design	  to	  
measure	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  as	  indicated	  by	  student	  officers	  in	  a	  self-­‐reported	  
attitudinal	  survey.	  	  The	  design	  will	  establish	  not	  only	  the	  remaining	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  treatment	  methods—Resident,	  Satellite,	  and	  
Hybrid	  attendance—but	  also	  the	  magnitude	  of	  change	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  for	  subjects	  in	  
each	  of	  the	  groups.	  	  It	  will	  first	  test	  if	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  exists	  between	  the	  
residual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  achieved	  by	  the	  treatment	  methods	  by	  performing	  an	  
analysis	  of	  variance	  (ANOVA)	  of	  the	  group	  mean	  of	  post-­‐course	  results	  among	  the	  three	  groups.	  	  	  
Second,	  it	  will	  employ	  ANOVA	  on	  the	  group	  mean	  of	  change	  between	  pre-­‐course	  and	  post-­‐test	  
results.	  	  Lastly,	  it	  will	  employ	  multiple	  regression	  to	  predict	  the	  change	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
as	  a	  function	  of	  professional	  background	  factors	  such	  as	  total	  active	  military	  service,	  total	  
service	  in	  operational	  joint	  headquarters,	  military	  rank,	  level	  of	  education,	  and	  age.	  	  These	  
factors	  can	  provide	  some	  explanatory	  value	  regarding	  the	  change	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  each	  student	  harbors.	  	  The	  primary	  source	  for	  this	  data	  is	  archival	  longitudinal	  survey	  
data	  provided	  by	  the	  JFSC	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  conducted	  in	  2016.	  	  The	  
survey	  is	  administered	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  by	  the	  JFSC	  and	  measures	  the	  change	  in	  student	  
prejudices	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  officers	  from	  the	  other	  military	  services.	  	  This	  study	  uses	  this	  
data	  to	  establish	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  is	  reduced	  by	  each	  delivery	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  (3rd	  Quarter	  2016),	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10	  
	  
method	  and	  to	  identify	  if	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  lies	  in	  the	  final	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  each.	  	  The	  survey	  data	  also	  includes	  de-­‐identified	  student	  
information	  regarding	  professional	  background	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  any	  differences	  
between	  the	  changes	  in	  individual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  across	  the	  three	  treatment	  
methods.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Contributions	  of	  this	  Research	  
This	  research	  is	  distinct	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  first	  to	  formally	  recognize	  the	  social	  psychology	  
involved	  in	  the	  complex	  processes	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice.	  	  The	  services	  are	  inherently	  social	  organizations,	  each	  constructed	  for	  distinctly	  
different	  military	  purposes.	  	  Accordingly,	  each	  has	  a	  powerful	  organizational	  culture	  comprised	  
of	  specific	  structures,	  protocols,	  and	  doctrines	  guiding	  members	  in	  their	  attitudes,	  behavior,	  
and	  performance.	  	  Theories	  of	  organizational	  culture	  illuminate	  not	  only	  why	  organizations	  
behave	  in	  the	  manner	  that	  they	  do,	  but	  also	  why	  their	  members	  believe	  and	  act	  in	  strong	  
accordance	  with	  organizational	  values	  and	  beliefs.	  	  Allison	  presents	  an	  organizational	  process	  
model	  predicated	  on	  early	  organizational	  theory	  and	  this	  model	  provides	  explanatory	  power	  in	  
understanding	  why	  organizations	  produce	  the	  behavioral	  outcomes	  that	  they	  do.14	  	  It	  does	  this	  
by	  examining	  the	  underlying	  organizational	  structure	  and,	  specifically,	  the	  inherent	  pre-­‐
established	  routines.	  	  Contemporary	  theories	  of	  organizational	  culture	  provide	  additional	  
understanding	  of	  how	  organizational	  culture	  governs	  the	  behavior	  of	  its	  members.	  	  Schein,	  as	  
well	  as	  Trice	  and	  Beyer,	  wrote	  of	  the	  organizational	  norms	  and	  beliefs	  that	  serve	  to	  knit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




individual	  members	  together	  into	  a	  coherent	  whole	  to	  provide	  for	  institutional	  stability.15	  	  
While	  some	  norms	  and	  beliefs	  guide	  members	  to	  behave	  and	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  advances	  
organizational	  goals,	  they	  also	  influence	  how	  members	  interact	  with	  others	  from	  different	  
organizations.	  	  Very	  often	  the	  differences	  between	  cultures,	  and,	  specifically,	  organizational	  
beliefs,	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  contempt	  toward	  members	  belonging	  to	  different	  organizations;	  and	  
therein	  lies	  a	  principle	  source	  of	  prejudice.	  
Much	  is	  also	  written	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  psychology	  regarding	  the	  broad	  topic	  of	  
prejudice,	  and	  the	  contemporary	  body	  of	  knowledge	  is	  based	  on	  the	  work	  of	  pioneers	  such	  as	  
Williams,	  in	  1947,	  and	  Allport,	  in	  1954.16	  	  In	  the	  following	  decades,	  researchers	  built	  on	  this	  
foundation	  by	  conducting	  hundreds	  of	  prejudice-­‐reduction	  studies	  and	  experiments.	  	  These	  
studies,	  however,	  were	  not	  guided	  by	  a	  central	  theory	  of	  prejudice	  reduction	  until	  Pettigrew,	  in	  
1998,	  began	  to	  formulate	  his	  theory	  of	  how	  intergroup	  contact	  can	  reduce	  the	  antipathies	  
between	  members	  of	  different	  social	  groups.17	  	  In	  2006,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  published	  their	  
Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory	  (ICT),	  founded	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Allport	  and	  his	  facilitating	  
conditions	  of	  contact	  by	  which	  prejudice	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  is	  reduced.	  	  ICT	  
provides	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  this	  study.18	  	  
Though	  much	  has	  already	  been	  written	  extolling	  the	  importance	  of	  joint	  education,	  
there	  is	  little	  formal	  research	  into	  the	  subject	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  Edgar	  H.	  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition	  (San	  Francisco:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  
2004).;	  Also,	  Janice	  M.	  Beyer	  and	  Harrison	  M.	  Trice,	  The	  Cultures	  of	  Work	  Organizations	  (Englewood	  Cliffs:	  Prentice	  
Hall,	  1993).	  
16	  See	  Robin	  M.	  Williams	  Jr,	  The	  Reduction	  of	  Intergroup	  Tensions:	  A	  Survey	  of	  Research	  on	  Problems	  of	  Ethnic,	  
Racial,	  and	  Religious	  Group	  Relations.	  (New	  York:	  Social	  Science	  Research	  Council,	  1947).;	  Also,	  Gordon	  Willard	  
Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice	  (New	  York:	  Addison-­‐Wesley,	  1979).	  
17	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew,	  "Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,"	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Psychology	  49,	  no.	  1	  (1998).	  
18	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  "A	  Meta-­‐Analytic	  Test	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,"	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  90,	  no.	  5	  (2006).	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social	  science	  and	  virtually	  none	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  
latent	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  present	  in	  a	  particular	  JPME	  II	  venue.	  	  This	  research	  is	  
also	  unique	  in	  describing	  the	  theoretical	  relationship	  existing	  between	  the	  two—that	  joint	  
acculturation	  is	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  the	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  within	  a	  JMPE	  II	  
program.	  	  As	  such,	  there	  exists	  no	  previous	  investigation	  into	  the	  efficacy	  of	  different	  JPME	  II	  
delivery	  methods	  in	  minimizing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  order	  to	  foster	  optimal	  joint	  
acculturation	  of	  the	  officers	  in	  attendance.	  	  This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  compare	  the	  various	  
proposed	  approaches	  to	  joint	  education	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  accumulating	  pressure	  to	  do	  
more	  with	  less	  and	  to	  do	  things	  differently.	  	  	  
In	  a	  broader	  context,	  the	  dearth	  of	  research	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  joint	  education	  
inhibits	  the	  development	  of	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  acculturation	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  military	  
officers	  and	  of	  jointness	  overall.	  	  This	  research	  contributes	  to	  this	  field	  of	  knowledge	  by	  
exploring	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  different	  delivery	  approaches	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  if	  any	  method	  
may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  advantageous	  in	  terms	  of	  effecting	  acculturation,	  and	  to	  identify	  which	  
aspects	  of	  the	  professional	  background	  of	  the	  students,	  if	  any,	  are	  of	  particular	  consequence.	  	  
Such	  knowledge	  can	  inform	  decision	  makers	  regarding	  future	  investments	  into,	  and	  changes	  in,	  
JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods.	  	  Additionally,	  this	  research	  helps	  establish	  objective	  definitions	  for	  
jointness,	  joint	  acculturation,	  and	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  and	  these	  may	  be	  adopted	  as	  terms	  
of	  reference	  for	  the	  joint	  community	  and	  used	  to	  improve	  related	  doctrinal	  or	  legal	  definitions.	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Layout	  of	  this	  Study	  
This	  study	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  by	  examining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  three	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  the	  
JFSC	  in	  reducing	  the	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  harbored	  by	  officers.	  	  Chapter	  II,	  Review	  of	  
the	  Literature,	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  discusses	  the	  purpose	  and	  nature	  of	  
jointness	  by	  examining	  the	  concept	  of	  jointness	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  military	  officers	  
possessing	  an	  understanding	  of,	  and	  appreciation	  for,	  the	  interdependency	  of	  military	  service	  
components	  in	  the	  context	  of	  joint	  operations.	  	  JPME	  II	  is	  the	  means	  for	  encouraging	  officers	  to	  
adopt	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  through	  the	  process	  of	  joint	  acculturation,	  but	  such	  an	  
outcome	  is	  only	  attainable	  after	  overcoming	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  service	  cultural	  prejudices	  toward	  
members	  of	  other	  services.	  	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  the	  JFSC	  is	  the	  principle	  venue	  for	  joint	  
acculturation	  to	  occur,	  and	  this	  is	  accomplished	  by	  creating	  an	  environment	  where	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  is	  minimized.	  	  Pressures	  to	  produce	  more	  graduates,	  reduce	  costs,	  and	  expand	  
accessibility	  are	  driving	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  the	  traditional	  in-­‐resident	  approach	  to	  
delivering	  JPME	  II.	  	  Yet,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  these	  alternatives	  in	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  
much	  less	  achieving	  optimal	  acculturation,	  remains	  unknown.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  such	  
alternative	  approaches	  to	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  may,	  in	  fact,	  undermine	  jointness.	  	  The	  latter	  half	  
of	  the	  chapter	  first	  examines	  what	  exists	  in	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  regarding	  organizational	  
culture,	  military	  service	  culture,	  and	  how	  culture	  contributes	  to	  prejudicial	  attitudes.	  	  It	  does	  
this	  by	  exploring	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  understanding	  organizational	  culture	  and,	  in	  turn,	  the	  
distinct	  cultures	  of	  each	  military	  service.	  	  Members	  of	  the	  specific	  service	  cultures	  hold	  certain	  
values	  and	  beliefs	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  over-­‐generalizations	  and	  stereotypes	  toward	  those	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perceived	  as	  belonging	  to	  “out-­‐groups,”	  and	  this	  results	  in	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  
harmful	  to	  jointness	  and	  military	  operational	  effectiveness.	  	  Next,	  it	  examines	  ICT	  as	  the	  
theoretical	  framework	  in	  understanding	  not	  only	  how	  to	  reduce	  these	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices,	  
but	  also	  understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  present	  in	  a	  contact	  encounter.	  	  The	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  ICT	  that	  moderate	  the	  
reduction	  of	  prejudice	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  by	  which	  to	  distinguish	  differences	  between	  
the	  different	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  the	  JFSC.	  
Chapter	  III,	  Methodology,	  uses	  these	  five	  facilitating	  conditions	  to	  examine	  the	  three	  
JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  the	  JCWS	  (Resident),	  the	  Non-­‐resident	  Satellite	  Program	  
(Satellite),	  and	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  (Hybrid)	  and	  highlights	  theoretical	  distinctions	  between	  them	  to	  
argue	  why	  their	  efficacy	  in	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  may	  not	  be	  the	  same.	  	  Accordingly,	  
it	  also	  presents	  the	  research	  design	  employed	  to	  ascertain	  the	  findings	  with	  respect	  to	  two	  
hypotheses.	  	  The	  design	  employs	  ANOVA	  and	  multiple	  regression	  techniques	  using	  JFSC	  archival	  
longitudinal	  survey	  data	  collected	  from	  students	  attending	  each	  of	  the	  delivery	  methods	  during	  
calendar	  year	  2016,	  and	  attempts	  to	  determine	  which	  delivery	  method	  achieves	  the	  highest	  
reduction	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  and	  which	  student	  population	  demonstrates	  the	  greatest	  
change	  between	  post-­‐	  and	  pre-­‐course	  results.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  employs	  regression	  analysis	  to	  
establish	  the	  explanatory	  value	  of	  professional	  background	  factors	  to	  self-­‐reported	  changes	  in	  
attitude	  and	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  
Chapter	  IV,	  Results,	  presents	  the	  outcomes	  of	  analysis	  of	  the	  three	  methods	  with	  
respect	  to	  their	  differences	  and	  similarities.	  	  Drawing	  on	  a	  dataset	  consisting	  of	  subject	  samples	  
from	  each	  JPME	  II	  program,	  statistical	  analysis	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  how	  the	  delivery	  methods	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differ	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  delivery	  method	  achieves	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  its	  subjects	  and	  which	  group	  demonstrates	  the	  greatest	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐
treatment	  change	  in	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  analysis	  considers	  the	  
influence	  of	  several	  professional	  background	  factors,	  which	  compositionally	  distinguish	  the	  
three	  groups	  on	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  scores	  of	  subjects.	  
This	  study	  concludes	  with	  Chapter	  V,	  Summary,	  which	  revisits	  the	  original	  research	  
question	  and	  hypotheses	  in	  light	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  statistical	  analysis.	  	  It	  discusses	  the	  finding	  
and	  the	  contributions	  of	  this	  study	  to	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  social	  psychology	  and	  social	  science,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  topic	  of	  joint	  education.	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  implications	  
of	  the	  research	  findings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ICT,	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model,	  cognitive	  
biases,	  and	  JPME	  II.	  	  With	  the	  last	  of	  these,	  the	  discussion	  attempts	  to	  provide	  some	  answers	  
regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  the	  JFSC	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice—
specifically,	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Resident	  and	  Hybrid	  methods	  and	  
also	  differences	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Satellite	  method	  from	  the	  other	  two.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  
chapter	  identifies	  limitations	  affecting	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  findings	  and	  interpretations	  to	  
other	  accredited	  JPME	  II	  programs	  outside	  the	  JFSC	  and	  provides	  recommendations	  for	  further	  





REVIEW	  OF	  THE	  LITERATURE	  
“Jointness	  is	  more	  than	  a	  word,	  it	  is	  a	  mindset.”	  1	  
-­‐	  General	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Paloméros	  
	  
Jointness	  and	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Joint	  Education	  
	  
Military	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  have	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  jointness	  for	  much	  of	  the	  
last	  century,	  yet	  efforts	  over	  the	  decades	  to	  achieve	  a	  lasting	  and	  penetrating	  appreciation	  for	  
jointness	  within	  the	  military	  have	  been,	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  World	  War,	  a	  Sisyphean	  
experience.	  	  While	  an	  operational	  definition	  follows	  later,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  
jointness	  lies	  preponderantly	  in	  the	  mental	  realm	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  collection	  of	  platforms	  and	  
capabilities	  from	  the	  different	  military	  services.	  	  It	  requires	  officers	  of	  all	  services	  serving	  in	  a	  
joint	  context	  to	  harbor	  a	  joint	  perspective	  and	  attitude.	  	  A	  focus	  of	  military	  reforms	  over	  the	  
last	  30	  years,	  JPME	  is	  seen	  by	  many	  as	  the	  principal	  means	  to	  surmount	  strongly	  implanted	  
service	  bias	  and	  prejudice	  in	  order	  to	  impart	  the	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  necessary	  for	  
the	  condition	  of	  jointness.	  	  While	  contributing	  much	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  jointness,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
traditional	  methods	  for	  delivering	  JPME	  are	  coming	  into	  question.	  	  As	  the	  U.S.	  military	  struggles	  
to	  expand	  jointness	  during	  a	  period	  of	  fiscal	  austerity,	  increasingly	  diverse	  proposals	  for	  
modifying	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  threaten	  to	  erode	  the	  ability	  to	  impart	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  
perspectives.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Stated	  in	  his	  graduation	  address	  at	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College,	  June	  14,	  2013.	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What	  Jointness	  is	  and	  Why	  it	  is	  Important	  	  
According	  to	  law,	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  individual	  military	  services—Army,	  Navy,	  
Air	  Force	  and	  the	  Marine	  Corps—to	  organize,	  train,	  and	  equip	  military	  forces.2	  	  Though	  the	  
services	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  providing	  forces	  and	  capabilities	  for	  use	  in	  military	  operations,	  
the	  same	  law	  requires	  a	  Joint	  Force	  Commander	  (JFC)	  to	  employ	  those	  service	  forces	  jointly	  to	  
achieve	  mission	  objectives.	  	  The	  JFC	  is	  one	  who	  exercises	  authority	  over	  forces	  from	  two	  or	  
more	  service	  components,	  has	  the	  support	  of	  a	  joint	  staff,	  and	  must	  gain	  and	  exploit	  command	  
of	  the	  land,	  air,	  and	  sea,	  by	  integrating	  the	  capabilities	  and	  efforts	  of	  the	  different	  services.3	  	  
The	  most	  senior	  of	  these	  are	  the	  combatant	  commanders,	  and	  they	  are	  vested	  with	  the	  
broadest	  geographic	  or	  functional	  authority	  under	  which	  to	  employ	  joint	  military	  forces.	  	  	  
“Joint”	  is	  the	  term	  distinguishing	  the	  JFC	  and	  military	  operations	  from	  those	  of	  the	  
individual	  services	  and	  is	  understood	  as	  “the	  activities,	  operations,	  and	  organizations	  where	  the	  
involvement	  of	  two	  or	  more	  service	  components	  is	  present.”4	  	  Though	  codified	  in	  military	  
doctrine,	  the	  definition	  is	  hardly	  without	  contention	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  inter-­‐service	  
cooperation	  and	  coordination	  indispensable	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  of	  military	  
operations.	  	  Rather,	  the	  term	  “jointness”	  picks	  up	  where	  “joint”	  falls	  short.	  	  Jointness,	  as	  a	  
derivative,	  is	  complicated	  because	  it	  is	  an	  invented	  term.	  	  It	  does	  not	  reside	  in	  a	  dictionary	  and	  
so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  a	  broadly	  accepted	  meaning	  for	  the	  term.	  	  Since	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  
DoD	  Reorganization	  Act	  of	  1986,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  GNA,	  the	  meaning	  and	  
implications	  of	  jointness	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  profound	  debate	  and	  interpretation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  10	  USC	  Subtitles	  B,	  C,	  and	  D,	  which	  more	  explicitly	  and	  completely	  describe	  the	  roles	  of	  each	  service	  
department.	  
3	  Lawrence	  Legere,	  "Unification	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces"	  (Doctoral	  Dissertation,	  Harvard	  University,	  1950),	  399.	  	  
4	  	  Joint	  Publication	  1-­‐02	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Dictionary	  of	  Military	  and	  Associated	  Terms	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  2010a).	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According	  to	  some,	  Colin	  Powell,	  former	  chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  offered	  the	  most	  
concise	  definition	  when	  he	  stated:	  “[in	  jointness]	  we	  train	  as	  a	  team,	  fight	  as	  a	  team,	  and	  win	  as	  
a	  team.”5	  	  Others	  have	  defined	  it	  as	  “a	  holistic	  process	  that	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  all	  military	  operations	  by	  synchronizing	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  produce	  
synergistic	  effects	  within	  and	  between	  all	  joint	  integrators	  at	  every	  level	  of	  war.”6	  	  Deptula	  adds	  
to	  this	  definitional	  diversity	  by	  describing	  jointness	  as	  “a	  separate	  array	  of	  capabilities	  …	  
provided	  to	  a	  joint	  force	  commander	  whose	  job	  is	  to	  assemble	  a	  plan	  from	  this	  ‘menu’	  of	  
capabilities,	  applying	  the	  right	  force,	  at	  the	  right	  place	  and	  the	  right	  time	  for	  a	  particular	  
contingency.	  	  It	  is	  when	  these	  core	  functions	  combine	  into	  one	  synergistic,	  seamless	  operation	  
that	  true	  jointness	  occurs.”7	  	  	  Although	  jointness	  appears	  to	  mean	  different	  things	  to	  different	  
people	  their	  definitions	  most	  often	  coincide	  with	  the	  effective	  integration	  of	  service	  capabilities	  
at	  the	  JFC	  level.8	  	  	  	  	  
More	  observantly,	  Wilkerson	  concludes	  that	  true	  jointness	  derives	  from	  the	  trust	  and	  
understanding	  that	  service	  members	  place	  in	  their	  sister	  service	  comrades	  as	  experts	  in	  their	  
core	  competencies.	  	  By	  stating,	  “the	  essence	  of	  jointness	  is	  understanding	  and	  trust,”	  he	  
touches	  on	  a	  dimension	  unacknowledged	  by	  the	  others:	  the	  psychological	  realm	  where	  trust	  
and	  understanding	  exist	  and	  operate.9	  	  Jointness	  is	  nothing	  if	  it	  is	  not	  recognized	  and	  accepted	  
in	  the	  minds	  of	  soldiers,	  sailors,	  airmen,	  and	  marines	  working	  together	  to	  achieve	  common	  
objectives.	  	  A	  mere	  collection	  of	  platforms	  and	  capabilities	  cannot	  create	  it.	  	  Nor	  can	  fiat	  alone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  General	  Colin	  L.	  Powell,	  "A	  Word	  from	  the	  Chairman,"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly	  1	  (Autumn	  1993):	  4.;	  Don	  M.	  Snider,	  
"The	  U.S.	  Military	  in	  Transition	  to	  Jointness,"	  Air	  &	  Space	  Power	  Journal	  10,	  no.	  3	  (1996):	  18.	  	  	  
6	  Michael	  C.	  Vitale,	  "Jointness	  by	  Design,	  Not	  Accident,"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly,	  no.	  9	  (Autumn	  1995):	  28.	  	  	  	  	  
7	  David	  Deptula	  and	  Harold	  Adams,	  "Joint's	  True	  Meaning,"	  Armed	  Forces	  Journal	  146,	  no.	  10	  (2009):	  38.	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Snider,	  The	  U.S.	  Military	  in	  Transition	  to	  Jointness:	  9.	  	  
9	  Lawrence	  B.	  Wilkerson,	  "What	  Exactly	  is	  Jointness?"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly,	  no.	  16	  (Summer	  1997):	  66.	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effect	  true	  jointness	  as	  the	  joint	  environment	  requires	  a	  more	  concerted	  course	  than	  an	  “I	  
command	  you”	  approach.10	  	  The	  need	  for	  trust	  and	  understanding	  between	  members	  of	  the	  
different	  services	  implies	  that	  transcendent	  cultural	  assumptions	  and	  beliefs	  must	  exist	  beyond	  
those	  associated	  with	  any	  particular	  branch	  of	  service.	  	  	  Some	  aspects	  of	  a	  joint	  culture	  are	  
necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  coordination	  and	  harmonized	  integration	  of	  service	  
competencies	  and	  capabilities	  by	  a	  JFC.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study,	  true	  jointness	  is	  
defined	  as	  the	  military	  circumstance	  enabled	  by	  trust	  and	  understanding	  transcending	  the	  core	  
beliefs	  and	  assumptions	  of	  any	  single	  service	  and	  exemplified	  by	  the	  effective	  integration	  and	  
employment	  of	  the	  different	  service	  capabilities	  and	  competencies.11	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  joint	  military	  doctrine,	  the	  profit	  of	  jointness	  is	  the	  synergistic	  combination	  
of	  cross-­‐service	  capability	  wherein	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  joint	  force	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  
the	  individual	  capabilities	  of	  the	  individual	  service	  components.12	  	  The	  harmonization	  of	  
different	  service	  forces	  to	  act	  as	  a	  single	  coherent	  organization	  is	  widely	  understood	  to	  amplify	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  military	  force.	  	  Powell	  considered	  jointness	  to	  be	  a	  major	  factor	  
contributing	  to	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  though	  “less	  tangible	  than	  training	  or	  
weaponry,”	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  best	  and	  the	  brightest	  of	  young	  Americans	  that	  are	  our	  
volunteers.13	  	  During	  the	  military	  operations	  of	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  U.S.	  military	  demonstrated	  
a	  high	  level	  of	  jointness	  evidenced	  by	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  cross-­‐service	  exposure	  and	  inter-­‐
service	  cooperation.	  	  The	  GNA	  reforms	  to	  the	  defense	  establishment	  since	  1986	  have	  yielded	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  "the	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project"	  Final	  Report	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  
[April	  2008]).:	  7.	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Charles	  M.	  Davis,	  "The	  Culture	  of	  Jointness:	  A	  Definitional	  Approach"	  (Research	  Paper,	  2013).	  
12	  	  Joint	  Publication	  1	  Doctrine	  for	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  
2013).	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Powell,	  A	  Word	  from	  the	  Chairman:	  5.	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great	  deal	  of	  progress.	  	  However,	  this	  level	  of	  jointness	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  norm.	  	  During	  
much	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  powerful	  cultures	  of	  the	  individual	  services—the	  Army	  and	  
the	  Navy	  in	  particular—wielded	  profound	  and	  parochial	  influence	  over	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
America	  fought	  its	  conflicts.	  	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  this	  often	  resulted	  in	  
enormous	  inefficiency	  and	  sometimes	  with	  disastrous	  ineffectiveness.	  	  Put	  simply,	  the	  
individual	  services	  possessed	  inordinate	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  employment	  of	  their	  forces	  
provided	  for	  military	  operations.	  	  Yet,	  each	  service	  usually	  held	  different	  and	  often	  conflicting	  
perspectives	  regarding	  the	  operational	  approach.	  	  Compounding	  this	  circumstance	  was	  the	  
difficulty	  in	  unifying	  the	  service	  forces	  participating	  in	  a	  military	  operation	  under	  the	  command	  
of	  a	  single	  JFC.	  	  Historically,	  the	  distinct	  cultural	  differences	  between	  the	  services	  made	  it	  an	  
extraordinary	  challenge	  to	  get	  them	  to	  relinquish	  control	  of	  their	  forces	  to	  a	  commander	  from	  
another	  service	  component	  and	  this	  reluctance	  impeded	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  military	  
operations.	  	  Without	  such	  unity	  of	  command	  any	  degree	  of	  cooperation	  achieved	  between	  the	  
services	  remained	  proportional	  to	  their	  mutual	  interests—cooperation	  came	  easily	  wherever	  
their	  interests	  intersected.	  	  Wherever	  they	  diverged,	  which	  was	  often,	  the	  services	  often	  
worked	  at	  cross-­‐purposes	  to	  one	  another.	  	  Disunity	  and	  competition	  between	  the	  Army	  and	  the	  
Navy	  had	  reached	  such	  a	  crescendo	  by	  the	  start	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  that	  agitation	  for	  
reform	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Joint	  Board	  in	  1903	  to	  foster	  coordination	  and	  understanding	  
between	  the	  two.	  	  Though	  a	  forerunner	  to	  the	  present	  day	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  the	  board	  failed	  
to	  accomplish	  anything	  of	  note—meeting	  only	  twice	  during	  the	  course	  of	  World	  War	  I	  and	  
falling	  into	  disuse	  by	  1919.14	  	  During	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period,	  the	  military	  establishment	  continued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Legere,	  Unification	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces,	  59-­‐60.	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to	  resist	  efforts,	  internal	  and	  external,	  to	  bridge	  the	  service	  bureaucracies	  that	  often	  worked	  
against	  each	  other.	  	  For	  much	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  “mutual	  cooperation”	  was	  often	  the	  
preferred	  basis	  for	  employing	  different	  service	  forces	  when	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  could	  not	  agree	  
on	  a	  unified	  command	  arrangement.15	  	  Indeed,	  the	  committee	  investigating	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  
Harbor	  cited	  the	  command	  arrangement	  of	  mutual	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  
commanders	  in	  Hawaii	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Japanese	  attack.16	  	  
The	  U.S.	  military	  entered	  into	  World	  War	  II	  (WWII)	  under	  circumstances	  that	  were	  only	  
marginally	  better.	  	  General	  Marshal	  successfully	  argued	  at	  the	  Arcadia	  Conference,	  held	  shortly	  
after	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  for	  a	  unified	  approach	  to	  European	  operations	  to	  minimize	  the	  
possibility	  of	  inter-­‐service	  squabbling	  and	  to	  establish	  greater	  unity	  of	  effort	  toward	  achieving	  
objectives.	  	  He	  noted,	  “we	  cannot	  manage	  by	  cooperation.	  	  Human	  frailties	  are	  such	  that	  there	  
would	  be	  emphatic	  unwillingness	  to	  place	  portions	  of	  troops	  under	  another	  service.	  	  If	  we	  make	  
a	  plan	  for	  a	  unified	  command	  now,	  it	  will	  solve	  nine-­‐tenths	  of	  our	  troubles."17	  
While	  such	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  Europe,	  this	  was	  not	  to	  be	  the	  circumstance	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  theater,	  which	  held	  three	  separate	  co-­‐equal	  military	  commands	  and	  where	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
single	  overall	  commander	  hindered	  overall	  operational	  effectiveness.	  	  The	  activities	  of	  these	  
commands	  were	  characterized	  by	  confusion	  over	  operations	  and	  logistics,	  uncoordinated	  
attacks	  on	  the	  same	  targets—sometimes	  simultaneously—and	  disruption	  of	  the	  logistical	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  Vernon	  E.	  Davis,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  Vol.	  I	  -­‐	  Origin	  of	  the	  Joint	  and	  Combined	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (Washington,	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  Historical	  Division,	  Joint	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  261.,	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  also	  Joint	  
Action	  of	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy,	  ed.	  The	  Joint	  Board	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1935).,	  5.	  
16	  .	  U.S	  Congress.	  Report	  of	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  the	  Investigation	  of	  the	  Pearl	  Harbor	  Attack	  (Washington,	  D.C,	  
[1946]):	  240.	  
17	  Davis,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  152.;	  See	  also	  ARCADIA	  Meetings,	  ABC	  337	  
(Washington,	  D.C.,,	  December	  24,	  1941),	  Sec	  4,	  TAB	  JCCS	  2,	  p2.	  Sec	  4,	  TAB	  JCCS	  2,	  p2.	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organization	  of	  the	  Pacific	  Ocean	  areas.18	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  military	  establishment	  
clearly	  recognized	  that	  the	  arrangement	  of	  mutual	  cooperation	  was	  undesirable	  for	  employing	  
forces	  in	  future	  conflicts,	  even	  with	  standing	  joint	  boards	  to	  facilitate.	  	  Shortly	  after	  the	  war	  
ended,	  General	  Marshall	  again	  articulated	  his	  disdain	  for	  cooperative	  command	  relationships:	  
"a	  system	  of	  coordinating	  committees	  ...	  cannot	  be	  considered	  a	  satisfactory	  solution.	  	  It	  
necessarily	  results	  in	  delays	  and	  compromises	  and	  is	  a	  cumbersome	  and	  inefficient	  method	  of	  
directing	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces."19	  	  
The	  National	  Security	  Act	  of	  1947	  addressed	  concerns	  regarding	  inter-­‐service	  
cooperation	  by	  establishing,	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  secretary	  of	  defense,	  but	  the	  legislation	  fell	  
short	  in	  engendering	  a	  spirit	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  still	  all-­‐too-­‐powerful	  military	  services.	  	  
Though	  there	  were	  other	  attempts	  at	  reform,	  the	  defense	  establishment	  languished	  for	  much	  
of	  the	  next	  four	  decades,	  leaving	  a	  string	  of	  embarrassing	  military	  failures.	  	  These	  include	  the	  
loss	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  the	  embarrassing	  performance	  of	  military	  forces	  employed	  in	  the	  
Mayaguez	  rescue	  in	  1975,	  the	  failed	  1980	  rescue	  attempt	  of	  American	  hostages	  in	  Iran,	  and	  the	  
less-­‐than-­‐resounding	  victory	  by	  the	  U.S.	  military	  over	  Cuban	  forces	  in	  Grenada	  in	  1983.	  	  
Unequivocally,	  these	  outcomes	  were	  attributable	  in	  part	  to	  the	  undue	  influence	  of	  the	  
individual	  services	  in	  operational	  matters	  and,	  more	  innately,	  the	  conflict	  and	  competition	  
between	  the	  services	  driven	  by	  their	  unique	  cultures.	  	  The	  specific	  cultures	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  
different	  services	  inhibited	  any	  inter-­‐service	  cooperation	  within	  a	  spirit	  of	  jointness,	  leading	  
instead	  to	  convoluted	  decision-­‐making,	  entangled	  chains	  of	  command	  for	  military	  forces,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Ferdinand	  Eberstadt,	  Unification	  of	  the	  War	  and	  Navy	  Departments	  and	  Postwar	  Organization	  for	  National	  
Security.	  Report	  to	  Honorable	  James	  Forrestal,	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Navy.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  
Office,	  [1945]):	  79.	  
19	  Appendix	  to	  JCS	  560,	  pages	  2-­‐3	  as	  referenced	  in	  Legere,	  Unification	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces,	  250.	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confusing	  lines	  of	  authority.20	  	  The	  tragic	  bombing	  of	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  barracks	  in	  Beirut	  in	  
1983,	  which	  claimed	  238	  Marines,	  was	  partially	  the	  result	  of	  antagonistic	  service	  and	  
operational	  chains	  of	  command.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  failure	  to	  properly	  train	  and	  resource	  the	  
Marine	  units	  headed	  to	  Lebanon	  highlighted	  the	  dysfunctional	  service	  barriers	  erected	  by	  the	  
Department	  of	  the	  Navy	  against	  the	  operational	  authority	  of	  the	  combatant	  commander	  
responsible	  for	  the	  operation.21	  	  More	  than	  anything,	  the	  aggravating	  circumstance	  of	  the	  
Beirut	  bombing	  was	  parochialism	  by	  the	  services	  and	  their	  cultural	  resistance	  to	  joint	  authority.	  	  
The	  Holloway	  commission,	  which	  investigated	  the	  failed	  Iranian	  hostage	  rescue	  mission,	  keenly	  
cited	  the	  lack	  of	  cross-­‐service	  exposure	  by	  the	  officers	  involved	  in	  the	  operation	  as	  a	  
compounding	  variable	  to	  its	  failure,	  and	  it	  was	  their	  belief	  that	  such	  exposure	  would	  have	  
fostered	  greater	  understanding	  and	  cooperation	  among	  the	  participating	  forces.22	  	  	  
The	  accumulation	  of	  military	  failures	  such	  as	  these	  precipitated	  the	  landmark	  reforms	  to	  
the	  DoD	  in	  the	  1980s.23	  	  These	  reforms,	  known	  collectively	  as	  the	  GNA,	  sought	  to	  improve	  
military	  effectiveness	  by	  strengthening	  jointness	  within	  the	  department.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  act,	  the	  
military	  establishment	  largely	  operated	  under	  the	  arrangement	  where	  each	  service	  educated	  
their	  officers	  in	  exclusively	  service-­‐specific	  matters,	  assigned	  their	  most	  talented	  officers	  to	  key	  
service	  positions,	  and	  promoted	  them	  to	  leadership	  positions	  within	  their	  own	  service.	  	  Due	  to	  
the	  formidable	  and	  influential	  cultures	  of	  the	  services,	  which	  were	  especially	  so	  by	  1986,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  James	  R.	  Locher	  III	  and	  Sam	  A.	  Nunn,	  Victory	  on	  the	  Potomac:	  The	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  Unifies	  the	  Pentagon	  
(College	  Station:	  Texas	  A	  &	  M	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  4.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  160-­‐1	  	  
22	  .	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Iran	  Hostage	  Rescue	  Mission	  Report	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Special	  
Operations	  Review	  Group,	  [1980]).:	  25-­‐6.	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Harry	  Thie	  and	  et	  al,	  Framing	  a	  Strategic	  Approach	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  (Santa	  Monica,	  CA:	  RAND	  
Corporation,	  [2005]):	  111.	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defense	  department	  found	  itself	  paralyzed	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  effect	  reform	  from	  within.24	  	  So	  
pronounced	  were	  the	  distinct	  cultures	  and	  rivalries	  that	  each	  service	  expended	  great	  effort	  and	  
formidable	  resources	  to	  sustain	  and	  protect	  their	  respective	  missions	  and	  capabilities.25	  	  
Reform	  had	  to	  come	  from	  the	  outside,	  and	  Congress	  recognized	  that	  cultural	  change	  was	  
necessary	  to	  move	  away	  from	  service	  parochialism	  toward	  inter-­‐service	  cooperation	  and	  
coordination.	  	  Under	  the	  GNA	  and	  subsequent	  legislation,	  joint	  education	  became	  a	  key	  
mechanism	  to	  instill	  and	  strengthen	  a	  culture	  of	  jointness	  and	  to	  foster	  inter-­‐service	  
coordination	  in	  joint	  operations	  and	  activities.	  	  Through	  joint	  education	  many	  believed	  that	  
service-­‐specific	  values	  and	  beliefs	  would	  give	  way	  to	  joint	  values	  and	  beliefs.	  
	  
Jointness	  Requires	  a	  Joint	  Attitude	  and	  Perspective	  
The	  GNA	  recognized	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  service-­‐competent	  officers,	  the	  U.S.	  military	  
needs	  high-­‐quality	  officers	  competent	  in	  joint	  matters,	  which	  law	  defines	  as	  those	  subjects	  
related	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  unified	  action.26	  	  This	  is	  because	  each	  service	  develops	  its	  
members	  as	  specialists	  to	  dominate	  in	  the	  particular	  domain	  in	  which	  that	  service	  primarily	  
operates.	  	  Accordingly,	  each	  service	  maintains	  a	  unique	  and	  powerful	  culture	  and	  perpetuates	  
such	  by	  inculcating	  service-­‐specific	  values	  and	  beliefs	  in	  every	  member	  beginning	  with	  entry	  
training.	  	  These	  cultural	  values	  and	  beliefs	  reflect	  the	  broad	  understanding	  of	  not	  only	  the	  core	  
mission	  of	  the	  service	  but	  also	  how	  best	  to	  accomplish	  that	  mission.	  	  Successive	  duty	  
assignments	  and	  periodic	  service	  schooling	  serve	  to	  further	  develop	  and	  reinforce	  these	  values	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Defense	  Department	  to	  implement	  reforms	  see	  General	  David	  C.	  
Jones,	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  testimony,	  February	  3,	  1982.	  	  	  
25	  Ibid.,	  111.	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Definitions,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2015a):	  §	  668.	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and	  beliefs	  throughout	  the	  member’s	  career.	  	  This	  underlying	  service	  cultural	  foundation	  is	  
common	  to	  all	  other	  members	  and	  represents	  a	  commanding	  guide	  for	  members	  to	  act	  in	  the	  
best	  interests	  of	  their	  respective	  service.	  	  	  
Schein	  argues	  that	  promotion	  potential	  within	  a	  particular	  organization	  (service)	  will	  
closely	  track	  with	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  member	  of	  that	  organization	  (officer)	  embodies	  the	  
attitude	  and	  perspective	  corresponding	  to	  the	  specific	  beliefs	  and	  values	  of	  that	  culture.27	  	  Such	  
attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  can	  evoke	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  dominance	  of	  one’s	  own	  service	  over	  
others	  and	  predispose	  members	  to	  military	  solutions	  principally	  involving	  the	  forces	  and	  
doctrine	  of	  their	  respective	  service.28	  	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  service-­‐specific	  
attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  encompass	  certain	  prejudices	  toward	  members	  of	  different	  services,	  
seen	  as	  members	  of	  “out-­‐groups,”	  and	  these	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  are	  detrimental	  to	  
jointness	  because	  of	  the	  imperative	  for	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  in	  the	  context	  of	  joint	  
operations.	  	  However,	  the	  more	  familiarity	  and	  understanding	  officers	  have	  of	  the	  culture,	  
capabilities,	  and	  forces	  of	  other	  services	  the	  less	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  default	  to	  military	  solutions	  
favoring	  their	  own	  service.29	  	  Schoomaker	  validates	  this	  by	  asserting	  that	  to	  achieve	  
interdependence	  between	  the	  members	  of	  a	  joint	  force	  they	  must	  possess	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  each	  service,	  agree	  on	  how	  they	  will	  integrate	  those	  
capabilities,	  and	  trust	  that	  the	  capabilities	  and	  forces	  will	  be	  employed	  as	  agreed.30	  	  This	  is	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Edgar	  H.	  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition	  (San	  Francisco:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2004),	  
244.	  
28	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  [1989b]).:	  58.	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid.,	  56;	  The	  same	  conclusion	  may	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Holloway	  Commission	  in	  its	  report	  on	  the	  
Iran	  hostage	  rescue	  attempt.	  
30	  Peter	  J.	  Schoomaker	  and	  R.	  L.	  Brownlee,	  "Serving	  a	  Nation	  at	  War:	  A	  Campaign	  Quality	  Army	  with	  Joint	  and	  
Expeditionary	  Capabilities,"	  Parameters	  (Summer	  2004):	  11.	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say	  that	  a	  joint-­‐minded	  officer	  must	  possess	  an	  individual	  appreciation	  for	  the	  competencies	  
and	  capabilities	  of	  members	  of	  another	  service	  as	  well	  as	  the	  value	  of	  working	  collaboratively	  
toward	  a	  common	  end.	  	  Therefore,	  creating	  true	  jointness	  within	  an	  operational	  setting	  
requires	  much	  more	  than	  just	  unity	  of	  command	  over	  a	  collection	  of	  forces	  from	  different	  
services,	  it	  requires	  trust	  and	  understanding.31	  	  Trust	  and	  understanding	  are	  prerequisites	  for	  
jointness	  and	  stem	  from	  having	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  cultures,	  competencies	  and	  capabilities	  
of	  the	  other	  military	  services.	  	  Officers	  possessing	  such	  trust	  and	  understanding	  are	  said	  to	  have	  
a	  “joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective,”	  and	  establishing	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  is	  a	  
substantial	  goal	  and	  valuable	  byproduct	  of	  true	  JPME.	  	  One	  may	  formally	  establish	  unity	  of	  
command	  clearly	  and	  quickly,	  but	  cultivating	  lasting	  attitudinal	  change	  takes	  much	  more	  effort	  
and	  time.	  	  It	  could	  take	  weeks	  or	  months	  to	  overcome	  the	  powerful	  cultural	  bias	  the	  respective	  
services	  spent	  years	  instilling	  in	  their	  members.	  	  	  
The	  proponents	  of	  the	  GNA	  recognized	  the	  absolute	  need	  to	  overcome	  this	  
circumstance	  and	  established	  requirements	  in	  law	  for,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  education	  of	  
officers	  selected	  for	  joint	  duty.	  	  The	  very	  intent	  of	  the	  provisions	  relating	  to	  JPME	  was	  to	  effect	  
a	  rebalance	  from	  principally	  service-­‐centric	  attitudes	  toward	  those	  valuing	  joint	  service.	  	  JPME	  
is	  the	  institutional	  mechanism	  for	  ensuring	  that	  officers	  understand	  and	  implement	  joint	  ideas,	  
and	  it	  represents	  a	  baseline	  for	  the	  appreciation	  of	  service	  competencies	  and	  the	  value	  of	  
jointness.	  	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  develop	  the	  joint	  operational	  expertise	  and	  perspectives	  of	  officers	  
so	  as	  to	  adequately	  prepare	  them	  to	  perform	  effectively	  in	  a	  joint	  assignment.32	  	  Joint	  
education	  in	  the	  right	  context	  and	  structure	  is	  an	  effective	  approach	  toward	  instilling	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Wilkerson,	  What	  Exactly	  is	  Jointness?:	  66.	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  Program	  of	  Instruction,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2015c):	  § 2155.	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advancing	  a	  culture	  of	  jointness,	  and	  it	  comes	  primarily	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  service	  
parochialism.33	  	  JPME	  accomplishes	  this	  in	  part	  by	  focusing	  on	  Joint	  Matters,	  which	  is	  defined	  in	  
law	  as	  “matters	  related	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  unified	  action	  by	  multiple	  military	  forces	  in	  
operations	  conducted	  across	  domains	  such	  as	  land,	  sea,	  or	  air,	  in	  space,	  or	  in	  the	  information	  
environment.”34	  	  Joint	  education	  reforms	  have	  considerably	  improved	  the	  performance	  of	  
those	  selected	  to	  serve	  in	  joint	  duty	  assignments,	  but	  of	  all	  the	  provisions	  within	  GNA	  they	  have	  
been	  among	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  implement.35	  	  	  
The	  GNA	  did	  not	  mark	  the	  inception	  of	  JPME,	  however.	  	  Joint	  education	  focusing	  on	  the	  
study	  of	  joint	  operations	  largely	  came	  about	  during	  and	  after	  WWII—first	  through	  the	  Army-­‐
Navy	  Staff	  College	  established	  in	  1943	  and	  then	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  Staff	  College	  (AFSC)	  
established	  in	  1946.	  	  Subsequently,	  these	  became	  the	  National	  War	  College	  and	  the	  JFSC	  
respectively.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  WWII,	  career	  military	  officers	  viewed	  attendance	  at	  these	  
schools	  as	  preferential.	  	  This	  attitude	  shifted	  over	  the	  succeeding	  decades,	  however,	  and	  
officers	  generally	  began	  to	  avoid	  attending	  these	  joint	  schools,	  favoring	  instead	  the	  service-­‐
specific	  schooling	  and	  assignments	  regarded	  as	  more	  valuable	  for	  promotion.	  	  Reflecting	  this	  
reality,	  only	  a	  very	  modest	  fraction	  of	  the	  officers	  serving	  on	  the	  Joint	  Staff	  had	  attended	  either	  
school	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  prior	  to	  GNA	  reforms.36	  	  As	  part	  of	  the	  sweeping	  reforms	  of	  the	  
legislation,	  Congress	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  joint	  education	  for	  officers—to	  incentivize	  
attendance	  to	  joint	  schools	  by	  requiring	  officers	  to	  complete	  JPME	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  joint	  duty	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Wilkerson,	  What	  Exactly	  is	  Jointness?:	  67.;	  Vitale,	  Jointness	  by	  Design,	  Not	  Accident:	  27-­‐8.	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Management	  Policies	  for	  Joint	  Qualified	  Officers,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2008):	  §661.	  
35	  James	  R.	  Locher,	  "Taking	  Stock	  of	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols,"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly,	  no.	  13	  (Autumn	  1996):	  15.;	  See	  also	  
2010	  HASC	  Report	  titled	  “Another	  Crossroads?	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐
Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel”	  
36	  Gordon	  Nathaniel	  Lederman,	  Reorganizing	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff:	  The	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  of	  1986	  
(Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1999),	  215.:	  43.	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assignments.	  	  Additionally,	  joint	  schooling	  and	  creditable	  joint	  experience	  together	  conferred	  a	  
“Joint	  Specialty”	  designation	  and	  the	  act	  required	  the	  services	  to	  promote	  these	  joint	  specialty	  
officers	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  those	  possessing	  only	  service-­‐specific	  experience.37	  	  	  
GNA	  legislation	  also	  added	  considerable	  rigor	  to	  the	  joint	  education	  requirements	  for	  
military	  officers.	  	  At	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  1989	  Skelton	  Panel,	  the	  FY1990-­‐91	  National	  
Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  prescribed	  the	  development	  of	  officers	  in	  joint	  matters	  through	  a	  
two-­‐phased	  JPME	  program.38	  	  The	  first	  phase,	  JPME	  I,	  is	  integrated	  into	  the	  curricula	  of	  the	  
services’	  intermediate	  professional	  military	  education	  schools,	  and	  graduates	  of	  these	  schools	  
are	  expected	  to	  know	  basic	  information	  about	  joint	  organizations	  and	  command	  relationships,	  
among	  other	  subjects.	  	  The	  second	  phase,	  JPME	  II,	  is	  presently	  offered	  through	  the	  JFSC	  or	  
through	  selection	  and	  resident	  attendance	  at	  a	  senior-­‐level	  college.39	  	  Two	  details	  in	  that	  
legislation	  provide	  critical	  distinction	  to	  JPME	  II	  offered	  through	  JFSC,	  however.	  	  First,	  the	  law	  at	  
that	  time	  articulated	  the	  curriculum	  should	  be	  “solely	  joint”	  and	  emphasized	  “multiple	  hands-­‐
on	  exercises”	  to	  prepare	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  to	  perform	  effectively	  in	  a	  “totally	  new	  
environment,”	  which	  would	  be	  a	  joint,	  multiservice	  organization.	  	  Second,	  it	  prescribed	  that	  the	  
duration	  of	  JPME	  II	  “will	  not	  be	  less	  than	  3	  months.”40	  	  These	  provisions	  established	  JPME	  II	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Promotion	  Policy	  Objectives	  for	  Joint	  Officers,	  U.S.	  Code	  10,	  (2014):	  §	  662.	  
38	  Congress	  later	  added	  a	  third	  phase,	  JPME	  Phase	  III,	  specifically	  for	  officers	  selected	  for	  promotion	  to	  either	  
Brigadier	  General	  or	  Rear	  Admiral	  (Lower	  Half).	  
39	  Senior-­‐Level	  Colleges	  include	  the	  respective	  senior-­‐level	  service	  colleges	  and	  also	  the	  National	  War	  College	  and	  
Eisenhower	  School	  for	  National	  Security	  and	  Resource	  Strategy	  within	  the	  National	  Defense	  University.	  See	  CJCSI	  
1800.01E	  dated	  29	  May	  2015.	  
40	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Years	  1990	  and	  1991,	  Public	  Law	  101-­‐89,	  (1989a):	  §	  1123.	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offered	  by	  JFSC	  as	  the	  “principal	  course	  of	  instruction”	  for	  instilling	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  
perspective	  among	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  and	  they	  were	  not	  arbitrary.41	  	  	  
	  
Joint	  Acculturation	  as	  an	  Outcome	  of	  JPME	  II	  
It	  is	  critical	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  Skelton	  Panel	  ranked	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  
attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  as	  most	  important	  among	  the	  four	  components	  of	  JPME	  II	  
education.	  	  This	  distinction	  makes	  JPME	  II	  unique	  and	  drives	  how	  it	  is	  structured	  and	  
delivered—direct	  student	  interaction	  is	  indispensable.42	  	  The	  development	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  
and	  perspectives	  means	  that	  joint	  education	  must	  effect	  a	  positive	  attitudinal	  change	  toward	  
jointness	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  service	  cultures.	  	  Reflecting	  on	  
Wilkerson’s	  observation,	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  jointness	  and	  
depends	  on	  the	  cultivation	  of	  deep	  trust	  and	  understanding	  between	  officers	  from	  different	  
services	  and	  service	  cultures.	  	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  General	  Martin	  Dempsey	  
echoed	  this	  by	  citing	  trust,	  empowerment,	  and	  understanding	  as	  one	  of	  four	  attributes	  that	  
joint	  education	  must	  develop	  in	  leaders.43	  	  It	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  such	  trust	  and	  
understanding	  are	  possible	  only	  when	  officers	  can	  overcome	  the	  biases	  and	  overgeneralizations	  
they	  hold	  concerning	  members	  of	  other	  service	  components.	  	  Such	  biases	  and	  
overgeneralizations	  are	  manifestations	  of	  the	  powerful	  yet	  fiercely	  distinct	  and	  independent	  
cultures	  of	  the	  services,	  and	  they	  drive	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  harmful	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  “Principal	  course	  of	  instruction”	  means	  any	  course	  of	  instruction	  offered	  at	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College	  as	  joint	  
professional	  military	  education	  as	  established	  by	  the	  FY	  1992/1993	  NDAA.	  	  	  
42	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services:	  105.	  	  	  	  	  




counterproductive	  in	  the	  joint	  context.	  	  Deep	  and	  lasting	  trust	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  
services	  is	  only	  possible	  after	  overcoming	  such	  deep-­‐seated	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices.	  	  Having	  a	  
joint	  mindset	  is	  a	  key	  joint	  staff	  officer	  competency,	  and	  this	  means	  demonstrating	  an	  open	  
willingness	  to	  set	  aside	  service	  loyalties	  and	  paradigms	  to	  better	  understand	  and	  integrate	  the	  
expertise	  of	  other	  services	  in	  developing	  joint	  solutions.44	  	  	  
Each	  service	  wields	  a	  highly	  developed	  institutional	  arm	  to	  educate,	  but	  also	  culturally	  
indoctrinate,	  the	  officers	  they	  recruit	  and	  subsequently	  promote.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  
that	  the	  institutional	  arm	  of	  each	  service	  endeavors	  not	  simply	  to	  educate	  good	  officers	  but	  
“good	  Army,	  Navy,	  Marine	  Corps,	  and	  Air	  Force	  officers.”45	  	  While	  powerful	  in	  its	  own	  respect—	  
such	  indoctrination	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  tremendous	  military	  capability	  possessed	  by	  each	  
service.	  	  However,	  an	  effective	  and	  meaningful	  joint	  education	  experience	  is	  necessary	  if	  
officers	  are	  to	  rise	  above	  service-­‐oriented	  beliefs	  to	  embrace	  a	  more	  broadly	  unifying	  ethos.	  	  It	  
is	  important	  to	  establish	  at	  this	  stage,	  however,	  that	  positive	  attitudinal	  change	  toward	  
jointness	  by	  military	  officers	  belonging	  to	  vastly	  different	  service	  cultures	  hinges	  on	  a	  process	  
termed	  by	  this	  research	  as	  “joint	  acculturation.”	  	  From	  an	  etymological	  standpoint,	  we	  can	  
formally	  define	  the	  term	  “acculturation”	  as	  the	  “cultural	  modification	  of	  an	  individual,	  group,	  or	  
people	  by	  adapting	  to	  or	  borrowing	  traits	  from	  another	  culture.”	  	  It	  is	  also	  understood	  as	  “a	  
merging	  of	  cultures	  as	  a	  result	  of	  prolonged	  contact.”46	  	  Moving	  beyond	  the	  simple	  dictionary	  
definitions,	  Sam	  and	  Berry	  state	  that	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  explanation	  is	  attributed	  to	  Redfield,	  
Linton,	  and	  Herscovits,	  who	  described	  acculturation	  as	  "those	  phenomena	  which	  result	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  "The	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project"	  Final	  Report:	  84.	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  William	  A.	  Owens,	  "Making	  the	  Joint	  Journey,"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly	  21	  (Spring	  1999):	  95.	  	  
46	  	  Merriam	  Webster,	  http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/dictionary/acculturation,	  May	  27,	  2016	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groups	  of	  individuals	  having	  different	  cultures	  come	  into	  continuous	  first-­‐hand	  contact,	  with	  
subsequent	  changes	  in	  the	  original	  culture	  patterns	  of	  either	  or	  both	  groups.”47	  	  Applied	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  adopting	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective,	  acculturation	  signifies	  the	  tradeoff	  by	  a	  
service	  member	  of	  some	  measure	  of	  their	  respective	  service	  culture	  for	  a	  measure	  of	  another.	  	  
Acculturation,	  however,	  will	  only	  occur	  when	  an	  individual	  achieves	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  
a	  different	  culture	  and	  begins	  to	  develop	  appreciation	  and	  trust	  toward	  its	  members.	  	  Indeed,	  
the	  act	  of	  voluntarily	  accepting	  certain	  values	  and	  beliefs	  associated	  with	  a	  different	  culture	  is	  a	  
manifestation	  of	  this	  trust.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unsatisfactory	  to	  proceed	  from	  this	  point	  operating	  only	  
on	  a	  general	  definition	  of	  acculturation,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  relate	  the	  base	  definition	  and	  
the	  process	  of	  acculturation	  to	  the	  joint	  context.	  	  Some	  caveats	  are	  necessary	  before	  
proceeding.	  	  While	  contemporary	  military	  operations	  routinely	  involve	  members	  of	  other	  U.S.	  
government	  agencies	  as	  well	  as	  members	  of	  foreign	  militaries,	  this	  research	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  
consideration	  to	  a	  joint	  military	  context	  rather	  than	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  interagency	  or	  
combined	  operations.	  	  Though	  it	  remains	  likely	  that	  acculturation	  involving	  the	  respective	  
cultures	  of	  civilian	  agencies	  and	  foreign	  militaries	  is	  analogous	  to	  acculturation	  in	  the	  joint	  
military	  context.	  	  It	  is	  also	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  separate	  “joint”	  
culture	  exists	  beyond	  those	  attributed	  to	  the	  individual	  services.	  	  While	  this	  would	  make	  an	  
interesting	  (though	  tangential)	  argument,	  there	  are	  many	  critically	  important	  aspects	  of	  
organizational	  culture	  present	  in	  service	  cultures	  but	  absent	  in	  a	  joint	  context.48	  	  The	  definition	  
of	  acculturation	  must	  necessarily	  consider	  the	  uniquely	  military	  context	  of	  jointness	  whereby	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  	  D.	  L.	  Sam	  and	  J.	  W.	  Berry,	  "Acculturation:	  When	  Individuals	  and	  Groups	  of	  Different	  Cultural	  Backgrounds	  
Meet,"	  Perspectives	  on	  Psychological	  Science	  5,	  no.	  4	  (2010):	  473.;	  Robert	  Redfield,	  Ralph	  Linton	  and	  Melville	  J.	  
Herskovits,	  "Memorandum	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Acculturation,"	  American	  Anthropologist	  38,	  no.	  1	  (1936):	  149.	  
48	  Among	  these	  are	  the	  ability	  to	  recruit,	  select,	  promote,	  and	  excommunicate	  members	  -­‐	  See	  Schein,	  
Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  261.	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officers	  from	  separate	  services	  must	  share	  a	  common	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  while	  operating	  
interdependently	  toward	  a	  common	  military	  goal.	  	  Congressman	  Ike	  Skelton,	  who	  chaired	  the	  
House	  Committee	  on	  Joint	  Education	  in	  1989,	  described	  this	  as	  “the	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  
rapport	  that	  develop	  when	  students	  from	  all	  services	  study	  in	  mixed	  seminars	  and	  share	  the	  
ideas,	  values,	  and	  traditions	  of	  their	  services,	  when	  they	  solve	  joint	  military	  problems	  together,	  
and	  when	  preconceived	  notions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  and	  solution	  to	  problems	  of	  warfare,	  
learned	  during	  service	  training	  and	  education,	  are	  challenged	  daily.”49	  	  Skelton	  understood	  the	  
value	  of	  acculturation	  in	  enabling	  officers	  to	  reject	  “approaches	  that	  always	  favor	  their	  own	  
service”	  and	  to	  inspire	  “mutual	  trust	  and	  confidence.”50	  	  He	  also	  understood	  intuitively	  that	  the	  
process	  of	  acculturation	  results	  from	  activities	  involving	  members	  of	  different	  service	  cultures	  
within	  a	  “contact”	  encounter.	  	  Such	  an	  encounter	  is	  essential	  to	  fostering	  a	  deeper	  individual	  
understanding	  of	  different	  service	  cultures.	  	  The	  development	  of	  trust	  between	  officers	  of	  
different	  services	  stems	  from	  their	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  others	  and	  necessarily	  
precedes	  the	  trade-­‐off	  of	  closely	  held	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  values.51	  	  	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  condition	  and	  process	  of	  acculturation	  in	  
detail	  and	  from	  a	  social	  science	  perspective.	  	  Therefore,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  
term	  “Joint	  Acculturation"	  is	  used	  and	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  of	  understanding	  the	  separate	  
service	  cultures	  (and	  other	  organizations)	  resulting	  in	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  common	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services:	  64.	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Ibid.,	  55	  
51	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory	  pioneered	  by	  Thomas	  Pettigrew	  and	  inspired	  by	  the	  prejudice	  
reduction	  research	  of	  Gordon	  Allport.	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beliefs,	  and	  trust,	  which	  occurs	  when	  diverse	  groups	  come	  into	  continuous	  direct	  contact.52	  	  The	  
trust	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  underwrites	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  this	  trust	  builds	  
as	  the	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  stemming	  from	  service-­‐specific	  prejudices	  are	  diminished.	  	  This	  
means	  that	  within	  a	  joint	  education	  context	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  enabled	  by	  reducing	  the	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudices	  harmful	  to	  fostering	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  and	  to	  the	  trust	  on	  
which	  jointness	  is	  predicated.	  
	  
Acculturation	  is	  What	  JPME	  II	  Must	  Accomplish	  
According	  to	  a	  2005	  RAND	  Corporation	  study	  of	  JPME,	  joint	  acculturation,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
developing	  joint	  officers,	  stands	  separate	  and	  distinct	  from	  the	  other	  components	  of	  joint	  
education,	  experience,	  and	  training.53	  	  It	  is	  highlighted	  in	  countless	  official	  documents	  and	  
studies,	  but	  its	  importance	  is	  not	  always	  acknowledged.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  official	  DoD	  
instruction	  concerning	  its	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  Program	  speaks	  to	  the	  latter	  three	  and	  is	  
silent	  on	  the	  component	  of	  joint	  acculturation.54	  	  One	  can	  infer	  much	  from	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  
question	  Congressman	  Skelton	  posed	  during	  the	  1991	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  
hearing	  on	  military	  education:	  “Don't	  nonresident	  students	  [JPME	  I]	  lose	  something	  by	  not	  
rubbing	  elbows	  with	  other	  service	  officers?”	  	  The	  response	  provided	  by	  the	  deputy	  
commandant	  of	  the	  Army	  Command	  and	  General	  Staff	  College	  was,	  “Joint	  exposure	  takes	  place	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  This	  definition	  is	  predicated	  on	  that	  by	  Linton,	  Redfield	  and	  Herscovits	  and	  is	  also	  congruent	  with	  the	  definition	  
used	  by	  the	  JFSC.	  	  
53	  Thie	  et	  al,	  Framing	  a	  Strategic	  Approach	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Management,	  96.	  
54	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  DoDI	  1300.19	  -­‐	  DOD	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  (JOM)	  Program	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  March	  4,	  2014).	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during	  the	  follow-­‐on	  Phase	  II	  course.”55	  	  Here,	  Skelton	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  joint	  
acculturation	  achieved	  through	  intergroup	  contact	  in	  order	  “to	  arrive	  at	  a	  point	  at	  which	  
jointness	  is	  a	  state	  of	  mind.”56	  	  The	  answer	  he	  received	  to	  his	  question	  highlights	  the	  
understanding	  that,	  of	  the	  two	  required	  phases,	  JPME	  II	  is	  the	  primary	  means	  for	  effecting	  joint	  
acculturation	  in	  officers	  of	  different	  services.	  	  Subsequent	  studies	  and	  reports	  have	  reiterated	  
the	  importance	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  achieved	  during	  JPME	  II	  as	  a	  critical	  dimension	  of	  joint	  
education.57	  	  As	  such,	  Congress	  sought	  to	  create	  an	  optimum	  environment	  to	  foster	  joint	  
acculturation	  and	  it	  was	  the	  intent	  of	  legislation	  to	  make	  the	  JPME	  II	  experience	  in-­‐residence,	  
multi-­‐service,	  and	  in	  a	  culturally-­‐neutral	  environment	  where	  no	  one	  service	  culture	  is	  
predominant.58	  	  Having	  military	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  living	  and	  working	  together	  as	  a	  
joint	  team	  during	  JPME	  II	  is	  the	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  program,	  serving	  as	  the	  intergroup	  contact	  
encounter	  to	  achieve	  a	  degree	  of	  acculturation	  impossible	  with	  seminars	  composed	  primarily	  of	  
officers	  from	  the	  same	  service	  or	  in	  an	  exclusively	  online	  environment.	  	  The	  prescribed	  duration	  
for	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC	  also	  aims	  to	  achieve	  deeper	  acculturation	  than	  what	  a	  shorter	  
program	  would	  provide.	  	  The	  statutory	  requirements	  for	  resident	  attendance	  to	  and	  the	  
duration	  of	  JPME	  II	  closely	  correlate	  to	  the	  intent	  for	  the	  program	  to	  effect	  joint	  acculturation.59	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  [April	  17,	  
1991]):	  3.	  
56	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services:	  57.;	  See	  also	  Independent	  Study	  of	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  and	  
Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  (McLean,	  VA:	  Booz	  Allen	  Hamilton,	  [2003]).	  
57	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  include	  the	  1998	  DoD	  Inspector	  General	  review	  of	  JPME,	  the	  2003	  independent	  study	  
conducted	  by	  Booz	  Allen	  Hamilton,	  and	  the	  2010	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  “Another	  Crossroads?”	  report.	  	  	  
58	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  
Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  
[2010b]):	  10.	  	  	  
59	  In-­‐resident	  is	  understood	  to	  mean	  attendance	  at	  a	  senior-­‐level	  college	  or	  the	  JFSC.	  	  	  
35	  
	  
JPME	  II	  credit	  is	  available	  to	  officers	  attending	  the	  10-­‐week	  JCWS	  at	  the	  JFSC,	  though	  
officers	  may	  also	  receive	  credit	  for	  JPME	  II	  through	  selection	  and	  attendance	  of	  the	  year-­‐long	  
programs	  offered	  by	  a	  senior-­‐level	  college.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  make	  
between	  the	  JPME	  II	  offered	  through	  JFSC	  and	  that	  offered	  by	  the	  other	  institutions.	  	  The	  JFSC	  
stands	  apart	  because	  no	  other	  institution	  accredited	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  II	  is	  specifically	  charged	  by	  
the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  to	  develop	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  in	  the	  
students	  they	  graduate.60	  	  The	  chairman	  has	  statutory	  responsibility	  for	  managing	  joint	  
education,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  chairman’s	  Officer	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Policy	  (OPMEP)	  that	  
prescribes	  the	  mission,	  goals,	  and	  learning	  areas	  for	  all	  military	  institutions	  delivering	  JPME.	  	  	  
Among	  these	  institutions,	  only	  the	  JFSC	  is	  directed	  specifically	  to	  cultivate	  the	  joint	  attitudes	  
and	  perspectives	  essential	  to	  successful	  military	  operations.	  	  The	  OPMEP	  articulates	  that	  the	  
mission	  of	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  programs	  is	  “to	  instill	  a	  primary	  commitment	  to	  joint,	  interagency,	  
intergovernmental,	  and	  multinational	  teamwork,	  attitudes,	  and	  perspectives.”	  	  The	  policy	  goes	  
on	  to	  say	  that	  “the	  faculty	  and	  student	  interaction	  in	  the	  fully	  joint	  environment	  of	  the	  JFSC	  
campus	  cements	  professional	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  essential	  to	  future	  successful	  
military	  operations.”61	  	  	  
Such	  explicit	  language	  and	  direction	  regarding	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  
perspectives	  is	  absent	  in	  the	  missions	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  other	  JPME	  II	  institutions.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
suggest	  that	  the	  component	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  totally	  absent	  in	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  of	  
the	  senior-­‐level	  colleges.	  	  Indeed,	  some	  measure	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  likely	  occurs	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Instruction	  1800.01E	  Officer	  Professional	  Military	  
Education	  Policy	  (OPMEP)	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  2015b).:	  E-­‐H-­‐1.	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ibid.,	  E-­‐H-­‐2.	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officers	  of	  different	  services	  experience	  sustained	  and	  continuous	  contact	  with	  each	  other,	  but	  
it	  is	  not	  sought	  as	  a	  key	  outcome	  as	  in	  the	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  programs.62	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  only	  governing	  
factors	  permitting	  these	  senior-­‐level	  colleges	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  II	  are	  that	  they	  maintain	  a	  specific	  
service	  mix	  among	  their	  student	  body	  and	  also	  among	  the	  faculty.	  	  Though	  the	  proportion	  of	  
faculty	  and	  students	  of	  the	  service	  administering	  the	  school	  may	  not	  exceed	  60	  percent	  of	  total	  
composition	  by	  law,	  the	  host	  service	  culture	  still	  reigns	  predominant.63	  	  Neither	  is	  the	  
curriculum	  joint	  in	  its	  entirety,	  as	  it	  is	  with	  JCWS,	  leaning	  instead	  toward	  service-­‐specific	  
subjects.	  	  It	  also	  follows	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  culturally	  neutral	  environment	  to	  foster	  optimal	  
joint	  acculturation	  is	  unlikely	  in	  these	  institutions.64	  	  These	  are	  not	  insignificant	  considerations	  
when	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  is	  a	  necessary	  antecedent	  to	  optimal	  joint	  
acculturation.	  	  As	  it	  is,	  the	  JFSC	  stands	  alone	  in	  its	  articulated	  OPMEP	  mission	  to	  instill	  the	  joint	  
attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  achieving	  this	  through	  its	  inherently	  joint,	  compositionally	  balanced	  
JPME	  II	  programs	  that	  rely	  on	  joint	  acculturation	  as	  an	  integral	  mechanism.	  
	  
New	  Directions	  in	  Joint	  Education	  	  
The	  GNA	  reforms	  to	  joint	  education	  were	  aimed	  at	  advancing	  a	  culture	  of	  jointness,	  and	  
Congressman	  Skelton	  believed	  long,	  in-­‐residence	  schools	  were	  the	  best	  means	  of	  effecting	  joint	  
acculturation.	  	  Since	  1991,	  JFSC’s	  resident	  JPME	  II	  program,	  JCWS,	  has	  stood	  as	  the	  principle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  "A	  Meta-­‐Analytic	  Test	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,"	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  90,	  no.	  5	  (2006):	  766.	  	  
63	  	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  Program	  of	  Instruction,	  § 2155	  
64	  All	  JPME	  programs	  are	  accredited	  by	  the	  chairman’s	  Process	  for	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education	  (PAJE)	  and	  must	  
meet	  common	  educational	  standards,	  which	  include	  “Develop	  Joint	  Awareness,	  Perspective,	  and	  Attitude.”	  	  While	  
PAJE	  teams	  examine	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives	  within	  JPME	  programs,	  the	  definition	  of	  
such	  within	  the	  OPMEP	  remains	  vague	  relative	  to	  the	  title	  of	  the	  standard.	  	  Correspondingly,	  the	  term	  
“acculturation”	  appears	  only	  once	  in	  the	  OPMEP	  and	  is	  undefined;	  Fred	  Kienle,	  Faculty,	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College.	  
Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  June	  27,	  2016.	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means	  for	  achieving	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  from	  the	  different	  services.	  	  However,	  
there	  have	  been	  many	  challenges	  by	  the	  defense	  establishment	  to	  this	  approach	  in	  the	  quarter	  
century	  since.	  	  Along	  the	  way,	  the	  DoD	  has	  repeatedly	  sought	  legislative	  relief	  from	  the	  GNA	  
provisions	  addressing	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  officers	  and	  still	  struggles	  in	  implementing	  
aspects	  of	  its	  joint	  officer	  development	  programs	  and	  policies.	  	  A	  2002	  Government	  
Accountability	  Office	  report	  noted	  that	  more	  than	  15	  years	  after	  the	  GNA	  the	  department	  had	  
yet	  to	  take	  a	  strategic	  approach	  to	  develop	  joint	  officers,	  and	  this	  reflected	  a	  significant	  
obstacle	  to	  fully	  realizing	  the	  cultural	  change	  intended	  by	  the	  act.	  	  	  
Likewise,	  the	  officer	  management	  policies	  and	  systems	  of	  the	  services	  have	  also	  
remained	  generally	  resistant	  to	  developing	  joint	  officers	  and	  would	  likely	  revert	  to	  something	  
much	  more	  favorable	  to	  the	  service	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  statutory	  requirements	  for	  joint	  officer	  
management.65	  	  These	  circumstances	  illustrate	  the	  conflict	  that	  sometime	  arises	  between	  the	  
implicit	  views	  of	  the	  joint	  and	  service	  communities	  and	  the	  explicit	  objectives	  of	  reforms.	  	  
Consequently,	  a	  cultural	  resistance	  to	  jointness	  remains.66	  	  To	  address	  this,	  a	  2005	  RAND	  
Corporation	  study	  recommended	  changing	  the	  current	  approach	  to	  joint	  officer	  development	  
to	  a	  more	  dynamic	  one	  that	  broadens	  the	  definitions	  of	  joint	  matters	  and	  joint	  qualifications	  to	  
allow	  more	  paths	  for	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  officers.	  	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  a	  severe	  
increase	  in	  overseas	  military	  commitments	  combined	  with	  a	  budgetary	  downturn	  to	  create	  
additional	  pressures	  on	  joint	  education	  and	  JPME	  II	  in	  particular.	  	  Fiscal	  austerity	  and	  the	  
imperative	  to	  expand	  jointness	  are	  leading	  toward	  more	  creative	  approaches	  to	  JPME	  II	  that	  
may	  be	  less	  effective	  at	  achieving	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  Drivers	  of	  change	  such	  as	  the	  desire	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Thie	  and	  et	  al,	  Framing	  a	  Strategic	  Approach	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Management,	  xxiii.	  
66	  Ibid.,	  8.	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increase	  student	  throughput,	  to	  reduce	  costs,	  and,	  more	  recently,	  to	  expand	  the	  accessibility	  of	  
joint	  education,	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  successive	  proposals	  to	  alter	  the	  legislated	  parameters	  of	  the	  
JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC,	  specifically	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  course	  and	  its	  mandated	  student	  
residency.	  
The	  first	  of	  these	  drivers	  of	  change	  is	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  increase	  student	  throughput	  
in	  order	  to	  produce	  more	  JPME	  II	  graduates.	  	  Historically,	  this	  driver	  stemmed	  from	  a	  desire	  by	  
senior	  military	  leadership	  to	  address	  perceived	  shortfalls	  in	  joint-­‐qualified	  officers	  available	  for	  
assignment	  to	  joint	  billets.	  	  To	  compensate	  for	  a	  shortage	  of	  189	  joint-­‐qualified	  officers,	  one	  
1998	  study	  recommended	  shortening	  the	  duration	  of	  JPME	  II	  at	  JFSC	  to	  afford	  more	  classes	  
annually	  and,	  consequently,	  more	  graduates.67	  	  Closer	  examination	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  
what	  was	  initially	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  capacity—that	  JFSC	  was	  not	  producing	  a	  sufficient	  
number	  of	  graduates	  to	  meet	  joint	  requirements—had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  officer	  
management	  policies	  of	  the	  different	  services.68	  	  The	  services	  are	  responsible	  for	  assigning	  
officers	  to	  joint	  billets	  and	  for	  ensuring	  that	  these	  officers	  are	  prepared	  for	  those	  assignments.	  	  
This	  means	  officers	  should	  report	  having	  already	  completed	  JPME	  II.	  	  However,	  the	  services	  
have	  not	  been	  diligent	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Rather	  than	  sending	  officers	  bound	  for	  joint	  assignments	  
to	  JPME	  II,	  they	  often	  substitute	  more	  readily	  available	  officers	  (read,	  convenience)	  and	  
repeatedly	  fail	  to	  fill	  their	  allocated	  spaces	  for	  JPME	  II.	  	  This	  continuing	  circumstance	  stemmed	  
from	  service	  officer	  management	  policies	  that	  rank	  service	  assignments	  as	  more	  important	  to	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  officer	  receiving	  higher-­‐level	  command.	  	  As	  such,	  joint	  assignments	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Evaluation	  Report	  on	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  (Report	  no.	  98-­‐
156)	  (Arlington,	  VA:	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Inspector	  General,	  [1998]):	  i.	  
68	  Ibid.,	  6-­‐7,	  46.	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schooling	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  particularly	  valuable.69	  	  When	  the	  services	  do	  place	  a	  greater	  
emphasis	  on	  JPME	  II	  it	  is	  usually	  in	  terms	  of	  qualifying	  officers	  for	  promotion	  and	  not	  as	  a	  
method	  to	  prepare	  officers	  for	  joint	  duty	  assignments.70	  	  Another	  recent	  study	  observed	  that	  
officers	  enroute	  to	  joint	  assignments	  often	  get	  bumped	  by	  more	  senior	  officers	  needing	  JCWS	  
for	  the	  joint	  specialty	  qualification	  necessary	  for	  promotion.71	  	  The	  result	  of	  these	  service	  
officer	  management	  policies	  is	  that	  many	  JCWS	  course	  seats	  are	  often	  filled	  by	  officers	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  their	  joint	  assignment	  or	  by	  officers	  heading	  back	  to	  their	  service	  after	  graduation.72	  	  A	  
2008	  study	  stated	  that,	  in	  practice,	  it	  has	  been	  more	  the	  exception	  instead	  of	  the	  rule	  that	  an	  
officer	  gets	  to	  attend	  JPME	  II	  prior	  to	  their	  joint	  assignment.73	  	  The	  espoused	  solution	  to	  this	  
problem	  is	  termed	  “the	  right	  officer	  at	  the	  right	  time,”	  yet	  the	  disconnect	  between	  receiving	  
JPME	  II	  and	  then	  heading	  off	  to	  a	  joint	  assignment	  persists.74	  	  This	  is	  despite	  concerns	  raised	  in	  
the	  past	  by	  senior	  leaders	  to	  the	  joint	  staff	  that	  the	  learning	  curve	  for	  staff	  officers	  arriving	  at	  a	  
combatant	  command	  is	  “too	  steep	  and	  too	  long”—disproportionately	  so	  from	  that	  of	  typical	  
service	  assignments.75	  
How	  many	  JPME	  II	  graduates	  the	  JFSC	  should	  produce	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  different	  
consideration	  and	  answers	  in	  the	  past	  were	  geared	  primarily	  to	  the	  number	  of	  billets	  included	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Thie	  and	  et	  al,	  Framing	  a	  Strategic	  Approach	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Management,	  32.	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  
Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel:	  xii.;	  See	  also	  Vincent	  C.	  
Bowhers,	  "Manage	  or	  Educate:	  Fulfilling	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education,"	  Joint	  Force	  
Quarterly,	  no.	  67	  (4th	  Quarter	  2012).	  	  
71	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  "the	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project"	  Final	  Report:	  69.	  	  	  
72	  The	  1998	  DoD	  IG,	  2003	  BAH,	  and	  2010	  HASC	  studies	  of	  JPME	  all	  make	  this	  observation,	  
73	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
74	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Working	  Group	  Recommendations	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  [March	  9,	  2016]).	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  
Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  
Panel:	  xiv.	  
75	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  "the	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project"	  Final	  Report:	  25.	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in	  the	  Joint	  Duty	  Assignment	  List	  (JDAL).	  	  This	  list	  identifies	  the	  billets	  in	  in	  which	  officers	  gain	  
significant	  experience	  in	  joint	  matters,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  billets	  are	  coded	  as	  critical	  joint	  duty	  
assignments,	  meaning	  a	  joint	  qualified	  officer	  must	  fill	  the	  position.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  services	  
must	  fill	  at	  least	  half	  of	  the	  JDAL	  billets	  in	  the	  rank	  of	  O5	  and	  above	  with	  joint-­‐qualified	  
officers.76	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  a	  possible	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  treat	  this	  circumstance	  as	  a	  simple	  
math	  problem,	  but	  in	  reality	  the	  answer	  remains	  much	  less	  clear.	  	  Joint-­‐qualified	  officers	  
serving	  multiple	  joint	  tours,	  frequent	  curtailment	  of	  joint	  tours,	  and	  the	  distinctly	  different	  
officer	  assignment	  cycles	  of	  the	  services	  all	  contribute	  complexity	  that	  makes	  such	  a	  
determination	  of	  capacity	  very	  difficult,	  at	  best.	  	  More	  recently,	  proposals	  to	  increase	  JPME	  II	  
student	  throughput	  are	  motivated	  more	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  advance	  joint	  education	  to	  a	  wider	  
population	  than	  just	  to	  officers	  headed	  to	  joint	  assignments.77	  	  Future	  operational	  challenges	  
will	  require	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  jointness,	  and	  this	  is	  facilitated	  by	  providing	  joint	  
education	  earlier	  and	  to	  a	  wider	  audience.	  	  Pushing	  jointness	  deeper	  than	  the	  GNA	  envisioned,	  
however,	  is	  held	  back	  by	  two	  factors:	  the	  finite	  number	  of	  joint	  assignments	  available	  and,	  of	  
course,	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  JFSC	  to	  produce	  JPME	  II	  graduates.	  	  	  
The	  desire	  to	  increase	  JPME	  II	  student	  throughput	  has	  spawned	  proposals	  within	  the	  
establishment	  to	  not	  only	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  the	  principle	  course	  at	  JFSC	  to	  accommodate	  
more	  classes	  annually	  but	  also	  to	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  institutions	  accredited	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  
II.	  	  In	  2004,	  Congress	  granted	  authority	  for	  the	  service	  senior-­‐level	  colleges	  to	  award	  JPME	  II	  
credit,	  agreeing	  with	  the	  defense	  establishment’s	  rationale	  for	  creating	  a	  larger	  pool	  of	  “JPME	  II	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  DoDI	  1300.19	  -­‐	  DOD	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  (JOM)	  Program:	  15-­‐17.	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Colonel	  Jeffrey	  Settle,	  Director,	  Joint	  Education	  Division,	  Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7.	  Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  
Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  2016.	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complete”	  officers	  from	  which	  to	  select	  general	  and	  flag	  officers,	  particularly	  for	  senior	  joint	  
duty.78	  	  The	  same	  legislation	  also	  trimmed	  the	  mandated	  length	  of	  JCWS	  from	  12	  weeks	  to	  10,	  
thereby	  allowing	  a	  33	  percent	  increase	  in	  capacity.	  	  Such	  initiatives,	  however,	  reflect	  the	  
concerns	  articulated	  by	  the	  Skelton	  Panel	  in	  1989,	  which	  warned	  of	  organizational	  pressures	  to	  
shorten	  the	  length	  of	  Phase	  II	  because,	  historically,	  the	  DoD	  had	  demonstrated	  little	  sensitivity	  
about	  the	  length	  of	  joint	  schools.79	  	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  panel	  determined	  that	  a	  12-­‐week	  JPME	  II	  
course	  conducted	  in-­‐residence	  was	  necessary	  to	  effect	  the	  desired	  "socialization"	  or	  "bonding"	  
critical	  for	  increasing	  inter-­‐service	  understanding	  and	  developing	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  
perspectives.80	  	  The	  panel	  adopted	  a	  12-­‐week	  model	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  would	  acculturate	  
more	  effectively	  than	  the	  5.5	  month	  course	  it	  displaced	  because	  greater	  social	  bonding	  and	  
camaraderie	  would	  result	  in	  a	  shorter	  course	  that	  officers	  would	  attend	  away	  from	  their	  
families.	  	  The	  panel	  also	  cautioned	  against	  initiatives	  that	  would	  implement	  a	  "diploma	  mill"	  
approach	  to	  JPME	  II	  delivery,	  emphasizing	  the	  credit	  for	  promotion	  purposes	  rather	  than	  the	  
education	  and	  acculturation	  necessary	  for	  military	  operational	  efficacy.81	  	  
The	  second	  historical	  driver	  for	  changing	  how	  JPME	  II	  is	  delivered	  is	  cost	  reduction,	  but	  
it	  is	  sometimes	  less	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  sending	  officers	  to	  school	  than	  it	  is	  about	  who	  is	  funding	  
it.	  	  The	  perspective	  of	  the	  combatant	  commanders	  is	  that	  they	  want	  joint-­‐qualified	  officers	  to	  
fill	  their	  joint	  personnel	  requirements	  and,	  as	  stated	  earlier,	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
services	  to	  prepare	  those	  officers	  for	  joint	  duty.	  	  Yet,	  the	  services	  often	  send	  officers	  to	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  
Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel:	  12.;	  See	  also	  FY	  2005	  
National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act.	  
79	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  111.	  	  	  	  
80	  Ibid.,	  4.	  
81	  Ibid.,	  110-­‐2	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joint	  assignments	  without	  having	  received	  JPME	  II	  in	  advance,	  and	  this	  means	  it	  falls	  to	  the	  joint	  
command	  to	  not	  only	  bear	  the	  financial	  cost	  of	  sending	  them,	  but	  to	  absorb	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
officer’s	  extended	  absence	  during	  his	  joint	  tour.82	  	  This	  circumstance	  has	  become	  more	  
contentious	  as	  force	  size	  and	  budgets	  become	  smaller	  while	  operational	  requirements	  remain	  
high.	  	  The	  combatant	  commands	  are	  increasingly	  resistant	  to	  the	  “gapping”	  of	  a	  billet	  for	  an	  
officer	  to	  attend	  JPME	  II	  at	  any	  point	  in	  an	  officer’s	  tour,	  contending	  instead	  that	  these	  officers	  
should	  arrive	  at	  their	  assignments	  having	  completed	  the	  course.83	  	  The	  problem	  of	  getting	  “the	  
right	  officer	  at	  the	  right	  time”	  to	  JPME	  II	  remains	  commonplace	  and	  several	  studies	  have	  
indicated	  that	  the	  services	  are	  not	  particularly	  diligent	  in	  sending	  the	  right	  officer	  to	  JPME	  II	  at	  
the	  right	  time.84	  	  Some	  of	  this	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  surge	  of	  officers	  who	  rotate	  jobs	  during	  
the	  summer,	  and	  JFSC	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  handle	  such	  a	  surge.	  	  Yet,	  in	  their	  own	  
right,	  the	  four	  services	  continue	  to	  struggle	  to	  balance	  joint	  requirements	  against	  their	  own	  
service	  needs	  and	  vary	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  importance	  that	  they	  place	  on	  joint	  education,	  
assignments,	  and	  promotions.	  	  This	  difference	  in	  emphasis	  indicates	  that	  service	  parochialisms	  
remain	  alive	  and	  well.85	  	  Rather	  than	  drawing	  increased	  scrutiny	  and	  pressure	  on	  the	  officer	  
management	  policies	  of	  the	  services,	  this	  problem	  has	  repeatedly	  led	  to	  proposals	  within	  the	  
defense	  establishment	  to	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  the	  principal	  course	  of	  instruction	  at	  JFSC	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  The	  1998	  DoD	  Inspector	  General	  report,	  2002	  GAO	  report,	  2008	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  project,	  and	  2010	  House	  
Armed	  Services	  Committee	  report	  concerning	  JPME	  II	  each	  presented	  this	  finding.	  	  
83	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  
Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel:	  39.	  
84	  Again,	  1998	  DoD	  Inspector	  General	  report,	  2002	  GAO	  report,	  2008	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  project,	  and	  2010	  House	  
Armed	  Services	  Committee	  report	  concerning	  JPME	  II	  each	  presented	  this	  finding.	  
85	  .	  U.S.	  Government	  Accountability	  Office.	  Military	  Personnel:	  Joint	  Officer	  Development	  Has	  Improved,	  but	  a	  
Strategic	  Approach	  is	  Needed,	  GAO-­‐03-­‐238	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  [2002]),	  30-­‐1.	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order	  to	  minimize	  the	  operational	  and	  financial	  impacts	  on	  the	  combatant	  commands.86	  	  Again,	  
such	  proposals	  were	  a	  principle	  concern	  articulated	  by	  the	  Skelton	  panel.	  
Cost	  reduction	  as	  a	  driver	  is	  sometimes,	  however,	  about	  the	  price	  of	  joint	  education	  
itself,	  and	  looming	  fiscal	  austerity	  is	  forcing	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  how	  JFSC	  delivers	  JPME	  II.	  	  A	  
recent	  proposal	  for	  legislative	  change	  to	  the	  original	  GNA	  reforms	  indicated	  “fiscal	  austerity	  is	  
challenging	  the	  contemporary	  10-­‐week	  in-­‐residence	  approach	  for	  JPME	  II.”	  	  According	  to	  an	  
earlier	  version	  of	  the	  proposal,	  “the	  quality	  of	  rigorous	  JPME	  II	  may	  not	  be	  sustainable	  in-­‐
residence	  at	  extant	  student	  levels”	  and	  the	  chairman	  desires	  to	  reduce	  and	  avoid	  the	  costs	  
associated	  with	  its	  delivery.	  	  The	  stated	  purpose	  of	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  delivery	  methods	  is	  
to	  avoid	  costs	  and	  achieve	  savings	  through	  program	  changes	  that	  substantially	  reduce	  
temporary	  duty	  requirements	  associated	  with	  in-­‐resident	  attendance.87	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
proposed	  change	  sought	  to	  repeal	  the	  mandated	  duration	  of	  resident	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC.	  	  
Instead	  it	  would	  allow	  the	  chairman	  to	  establish	  the	  appropriate	  length	  of	  the	  course,	  which	  
would	  necessarily	  be	  shorter	  than	  10	  weeks	  to	  reap	  any	  cost	  savings	  from	  a	  reduced	  temporary	  
duty	  requirement.	  	  	  	  
The	  third	  driver	  for	  change	  is	  the	  growing	  desire	  to	  make	  joint	  education	  more	  
accessible.	  	  The	  innovation	  in	  communications	  technology	  has	  fueled	  the	  interest	  of	  senior	  
military	  leadership	  in	  making	  joint	  education	  more	  reachable	  to	  officers	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  
attend	  JPME	  II	  in	  residence	  at	  JFSC.88	  	  Indeed,	  as	  early	  as	  2002,	  Congress	  directed	  a	  study	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Evaluation	  Report	  on	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  (Report	  no.	  98-­‐
156):	  12.;	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Working	  Group	  Recommendations	  	  	  	  	  
87	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Draft	  Legislative	  Change	  Proposal	  -­‐	  Amendment	  to	  Residency	  Requirements	  and	  
Content	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  2015d):	  2.	  	  	  	  
88	  Dempsey,	  Joint	  Education	  White	  Paper:	  5.;	  Settle,	  Director,	  Joint	  Education	  Division,	  Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7.	  Interview	  by	  
Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  2016.	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examine,	  among	  other	  things,	  whether	  distributed	  learning	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  joint	  education.89	  	  
Subsequent	  writings	  by	  chairmen	  also	  urged	  a	  “blend	  of	  resident	  and	  non-­‐resident	  delivery	  
approaches	  [to]	  extend	  the	  benefits	  of	  JPME	  [II]	  to	  the	  largest	  possible	  number	  of	  officers”	  and	  
encouraging	  the	  exploration	  of	  “alternative	  delivery	  methods	  to	  expand	  access	  outside	  the	  
conventional	  classroom.“90	  	  This	  interest	  has	  prompted	  proposals	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  II	  through	  
blended	  models	  delivering	  much	  of	  the	  curriculum	  online	  and,	  therefore,	  requiring	  much	  less	  
time	  in-­‐residence	  for	  students.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  initiative	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  the	  
course	  extending	  JPME	  II	  to	  officers	  in	  the	  reserve	  components.	  	  The	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  course	  
delivered	  by	  JFSC	  blends	  37	  weeks	  of	  online	  education	  with	  three	  weeks	  of	  resident	  
attendance.	  	  Its	  curriculum	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  JCWS	  in	  that	  it	  addresses	  the	  same	  OPMEP	  
learning	  areas	  and	  many	  of	  the	  same	  lesson	  objectives,	  though	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  
delivery	  methodologies.	  	  Distance	  learning	  models,	  however,	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  law	  
that	  requires	  that	  JPME	  II	  must	  include	  10	  weeks	  of	  in	  residence	  attendance	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  
the	  intended	  degree	  of	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  The	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  course	  does	  not	  completely	  
comply	  with	  statutory	  requirements	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II,	  but	  was	  recently	  accredited	  by	  
the	  chairman	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II.91	  	  Hybrid	  delivery	  models	  are	  also	  thought	  to	  help	  in	  
addressing	  the	  other	  considerations	  of	  increased	  throughput	  and	  cost	  reduction,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  
particularly	  clear.	  	  High	  quality	  distance	  learning	  solutions	  are	  not	  cheap,	  nor	  is	  the	  additional	  
faculty	  necessary	  to	  accommodate	  greater	  numbers	  of	  students.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  See	  Public	  Law	  107–107,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2002	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act.	  
90	  General	  Peter	  Pace,	  Chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Vision	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Development	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  [2005]).:	  6.	  
91	  	  See	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Instruction	  1800.01E	  Officer	  Professional	  Military	  
Education	  Policy	  (OPMEP)	  Change	  1	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  June	  30,	  2016).;	  Settle,	  Director,	  Joint	  
Education	  Division,	  Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7.	  Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  2016.	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Like	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  Skelton	  panel	  over	  the	  JPME	  cost-­‐saving	  and	  throughput	  
initiatives	  that	  were	  certain	  to	  come,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  sustained	  interpersonal	  
contact	  occurring	  through	  in-­‐residence	  delivery	  was	  an	  implicit	  assumption	  in	  the	  original	  GNA	  
reforms	  concerning	  JPME	  II.	  	  This	  is	  because	  few,	  if	  any,	  non-­‐resident	  delivery	  approaches	  were	  
available	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Since	  then,	  several	  studies	  sought	  to	  give	  pause	  to	  notions	  of	  JPME	  II	  
distance	  learning	  approaches.	  	  One	  independent	  study	  argued	  that	  JPME	  II	  should	  not	  be	  
converted	  to	  a	  distance	  learning	  program	  because	  “personal	  interaction	  is	  a	  teaching	  vehicle	  
that	  builds	  mutual	  understanding	  of	  each	  other’s	  service	  and	  the	  trust	  and	  confidence	  critical	  to	  
JSOs.”92	  	  Another	  study	  observed	  that	  distance	  education	  approaches	  could	  restrict	  opportunity	  
for	  thought	  and	  reflection	  by	  placing	  the	  burden	  of	  education	  on	  the	  student	  officer,	  who	  must	  
concurrently	  perform	  his	  primary	  joint	  duty	  while	  devoting	  considerable	  time	  to	  the	  online	  
program.93	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  student	  officer,	  the	  2008	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project	  
concluded	  that	  in	  every	  category	  reviewed—by	  command,	  by	  grade,	  and	  by	  service—	  the	  
option	  for	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction	  normally	  associated	  with	  resident	  attendance	  was	  the	  “the	  
top	  choice	  by	  a	  large	  margin.”94	  	  
	  
Responding	  to	  Drivers	  for	  Change	  
Over	  time,	  these	  desires	  for	  increased	  throughput,	  reduced	  costs,	  and	  expanded	  
accessibility	  have	  precipitated	  some	  notable	  changes	  to	  JPME	  II	  as	  delivered	  by	  JFSC.	  	  The	  first	  
of	  these	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Advanced	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  (AJPME)	  course	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  .	  Independent	  Study	  of	  Joint	  Officer	  Management	  and	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education:	  ES-­‐19.	  
93	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee.	  Another	  Crossroads?:	  Professional	  
Military	  Education	  Two	  Decades	  After	  the	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Act	  and	  the	  Skelton	  Panel:	  159.	  	  	  	  	  
94	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  "the	  Joint	  Staff	  Officer	  Project"	  Final	  Report:	  65.	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by	  JFSC	  in	  2003.95	  	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  this	  recently	  accredited	  JPME	  II	  course	  accommodates	  
the	  limited	  availability	  of	  reserve	  officers	  to	  attend	  the	  JCWS	  program,	  and	  it	  employs	  a	  
blended	  approach	  over	  40	  weeks	  where	  curriculum	  is	  delivered	  through	  both	  online	  learning	  
and	  a	  modest	  amount	  of	  in-­‐resident	  education.	  	  The	  chairman	  recently	  accredited	  AJPME	  to	  
deliver	  JPME	  II,	  renaming	  the	  course	  as	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid,	  and	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  allow	  active	  
component	  officers	  to	  attend	  in	  the	  near	  future.96	  	  Another	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  
JPME	  II	  by	  JFSC	  was	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  JCWS	  course	  length	  from	  12	  weeks	  to	  10	  in	  2005.	  	  	  The	  
shorter	  course	  allows	  for	  more	  classes	  in	  a	  given	  year	  with	  the	  outcome	  being	  more	  JPME	  II	  
graduates	  at	  a	  lower	  overall	  cost	  per	  student	  graduate.	  	  The	  same	  legislation	  allowed	  the	  
individual	  Service	  War	  Colleges	  to	  confer	  JPME	  II	  credit	  so	  long	  as	  they	  meet	  certain	  faculty	  and	  
student	  composition	  requirements.97	  	  In	  2011,	  the	  chairman	  sought	  and	  received	  the	  authority	  
for	  JFSC	  to	  offer	  JPME	  II	  on	  an	  “other	  than	  in-­‐residence	  basis”	  with	  Congress	  allowing	  a	  pilot	  
JPME	  II	  satellite	  program	  at	  a	  remote	  location.	  	  Such	  was	  deemed	  a	  “non-­‐resident”	  approach	  
and	  the	  pilot	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program	  (NRSP)	  commenced	  the	  next	  year	  in	  Tampa,	  
FL	  supporting	  the	  two	  combatant	  commands	  located	  there.98	  	  This	  initiative	  aimed	  to	  establish	  
the	  validity	  of	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  at	  a	  location	  other	  than	  the	  JFSC	  campus	  and	  to	  explore	  the	  
cost	  reduction	  possibilities	  of	  the	  approach.99	  	  NRSP	  students	  attend	  the	  course	  in	  person	  at	  the	  
satellite	  location,	  just	  as	  they	  would	  if	  attending	  at	  the	  JFSC.	  	  The	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Public	  Law	  105-­‐261	  directed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  JPME	  II	  program	  for	  reserve	  component	  officers.	  
96	  Settle,	  Director,	  Joint	  Education	  Division,	  Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7.	  Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  
2016.	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Ronald	  W.	  Reagan	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  2005,	  Public	  Law	  108-­‐375,	  (2004):	  §	  2156.	  
98	  The	  FY2112	  NDAA	  authorized	  the	  NRSP	  pilot	  program;	  The	  term	  “non-­‐resident”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  pilot	  is	  
understood	  to	  mean	  not	  in	  attendance	  at	  JFSC	  rather	  than	  the	  use	  of	  a	  distance	  learning	  approach.	  
99	  Pub.	  L.	  112–81	  §	  552(b);	  Kenneth	  Pisel,	  Director,	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program,	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College.	  
Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  2016.	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NRSP	  and	  the	  resident	  JPME	  II	  program	  is	  that	  NRSP	  students	  are	  not	  isolated	  from	  the	  
competing	  demands	  of	  family	  and	  workplace	  responsibilities.	  	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  isolation	  of	  
students	  from	  family	  responsibilities	  was	  an	  important	  consideration	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  
Skelton	  panel	  in	  1989	  to	  adopt	  a	  12-­‐week	  resident	  JPME	  II	  course	  over	  a	  much	  longer	  one.	  	  In	  
2015,	  Congress	  approved	  legislation	  to	  make	  the	  satellite	  program	  a	  permanent	  alternative	  to	  
the	  in-­‐resident	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  at	  the	  JFSC.	  	  The	  latest	  initiative	  seeking	  change	  to	  the	  
delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  by	  JFSC	  proposes	  to	  strike	  the	  requirement	  for	  10	  weeks	  of	  “in-­‐resident”	  
instruction	  from	  the	  law	  and	  to	  provide	  the	  chairman	  the	  authority	  to	  set	  any	  such	  in-­‐residence	  
requirement	  for	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC.100	  	  Such	  a	  change	  would	  purportedly	  allow	  for	  more	  
flexible	  delivery	  methods	  while	  maintaining	  academic	  rigor.	  
Historically,	  proposals	  for	  change	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  
importance	  of	  maintaining	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  education,	  and	  this	  is	  generally	  understood	  to	  
mean	  that	  any	  alternatives	  must	  adhere	  to	  provisions	  for	  joint	  curriculum,	  joint	  acculturation,	  
faculty,	  and	  students	  as	  established	  by	  law	  and	  policy.101	  	  The	  department	  has	  stated	  that	  it	  
realizes	  the	  value	  of	  joint	  education	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  acculturating	  its	  officers	  in	  joint	  
matters.	  	  Even	  the	  most	  recent	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  proposal	  to	  empower	  the	  defense	  secretary	  to	  
authorize	  courses	  to	  award	  JPME	  II	  credit	  regardless	  of	  delivery	  method	  rested	  on	  the	  
understanding	  that	  any	  alternative	  must	  achieve	  joint	  acculturation	  objectives.102	  	  This	  is	  
admirable	  except	  that	  many	  of	  the	  studies	  making	  such	  recommendations	  fall	  short	  in	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Working	  Group	  Recommendations.	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Settle,	  Director,	  Joint	  Education	  Division,	  Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7.	  Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  
2016.;	  A	  recurring	  caveat	  within	  past	  proposals	  to	  modify	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  has	  been	  the	  need	  to	  
maintain	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  JPME	  Phase	  II	  experience	  and	  outcome.	  See	  1998	  DoD	  Inspector	  General	  Report,	  2003	  
Booz	  Allen	  Hamilton	  study,	  and	  recent	  Joint	  Staff	  legislative	  change	  proposals.	  
102	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Draft	  Legislative	  Change	  Proposal	  -­‐	  Amendment	  to	  Residency	  Requirements	  and	  
Content:	  1.	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analysis	  of	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  qualitative	  outcomes.	  	  Rather,	  arguments	  
for	  a	  shorter	  course	  or	  modified	  delivery	  have	  historically	  rested	  on	  mitigating	  the	  operational	  
impacts	  to	  joint	  commands	  and	  the	  services.103	  	  Another	  argument	  is	  that	  officers	  have	  had	  
greater	  exposure	  to	  joint	  operations	  than	  those	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  original	  reforms	  and	  can	  have	  
their	  needs	  met	  by	  a	  shorter	  course.	  	  While	  appealing	  and	  nominally	  logical,	  no	  empirical	  study	  
exists	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  officers	  attending	  JPME	  II	  possess	  a	  better	  mastery	  of	  joint	  
matters	  than	  their	  arguably	  “less	  joint”	  predecessors.104	  	  
Achieving	  joint	  acculturation	  objectives	  means	  that	  JPME	  II	  graduates	  must	  value	  
jointness.105	  	  Joint	  acculturation	  results	  from	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  change	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  
officers	  attending	  a	  JPME	  II	  alternative.	  	  These	  students	  must	  overcome	  deeply	  instilled	  service	  
prejudices	  to	  improve	  their	  understanding	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  officers	  from	  different	  services	  
and	  for	  trust	  to	  develop	  between	  them.	  	  Absent	  from	  virtually	  every	  study	  and	  review	  of	  JPME	  II	  
since	  1989	  is	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  psychology,	  which	  is	  inescapable	  when	  
trying	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  not	  to	  mention	  joint	  acculturation,	  
and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  reduced.	  	  This	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  proponents	  for	  change	  have	  made	  
recommendations	  for	  alternative	  JPME	  II	  approaches	  without	  deep	  and	  thoughtful	  
understanding	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  desired	  level	  of	  attitudinal	  change	  JPME	  II	  should	  
produce	  in	  its	  graduates.	  	  Accordingly,	  proposed	  changes	  to	  the	  present	  method	  of	  delivery	  for	  
in-­‐resident	  JPME	  II	  do	  not	  adequately	  consider	  the	  potential	  operational	  impacts	  of	  graduates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  See	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Evaluation	  Report	  on	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  (Report	  no.	  
98-­‐156)	  	  	  	  	  
104	  See	  the	  1998	  DoD	  Inspector	  General	  and	  2005	  RAND	  JPME	  studies	  and	  also	  the	  2016	  Levine	  and	  Waldhauser	  
memorandum.	  
105	  	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Instruction	  1800.01E	  Officer	  Professional	  Military	  
Education	  Policy	  (OPMEP):	  E-­‐H-­‐3.	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possessing	  less	  affinity	  for	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  than	  different	  delivery	  methods	  
could	  produce.	  	  A	  “quantity	  over	  quality”	  approach	  could	  discount	  the	  acculturation	  component	  
of	  joint	  education	  that	  is	  critically	  important	  in	  reshaping	  service-­‐centric	  attitudes	  and	  
prejudices	  of	  officers	  toward	  those	  embodying	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective.	  	  	  
Presently,	  there	  is	  no	  instruction,	  regulation,	  or	  guidance	  that	  provides	  a	  measurable	  
standard	  for	  the	  level	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  each	  alternative	  must	  achieve.	  	  The	  joint	  
acculturation	  requirements	  articulated	  in	  law	  were	  written	  in	  consideration	  of	  in-­‐residence	  
instruction	  and	  represent	  only	  a	  vague	  indication	  of	  the	  level	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  change	  resident	  
JPME	  II	  must	  achieve.	  	  It	  is	  also	  insufficient	  to	  suggest	  that	  adequate	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  
simply	  a	  matter	  of	  policy-­‐mandated	  student	  and	  faculty	  mixes	  by	  military	  departments.106	  	  The	  
outcomes	  of	  various	  JPME	  II	  programs	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  and	  joint	  
acculturation	  are	  not	  well	  understood,	  and	  yet	  proponents	  have	  succeeded	  in	  shortening	  the	  
JPME	  II	  principal	  course	  of	  instruction,	  created	  a	  non-­‐resident	  alternative,	  and	  advocated	  for	  a	  
blended	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  model.	  	  This	  raises	  some	  important	  questions:	  How	  well	  are	  the	  
different	  forms	  of	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC	  serving	  to	  change	  officer	  attitudes?	  	  Are	  these	  
alternatives	  equally	  effective	  at	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  among	  student	  officers	  to	  
facilitate	  trust	  building?	  	  And,	  does	  the	  professional	  background	  of	  student	  officers	  matter	  in	  
the	  approach?	  	  Without	  this	  knowledge	  it	  cannot	  be	  established	  whether	  the	  alternative	  
approaches	  are	  contributing	  meaningfully	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  jointness.	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  See	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  Program	  of	  Instruction,	  § 2155	  and	  Pace,	  Chairman,	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Vision	  for	  Joint	  Officer	  Development	  for	  these	  quantifications	  of	  acculturation.	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Organizational	  Culture,	  the	  Services,	  and	  Prejudice	  
As	  the	  last	  chapter	  established,	  JPME	  II	  is	  the	  principle	  means	  by	  which	  to	  acculturate	  
officers	  of	  different	  services	  away	  from	  service	  centrism	  and	  toward	  a	  joint	  perspective	  and	  
attitude.	  	  Optimal	  joint	  acculturation,	  however,	  is	  possible	  only	  with	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  biases	  
and	  prejudices	  ensconced	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  officers	  by	  their	  respective	  service	  culture	  and	  
military	  experience.	  	  While	  these	  remain,	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  the	  trust	  necessary	  
between	  members	  of	  different	  organizational	  cultures	  for	  a	  tradeoff	  in	  cultural	  values	  and	  
beliefs	  to	  occur.	  	  For	  all	  the	  studies	  and	  reports	  focusing	  on	  joint	  education	  and	  acculturation	  
over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	  little	  is	  said	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  joint	  acculturation	  
and	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  and	  related	  biases	  that	  can	  hinder	  it.	  	  	  
Among	  different	  theoretical	  views	  of	  prejudice,	  this	  study	  adopts	  a	  particularly	  socio-­‐
cultural	  focus,	  where	  societal	  and/or	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  prejudice	  
toward	  out-­‐groups.	  	  The	  consideration	  of	  social	  science	  and	  social	  psychology,	  specifically,	  are	  
unavoidable	  when	  seeking	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  prejudice	  and,	  more	  
importantly,	  the	  processes	  and	  conditions	  that	  help	  to	  reduce	  it.	  	  Yet,	  consideration	  for	  these	  
subjects	  remains	  virtually	  absent	  in	  the	  studies	  and	  reports	  concerning	  JPME	  II	  over	  the	  last	  
three	  decades.	  	  To	  help	  address	  this	  void,	  this	  section	  examines	  how	  organizational	  cultures	  can	  
foster	  certain	  prejudices	  among	  their	  members	  that	  lead	  to	  antipathy	  toward	  others	  belonging	  
to	  different	  groups.	  	  It	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  prejudice	  and	  how	  it	  may	  be	  
overcome	  to	  improve	  the	  prospect	  for	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  
Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory	  (ICT)	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  establish	  process	  and	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  
for	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  and	  then	  relate	  them	  to	  the	  context	  of	  JPME	  II	  and	  the	  three	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delivery	  methods	  employed	  by	  JFSC.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  underlying	  distinctions	  between	  these	  
delivery	  methods	  become	  clearer.	  	  Moreover,	  so	  do	  the	  potential	  implications	  of	  these	  
distinctions	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  and,	  ultimately,	  
the	  degree	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  each	  method	  may	  achieve.	  
	  
Service	  Cultures	  are	  Organizational	  Cultures	  	  
The	  military	  service	  cultures	  are	  organizational	  cultures,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  represent	  the	  
identity	  and	  the	  personality	  of	  their	  associated	  organizations.	  	  By	  nature,	  organizational	  
cultures	  are	  abstract—unseen	  and	  often	  subliminal—yet	  powerful	  in	  how	  they	  influence	  the	  
activities	  and	  outcomes	  of	  an	  organization.	  	  Renowned	  psychologist	  Edgar	  Schein	  describes	  
these	  cultures	  as	  “deep,	  pervasive,	  complex,	  patterned,	  and	  morally	  neutral.”107	  	  While	  
acknowledging	  the	  existence	  of	  several	  definitions	  for	  organizational	  culture,	  he	  generally	  
describes	  it	  as	  a	  pattern	  of	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  assumptions,	  or	  basic	  values,	  learned	  by	  a	  group	  
to	  solve	  problems	  of	  external	  adaptation	  and	  internal	  integration.	  	  These	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  
assumptions	  are	  relevant	  and	  distinctive	  to	  the	  group	  and	  are	  also	  promulgated	  to	  new	  
members	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  They	  are	  understood	  subconsciously	  and	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  
terms	  of	  how	  a	  particular	  organization	  views	  itself	  and	  its	  environment.	  	  Trice	  and	  Beyer	  
reinforce	  this	  view	  by	  saying	  that	  organizational	  culture	  is	  fundamentally	  about	  patterning	  and	  
integration—helping	  members	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  world.	  	  Humans	  cope	  with	  their	  
environment	  by	  establishing	  order	  and	  sensibility	  and,	  as	  human	  collectives,	  the	  same	  applies	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  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  60.	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to	  organizations.108	  	  Smith	  directly	  observes	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  a	  particular	  organization,	  the	  
services	  in	  this	  case,	  also	  provides	  its	  members	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  shared	  mission,	  which	  enhances	  
cohesion	  and	  organizational	  stability	  in	  that	  substantive	  change	  will	  not	  come	  about	  necessarily	  
with	  the	  departure	  or	  arrival	  of	  new	  members.109	  	  
Schein	  further	  describes	  three	  levels	  of	  organizational	  culture	  based	  on	  their	  visibility.	  
These	  levels	  are	  artifacts,	  espoused	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  and	  basic	  values.	  	  Artifacts	  are	  the	  most	  
visible,	  yet	  least	  decipherable,	  manifestation	  of	  the	  underlying	  culture.	  	  Observers	  will	  see	  and	  
associate	  these	  artifacts	  with	  a	  particular	  culture	  or	  organization,	  but	  may	  not	  necessarily	  
understand	  their	  meaning	  or	  significance.	  	  Lying	  below	  the	  observable	  artifacts	  of	  
organizational	  culture	  are	  the	  espoused	  values	  and	  beliefs	  representing	  the	  cultural	  or	  
organizational	  approach	  taken	  toward	  a	  fundamental	  problem	  or	  issue.	  	  Beyond	  these	  are	  the	  
basic	  underlying	  values,	  or	  assumptions,	  of	  the	  organization,	  which	  are	  the	  least	  observable	  but	  
most	  consequential	  aspect	  of	  organizational	  culture.	  	  Unless	  the	  underlying	  values	  can	  be	  
identified	  it	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  to	  decipher	  the	  artifacts,	  espoused	  values	  and	  
norms	  of	  an	  organization.110	  	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  Trice	  and	  Beyer	  describe	  cultural	  forms—	  	  
symbols,	  language,	  narratives,	  and	  practices—which	  are	  observable	  manifestations	  of	  
organizational	  culture	  and	  guide	  members	  regarding	  how	  to	  think	  and	  act	  and	  tell	  them	  “how	  
we	  do	  things	  around	  here.”	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  Janice	  M.	  Beyer	  and	  Harrison	  M.	  Trice,	  The	  Cultures	  of	  Work	  Organizations	  (Englewood	  Cliffs:	  Prentice	  Hall,	  
1993),	  4.;	  See	  also	  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  16.	  
109	  James	  M.	  Smith,	  "Service	  Cultures,	  Joint	  Cultures,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Military,"	  Airman-­‐Scholar	  (Winter	  1998):	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110	  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  59.	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Organizational	  culture	  begins	  when	  the	  leader	  of	  an	  organization	  or	  group	  imposes	  a	  
belief	  system,	  or	  ideology,	  as	  Trice	  and	  Beyer	  refer	  to	  it,	  on	  the	  other	  members.111	  	  This	  defines	  
the	  roles	  and	  mission	  of	  the	  organization,	  its	  operation,	  and	  the	  system	  of	  promotion	  that	  
serves	  to	  reinforce	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  culture.	  	  Continual	  reinforcement	  further	  inculcates	  the	  
associated	  beliefs	  and	  values	  among	  the	  members	  and	  over	  time	  they	  become	  accepted	  as	  
shared	  truths	  or	  rendered	  invalid	  and	  replaced	  by	  more	  suitable	  ones.	  	  A	  culture	  begins	  to	  form	  
as	  members	  unite	  around	  the	  common	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  guide	  the	  organization	  in	  how	  to	  
be	  successful	  in	  its	  environment.112	  	  Thus,	  leadership	  and	  culture	  operate	  in	  tandem	  with	  
leaders	  creating	  and	  managing	  the	  culture	  of	  an	  organization	  and	  the	  culture	  itself	  defining	  who	  
will	  be	  promoted	  to	  positions	  of	  influence.113	  	  As	  such,	  the	  culture	  then	  begins	  to	  define	  the	  
characteristics	  and	  expectations	  of	  its	  future	  leaders.	  	  When	  an	  organization	  encounters	  failure	  
or	  difficulty	  in	  adapting	  to	  a	  changing	  external	  environment	  its	  members	  must	  reexamine	  the	  
validity	  of	  the	  underlying	  truths	  of	  their	  culture.	  	  Because	  they	  sometimes	  cannot	  be	  reformed	  
from	  within,	  organizations	  require	  external	  help	  in	  changing	  their	  cultures.	  	  According	  to	  Smith,	  
cultural	  change	  usually	  occurs	  after	  a	  change	  in	  the	  external	  environment	  such	  that	  the	  
performance	  or	  core	  mission	  experiences	  are	  threatened	  with	  failure.	  	  Cultural	  transition	  is	  
difficult	  and	  slow,	  leading	  organizations	  to	  protect	  their	  equities	  as	  long	  as	  possible.	  	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  military	  services	  these	  equities	  most	  often	  translate	  to	  mission	  and	  budget.114	  	  
This	  self-­‐protective	  behavior	  means	  that	  if	  substantive	  cultural	  change	  is	  to	  occur	  the	  
organization’s	  leaders	  must	  step	  outside	  of	  their	  organization's	  culture	  to	  reassess	  present	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  Beyer	  and	  Trice,	  The	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  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  16.;	  See	  also	  Smith,	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  Cultures,	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  the	  U.S.	  Military:	  16.	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  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	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  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	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114	  Smith,	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values,	  beliefs,	  and	  assumptions	  and	  then	  impose	  new	  ones.115	  	  Indeed,	  such	  was	  the	  example	  
of	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  General	  David	  Jones,	  who	  argued	  vociferously	  outside	  
of	  the	  defense	  establishment	  for	  the	  imposition	  of	  defense	  reforms	  that	  ultimately	  became	  the	  
GNA.116	  	  
Within	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  each	  service	  has	  its	  own	  powerful,	  distinct,	  and	  unique	  
organizational	  culture	  that,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Air	  Force,	  has	  developed	  and	  evolved	  for	  
more	  than	  two	  centuries.	  	  For	  example,	  Mahnken	  and	  FitzSimonds	  describe	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  
Air	  Force	  as	  emphasizing	  technology	  more	  than	  other	  services.	  	  The	  Navy	  culture	  is	  particularly	  
attuned	  to	  the	  platforms	  on	  which	  they	  deploy,	  while	  the	  Army	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  focus	  more	  
on	  the	  human	  element	  of	  combat.117	  	  The	  basic	  beliefs	  and	  values	  of	  these	  different	  cultures	  
have	  adapted	  each	  service	  to	  be	  competent,	  if	  not	  dominant,	  in	  the	  physical	  domains	  in	  which	  
they	  operate.	  	  Even	  further,	  the	  distinct	  cultures	  of	  the	  military	  services	  are	  not	  monolithic.	  	  
Rather,	  they	  are	  composed	  internally	  of	  different	  branches	  that	  often	  have	  diverse	  goals,	  
values,	  and	  interests.	  	  The	  Army,	  for	  example,	  includes	  the	  combat	  arms,	  combat	  support,	  and	  
combat	  service	  support	  communities.	  	  The	  Navy	  culture	  is	  comprised	  of	  aviation,	  surface	  
warfare	  and	  subsurface	  subcultures.	  	  The	  Air	  Force	  contains	  not	  only	  fighter,	  bomber,	  and	  
transport	  pilots,	  but	  also	  space	  and	  missile	  communities.	  	  Like	  Smith,	  Trice	  and	  Beyer	  also	  note	  
that	  organizational	  culture	  goes	  beyond	  just	  shared	  norms	  and	  beliefs	  to	  provide	  for	  structural	  
stability.	  	  It	  also	  serves	  to	  integrate	  members	  into	  a	  coherent	  whole	  working	  toward	  a	  broadly	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common	  purpose.118	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  while	  each	  of	  the	  service	  subcultures	  has	  its	  own	  norms	  
and	  beliefs	  toward	  war	  they	  remain	  unified	  by	  the	  more	  encompassing	  service	  culture	  to	  which	  
each	  belongs.119	  	  Just	  as	  the	  subcultures	  of	  the	  separate	  services	  unite	  in	  a	  way	  to	  form	  a	  
singular	  organization,	  jointness	  as	  a	  “quasi-­‐culture”	  transcends	  the	  cultures	  of	  the	  individual	  
services	  to	  fuse	  the	  members	  and	  capabilities	  of	  each	  into	  a	  “coherent	  whole”—the	  joint	  force.	  	  	  
Yet,	  without	  a	  cohesive	  system	  of	  shared	  joint	  values	  to	  transcend	  service	  interests	  and	  inspire	  
“purple-­‐minded”	  warfighters	  to	  think	  as	  a	  team,	  Fautua	  argues	  that	  genuine	  jointness	  will	  be	  
muted	  by	  service	  parochialism	  when	  convenient,	  whether	  on	  a	  battlefield	  or	  in	  a	  joint	  staff.120	  	  
Indeed,	  parochialism	  often	  generates	  a	  powerful	  tension	  between	  the	  vibrant,	  powerful	  
cultures	  of	  the	  military	  services	  and	  that	  of	  jointness.	  	  These	  tensions	  occur	  not	  only	  in	  the	  
highest	  tier	  of	  joint	  organization—the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff—but	  also	  engender	  counterpart	  
tensions	  in	  the	  combatant	  commands	  and	  throughout	  the	  multilayered	  joint	  staff	  structure	  
where	  joint	  issues	  are	  addressed.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon.	  	  As	  far	  back	  as	  1919,	  
Secretary	  of	  War	  Baker	  noted	  such	  when	  he	  wrote	  against	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  air	  
components	  from	  the	  Navy	  and	  Army	  to	  create	  a	  third	  service	  because	  "to	  separate	  them	  
makes	  them	  rival	  services	  with	  the	  whole	  train	  of	  evils	  which	  such	  rivalry	  creates."121	  	  To	  be	  
sure,	  jointness	  would	  not	  be	  as	  powerful	  or	  compelling	  without	  the	  unique	  competencies	  and	  
capabilities	  of	  the	  individual	  services	  that	  provide	  robust	  diversity	  to	  the	  joint	  force	  
commander.	  	  Wilkerson	  states	  that	  without	  proficiency	  in	  one’s	  own	  service	  there	  is	  no	  basis	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for	  the	  inter-­‐service	  trust	  and	  understanding	  critical	  to	  jointness.122	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  respective	  
cultures	  drive	  each	  service	  to	  excellence—to	  dominate	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare	  within	  which	  
they	  primarily	  operate.	  	  According	  to	  Smith,	  service	  rivalries	  are	  an	  outcome	  precipitated	  by	  the	  
different	  cultures	  of	  the	  services,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  innate	  self-­‐interests	  and	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  
superiority	  of	  their	  mission	  and	  processes.123	  	  Each	  service	  devotes	  substantial	  resources	  to	  
protect	  and	  perpetuate	  their	  culture,	  driven	  in	  some	  respects	  by	  an	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  
the	  primacy	  of	  their	  particular	  organization	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  services.	  	  These	  differences	  in	  
underlying	  values	  among	  the	  unique	  service	  cultures	  provide	  fertile	  ground	  for	  competition	  and	  
conflict.	  	  As	  discussed	  later,	  such	  rivalry	  often	  manifests	  in	  dysfunctional	  and	  counterproductive	  
competition	  between	  the	  services	  and	  has	  historically	  undermined	  the	  operational	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  joint	  force.	  
Others	  observe	  that	  having	  a	  long	  history	  of	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  values	  leads	  to	  a	  
stronger	  culture	  because,	  as	  a	  set	  of	  learned	  behaviors,	  culture	  is	  only	  as	  strong	  as	  the	  learning	  
history	  of	  an	  organization.124	  	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  long	  histories	  of	  the	  different	  services	  in	  the	  
U.S.	  military	  have	  led	  to	  particularly	  powerful	  cultures.	  	  Adding	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  service	  
cultures	  is	  the	  closed	  personnel	  system	  they	  employ.	  	  To	  get	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  organization	  one	  
must	  first	  come	  in	  at	  the	  bottom,	  and	  there	  are	  few,	  if	  any,	  opportunities	  to	  enter	  the	  
organization	  mid-­‐stream.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  culture	  is	  protected	  from	  external	  competition.	  	  On	  top	  
of	  this,	  each	  service	  also	  retains	  exclusive	  promotion	  authority	  to	  advance	  those	  who	  most	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closely	  embody	  the	  values,	  beliefs,	  and	  behaviors	  of	  their	  respective	  culture.125	  	  Conversely,	  it	  is	  
arguable	  that	  a	  corresponding	  joint	  culture	  exists,	  at	  least	  not	  strictly	  by	  the	  structures	  and	  
definitions	  described	  by	  Schein	  and	  Smith.126	  	  The	  joint	  arena	  and	  joint	  commands	  rely	  on	  
officers	  already	  indoctrinated	  into	  the	  cultures	  of	  their	  respective	  service	  because	  no	  separate	  
joint	  career	  path	  yet	  exists.	  	  Promotion	  and	  assignment	  responsibilities	  lie	  exclusively	  with	  the	  
individual	  services	  and	  this	  circumstance	  strongly	  influences	  the	  loyalties	  of	  officers	  to	  remain	  
with	  their	  service.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  Smith	  argues	  that	  joint	  experience	  and	  education	  remain	  
essential	  until	  such	  time	  that	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  structure	  to	  establish	  and	  nurture	  joint	  
culture	  exists.127	  	  
	  
Service	  Cultures	  Within	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model	  
Though	  this	  study	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  contemporary	  theory	  of	  organizational	  culture	  to	  
understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  dysfunctional	  behavior	  of	  the	  services	  in	  joint	  military	  operations,	  
Allison’s	  organizational	  process	  model	  provides	  additional	  explanatory	  power.	  	  When	  
developed	  by	  Allison,	  the	  model	  derived	  from	  existing	  organizational	  theory	  to	  provide	  an	  
alternative	  paradigm	  valuable	  to	  the	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  and	  international	  politics.	  	  The	  
model	  helps	  explain	  an	  event	  when	  the	  relevant	  organizations	  are	  described	  and	  the	  patterned	  
organizational	  behavior	  from	  which	  a	  particular	  action	  has	  emerged.128	  	  First	  applied	  to	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  the	  paradigm	  describes	  how	  the	  features	  of	  organizations,	  
rather	  than	  rational	  individuals,	  serve	  as	  the	  relative	  determinants	  of	  their	  behavior.	  	  The	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actions	  of	  a	  single	  person	  are	  viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  larger	  organization	  of	  which	  he	  is	  a	  
member,	  and	  so	  the	  model	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  outputs	  of	  relevant	  organizations	  produce	  a	  
particular	  operational	  outcome—whether	  successful	  or	  not.	  	  Through	  this	  model,	  actions	  are	  
the	  outputs	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  these	  are	  characterized	  by	  what	  Allison	  terms	  “pre-­‐
established	  routines,”	  which	  include	  organization	  goals	  for	  acceptable	  performance,	  standard	  
operating	  procedures,	  programs,	  and	  repertoires.	  	  However,	  these	  can	  be	  described	  more	  
explicitly	  as	  the	  organization’s	  procedures	  for	  promotion	  and	  reward	  for	  members,	  recruitment	  
and	  socialization	  to	  organizational	  norms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  professional	  standards,	  expectations,	  
and	  attitudes	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  organization.129	  	  
Applying	  this	  model	  to	  the	  context	  of	  joint	  military	  operations	  provides	  an	  illustrative	  
explanation	  and	  value	  to	  this	  study	  when	  applied	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  services.	  	  The	  U.S.	  military	  is	  
often	  viewed	  like	  a	  unitary	  actor	  but,	  like	  the	  federal	  government	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  part,	  it	  is	  made	  
up	  of	  several	  large	  organizations—primarily	  the	  different	  services.	  	  When	  centrally	  directed	  to	  
conduct	  joint	  military	  operations,	  much	  of	  the	  resulting	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  these	  operations	  
rests	  on	  how	  they	  are	  implemented,	  and	  this	  involves	  the	  organizational	  behavior	  of	  the	  
individual	  services.	  	  Dysfunctional	  outcomes	  occur	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  basic	  organizational	  
processes	  that	  generate	  competitive	  and	  often	  counterproductive	  actions	  when	  the	  Services	  
interact	  with	  each	  other.130	  	  Joint	  military	  operations	  are	  only	  as	  successful	  as	  the	  behavior	  of	  
the	  participating	  service	  branches	  allow	  because	  their	  organizational	  outputs	  often	  constrain	  or	  
restrict	  the	  range	  of	  alternatives	  available	  to	  a	  decision	  maker.131	  	  In	  a	  historical	  context,	  the	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model	  is	  illustrative	  of	  the	  unpreparedness	  of	  military	  forces	  in	  Hawaii	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  attack	  in	  1941.	  	  For	  instance,	  Allison	  argues	  that	  the	  organizational	  culture	  of	  the	  Navy	  
contributed	  to	  a	  continuance	  of	  normal	  procedures	  and	  routines	  in	  Pearl	  Harbor	  on	  December	  
7,	  despite	  warnings	  received	  earlier	  of	  an	  impending	  Japanese	  attack.132	  	  The	  model	  also	  
indicates	  that	  options	  for	  action	  on	  issues	  between	  organizations	  are	  limited,	  meaning	  that	  
organizations	  will	  default	  to	  their	  own	  way	  of	  doing	  business	  rather	  than	  adopt	  a	  joint	  solution	  
between	  organizations.	  	  Despite	  repeated	  failures	  in	  intelligence	  sharing	  and	  communication	  
between	  the	  Navy	  and	  the	  Army	  in	  Hawaii	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  Japanese	  attack,	  neither	  
organization	  saw	  incentive	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  Even	  after	  receiving	  direction	  from	  Washington	  for	  full	  
integration	  of	  these	  functions	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  in	  Hawaii	  remained	  essentially	  
uncoordinated	  and	  sometimes	  in	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.133	  
	  	   Under	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model,	  this	  dysfunctional	  behavior	  is	  the	  output	  of	  a	  
large	  organization	  operating	  according	  to	  standard	  patterns	  of	  behavior.	  	  The	  services	  interact	  
with	  each	  other	  to	  address	  their	  portion	  of	  a	  “factored”	  or	  joint	  military	  problem	  because	  rarely	  
does	  a	  single	  service	  represent	  a	  complete	  solution	  in	  the	  context	  of	  military	  conflict	  or	  
operations.	  	  Primary	  power	  usually	  accompanies	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  a	  given	  problem	  
factor,	  and	  the	  factors	  within	  a	  joint	  military	  context	  usually	  represent	  the	  domains	  of	  air,	  sea,	  
and	  land.	  	  So,	  it	  is	  logical	  to	  expect	  the	  Navy	  to	  act	  authoritatively	  for	  maritime	  matters	  or	  the	  
Army	  for	  land	  operations.	  	  It	  is	  primary	  power,	  however,	  that	  encourages	  parochial	  priorities	  
and	  perceptions.	  	  Service	  behavior,	  as	  an	  output	  of	  this	  model,	  is	  driven	  by	  organizationally	  
specific	  performance	  standards,	  standard	  operating	  procedures,	  programs	  and	  repertoires.	  	  The	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latter	  two	  are	  commonly	  reflected	  in	  military	  drills	  and	  exercises.	  	  In	  addition,	  organizational	  
outputs	  are	  often	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty	  avoidance,	  problem-­‐directed	  searches	  for	  
solutions	  to	  avoid	  atypical	  discomfort,	  and	  by	  organizational	  learning	  and	  change.	  	  In	  the	  last,	  
fiscal	  surplus	  and	  austerity	  are	  often	  the	  catalysts	  promoting	  change	  by	  forcing	  organizations	  to	  
adopt	  new	  behaviors	  when	  growing	  or	  acquiring	  new	  technology	  or	  by	  having	  to	  adapt	  when	  
they	  must	  do	  with	  less.	  	  Dramatic	  organizational	  change	  usually	  occurs	  in	  extremis—when	  the	  
organization	  is	  presented	  with	  catastrophic	  mission	  failure	  or	  disaster.134	  	  
	  
Cultural	  Beliefs	  and	  Values	  Influence	  the	  Attitudes	  and	  Behaviors	  of	  Members	  	  
According	  to	  many	  authors,	  cultures	  operate	  on	  shared	  values,	  or	  assumptions,	  
regarding	  interaction	  and	  adaptation	  to	  the	  external	  environment	  and	  also	  the	  internal	  
integration	  of	  its	  members.	  	  These	  invoke	  a	  perspective	  among	  its	  members	  of	  not	  only	  what	  
the	  organization	  exists	  to	  be,	  but	  also	  how	  it	  fits	  within	  the	  larger	  whole—its	  external	  
environment.	  	  Assumptions	  of	  organizational	  mission	  and	  strategy	  lead	  to	  others	  regarding	  the	  
organizational	  goals	  and	  also	  the	  means,	  internal	  and	  external,	  of	  the	  organization	  for	  
accomplishing	  them.	  	  Once	  shared,	  and	  no	  longer	  contested,	  such	  assumptions	  are	  accepted	  as	  
truth	  and	  become	  “non-­‐negotiable.”	  	  Many	  of	  these	  cultural	  assumptions	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  so	  
unquestionable	  that	  doing	  so	  may	  lead	  one	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  outsider	  or	  deranged,	  which	  is	  why	  
Schein	  prefers	  to	  term	  them	  “assumptions”	  rather	  than	  values,	  as	  others	  such	  as	  Trice	  and	  
Beyer	  have	  done.135	  	  Such	  basic	  cultural	  assumptions	  can	  be	  extremely	  hard	  to	  change	  as	  doing	  
so	  often	  invokes	  a	  measure	  of	  cognitive	  instability,	  and	  in	  this	  light	  it	  seems	  logical	  that	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members	  of	  a	  culture	  will	  look	  to	  avoid	  disruptions	  in	  their	  view	  or	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  
around	  them.136	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  challenge	  existing	  cultural	  assumptions	  or	  
adopt	  new	  ones	  while	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  one’s	  own	  cultural	  environment,	  surrounded	  by	  other	  
members	  vigorously	  defending	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  	  	  
However,	  the	  reluctance	  to	  challenge	  these	  underlying	  cultural	  assumptions	  can	  also	  
lead	  to	  misperception	  and	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  others.137	  According	  to	  Trice	  and	  
Beyer,	  this	  is	  because	  strong	  cultures	  encourage	  ethnocentrism	  where	  the	  values	  of	  a	  particular	  
culture	  are	  predeterminants,	  often	  subconsciously,	  of	  how	  members	  think,	  see,	  and	  feel,	  
ultimately	  leading	  them	  to	  display	  certain	  attitudes	  toward	  their	  environment	  and	  members	  of	  
other	  cultures.138	  	  These	  attitudes	  influence	  how	  other	  social	  objects	  are	  received	  and	  
understood—or	  misunderstood—through	  such	  phenomena	  as	  selective	  interpretation	  and	  
memory.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  subject	  more	  readily	  draws	  upon	  and	  stores	  interpretations	  consistent	  
with,	  and	  confirmatory	  of,	  the	  attitude	  they	  hold	  toward	  the	  object.139	  	  The	  discussion	  of	  
attitude	  is	  important	  to	  understanding	  behavior	  as	  well.	  	  Together	  with	  subjective	  cultural	  
norms,	  a	  member	  forms	  attitudes	  and	  intentions	  that	  in	  turn	  beget	  volitional	  behaviors.140	  	  
Within	  a	  military	  context,	  Smith	  says	  that	  service	  cultural	  assumptions	  influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  
its	  officers	  to	  support	  policies	  promoting	  its	  core	  mission,	  to	  remain	  indifferent	  to	  matters	  
peripheral	  to	  its	  core	  mission,	  and	  to	  oppose	  any	  challenges	  to	  the	  core	  mission.	  	  Service	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cultures	  compel	  their	  leaders	  to	  seek	  autonomy	  and	  often	  exclusivity	  in	  its	  core	  mission	  area,	  
and	  this	  is	  how	  service	  cultures	  fundamentally	  threaten	  jointness.141	  	  
In	  describing	  how	  cultures	  can	  form,	  Schein	  also	  suggests	  how	  new	  cultures	  can	  emerge	  
or	  perhaps	  be	  altered.	  	  At	  the	  individual	  level,	  this	  means	  supplanting	  underlying	  beliefs	  and	  
values	  with	  different	  ones.	  	  This	  can	  begin	  with	  an	  originating	  event	  that	  brings	  people	  of	  
different	  backgrounds	  together,	  voluntarily	  or	  otherwise,	  and	  usually	  at	  a	  location	  
geographically	  apart	  from	  any	  of	  the	  organizations	  from	  which	  they	  originate.	  	  By	  progressing	  
through	  four	  evolutionary	  stages—group	  formation,	  group	  building,	  group	  work,	  and	  group	  
maturity—dissimilar	  participants	  graduate	  from	  a	  self-­‐orientation	  to	  a	  group	  conceptualization	  
and	  then	  toward	  the	  development	  of	  group	  norms	  and	  teamwork	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  perpetuating	  
reinforcement	  of	  the	  shared	  understanding	  which	  enabled	  the	  group	  to	  be	  successful.142	  	  By	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  second	  stage,	  group	  building,	  the	  group	  has	  cultivated	  a	  “functional	  familiarity”	  
whereby	  they	  understand	  what	  to	  expect	  from	  each	  other	  and	  that	  coexistence	  is	  possible	  even	  
when	  the	  members	  may	  not	  particularly	  like	  one	  another.	  	  But	  it	  is	  only	  during	  the	  third	  stage—
group	  work—that	  the	  differences	  of	  members	  become	  valued	  rather	  than	  rejected	  by	  the	  other	  
members.	  	  Schein	  notes	  that	  this	  stage	  also	  involves	  a	  strong	  socio-­‐emotional,	  or	  affective,	  
dimension.143	  	  This	  model	  provides	  consequential	  support	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  joint	  
acculturation	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  presented	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  While	  such	  is	  a	  
descriptive	  model	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  culture,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  joint	  acculturation	  the	  focus	  of	  change	  is	  on	  the	  individual	  officer.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  JPME	  II	  is	  not	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to	  alter	  basic	  cultures	  of	  the	  services.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  modify	  the	  culture	  in	  the	  officer	  by	  
positively	  altering	  the	  individual's	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  members	  of	  out-­‐groups,	  which	  
are	  the	  officers	  from	  other	  services.	  	  Correspondingly,	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  
assimilation	  or	  diffusion—neither	  to	  subsume	  one	  service	  culture	  into	  another	  nor	  to	  spread	  
values	  and	  beliefs	  from	  one	  culture	  to	  the	  others.	  	  The	  outcome	  is	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  individual	  
officer	  a	  better	  appreciation	  of	  the	  different	  service	  cultures	  and	  to	  instill	  a	  joint	  perspective	  
and	  joint	  attitude.	  	  
	  
Inter-­‐service	  Prejudice	  and	  Joint	  Acculturation	  
As	  stated	  earlier,	  cultural	  beliefs,	  values,	  and	  personal	  experience	  influence	  the	  
attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  of	  group	  members,	  and	  this	  is	  necessary	  for	  coping	  with	  the	  
complexities	  of	  the	  larger	  world	  and	  range	  of	  experiences	  outside	  the	  organization.	  	  Allport	  
observed,	  however,	  that	  rigid	  adherence	  to	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  overgeneralizations	  from	  
experience	  lead	  to	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  often	  discriminatory	  behavior.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  
military	  officers,	  as	  members	  of	  organizational	  cultures,	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  inclinations	  
toward	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  discriminatory	  behavior	  toward	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  
services.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  make	  the	  service	  cultures	  especially	  powerful	  also	  
makes	  their	  members,	  military	  officers	  in	  this	  case,	  especially	  inclined	  to	  harbor	  prejudicial	  
attitudes	  that	  can	  be	  more	  deeply	  ingrained	  and	  more	  prevalent	  within	  the	  organization.	  
Before	  going	  further,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  discuss	  and	  define	  prejudice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
study.	  	  Gordon	  Allport,	  whose	  seminal	  work	  in	  1954	  established	  the	  foundational	  
understanding	  of	  prejudice	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  psychology,	  noted	  that	  any	  definition	  of	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prejudice	  must	  necessarily	  include	  “an	  attitude	  of	  favor	  or	  disfavor	  and	  this	  must	  stem	  from	  an	  
overgeneralization”	  derived	  from	  a	  core	  belief	  or	  personal	  experience.144	  	  Given	  the	  profound	  
influence	  of	  his	  contribution	  to	  social	  psychology	  and	  prejudice-­‐reduction	  research,	  this	  study	  
adopts	  Allport’s	  definition	  of	  prejudice,	  which	  he	  articulated	  as	  “an	  antipathy	  based	  upon	  faulty	  
and	  inflexible	  generalization;	  it	  may	  be	  felt	  or	  expressed.	  	  It	  may	  be	  directed	  toward	  a	  group	  as	  
a	  whole,	  or	  toward	  an	  individual	  because	  he	  is	  a	  member	  of	  that	  group.”145	  	  Such	  prejudice	  can	  
be	  either	  explicit	  or	  implicit,	  whereby	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  lies	  in	  the	  subject's	  
awareness	  of	  personal	  prejudices	  or	  biases	  toward	  other	  social	  objects.146	  	  Allport	  notes	  that	  
while	  often	  harmless	  or	  benign,	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  often	  lead	  to	  discrimination,	  which	  is	  
selectively	  negative	  behavior	  toward,	  or	  exclusion	  of,	  members	  of	  out-­‐groups.147	  	  Undoubtedly,	  
however,	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  primarily	  stem	  from	  two	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  The	  first	  is	  
what	  Allport	  terms	  “conformity	  prejudice,”	  which	  is	  where	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  
result	  from	  the	  member’s	  perceived	  need	  to	  conform	  to	  cultural	  custom	  and	  to	  maintain	  the	  
cultural	  pattern.	  	  The	  reluctance	  to	  challenge	  these	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  assumptions	  can	  lead	  to	  
misperception,	  misunderstanding,	  and	  overgeneralization.	  	  In	  fact,	  Allport	  stated	  that	  
conformity	  to	  group	  values	  and	  beliefs	  represent	  the	  “single	  most	  important	  source	  of	  
prejudice.”148	  	  While	  such	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  can	  sometimes	  be	  of	  the	  “polite	  and	  harmless”	  
order,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  tremendously	  counterproductive	  or	  destructive	  when	  members	  of	  a	  
particular	  service	  culture	  demonstrate	  a	  “neurosis	  of	  conformity”	  where	  loyalty	  and	  obedience	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eclipse	  rationality.149	  	  In	  the	  second	  circumstance,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  germane	  to	  this	  study,	  
prejudice	  often	  stems	  from	  stereotypes	  that	  result	  from	  overgeneralizations.	  	  Generalization	  in	  
itself	  is	  not	  inherently	  negative	  as	  it	  enables	  a	  person	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  larger	  external	  world	  
beyond	  their	  personal	  experience	  and	  understanding.	  	  Cultural	  beliefs	  and	  personal	  experience	  
provide	  a	  basis	  for	  members	  of	  an	  organization	  to	  generalize	  their	  understanding	  to	  a	  broader	  
context.	  	  Humans	  develop	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  around	  them	  and	  how	  to	  interact	  
with	  others	  by	  generalizing	  based	  on	  what	  they	  know	  from	  experience	  and	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  
be	  true.150	  	  When	  such	  knowledge	  and	  beliefs	  are	  overused,	  however,	  or	  when	  a	  generalization	  
is	  ill-­‐informed,	  distortions	  are	  created	  that	  produce	  stereotypes.	  	  Stereotypes	  are	  inherently	  
prejudicial	  and	  they	  bias	  individual	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  and	  distort	  perceptions	  by	  changing	  
the	  way	  an	  individual	  perceives	  what	  is	  observed	  in	  members	  of	  other	  cultures.	  	  Social	  Identity	  
Theory	  also	  echoes	  Allport’s	  observations	  by	  positing	  that	  individuals	  generalize,	  or	  categorize,	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  ethnicity,	  nationality,	  gender,	  age,	  and	  occupation.	  	  Where	  self-­‐esteem	  is	  a	  
function	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  perceived	  in-­‐group,	  members	  maintain	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  by	  
identifying	  with	  the	  in-­‐group	  and	  by	  displaying	  discriminatory	  behavior	  toward	  out-­‐groups.151	  	  
Within	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  focus,	  Allport	  notes	  several	  conditions	  that	  portend	  higher	  levels	  of	  
prejudice	  in	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  context.	  	  Among	  these	  are	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  population,	  
ignorance	  and	  barriers	  to	  communication,	  existence	  of	  rivalries	  and	  conflict,	  and	  unfavorable	  
attitudes	  toward	  assimilation	  and	  cultural	  pluralism.152	  	  Each	  of	  these	  conditions	  seem	  
especially	  salient	  in	  the	  context	  of	  military	  service	  and	  service	  cultures,	  and	  this	  adds	  weight	  to	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the	  earlier	  notion	  that	  military	  officers	  may	  be	  especially	  susceptible	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
prejudicial	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  other	  services	  and	  their	  members.	  
To	  provide	  necessary	  focus	  and	  clarity,	  this	  study	  uses	  the	  term	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
when	  describing	  the	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  held	  by	  officers	  of	  one	  service	  toward	  officers	  of	  a	  
different	  service.	  	  This	  term	  preserves	  the	  definition	  provided	  earlier—namely,	  that	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  represents	  antipathy	  stemming	  from	  an	  overgeneralization	  and	  directed	  
toward	  a	  group	  or	  an	  individual	  of	  that	  group.	  	  At	  the	  organizational	  level,	  service	  cultural	  
beliefs	  and	  values	  provide	  the	  first	  source	  for	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  and	  most	  often	  lead	  to	  
inter-­‐service	  clashes	  over	  missions	  and	  resources.	  	  Smith	  cites	  these	  as	  historically	  contested	  
turfs	  between	  the	  different	  services,	  where	  intergroup	  competition	  for	  resources,	  even	  if	  only	  
perceived,	  can	  also	  produce	  negative	  intergroup	  attitudes	  and	  prejudice.153	  	  However,	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  may	  also	  stem	  from	  an	  officer’s	  personal	  experience	  with	  members	  of	  other	  
services	  or	  from	  the	  teaching	  and	  learning	  within	  one’s	  own	  service.154	  	  	  
Examples	  of	  cultural	  and	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  demonstrated	  by	  officers	  of	  one	  service	  
toward	  another	  are	  myriad,	  especially	  in	  operational	  circumstances.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  impact	  of	  
these	  differences	  and	  attitudes	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  military	  operations	  led	  to	  the	  monumental	  
reforms	  under	  GNA.	  	  But	  these	  continued	  even	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  reforms	  in	  1986.	  	  In	  
recounting	  Operation	  JUST	  CAUSE,	  the	  U.S.	  invasion	  of	  Panama	  in	  1989,	  Yates	  describes	  the	  
recalcitrance	  of	  Navy	  leadership	  in	  allowing	  the	  command	  of	  naval	  forces	  by	  anyone	  other	  than	  
a	  naval	  officer.	  	  The	  invasion	  plan	  long	  called	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  carrier	  battle	  group	  by	  the	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  Rupert	  Brown	  and	  Hanna	  Zagefka,	  "The	  Dynamics	  of	  Acculturation:	  An	  Intergroup	  Perspective,"	  Advances	  in	  
Experimental	  Social	  Psychology	  44	  (2011):	  151.	  
154	  Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice,	  292.	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U.S.	  Navy’s	  Atlantic	  Command	  to	  the	  joint	  task	  force	  commander,	  an	  Army	  officer,	  responsible	  
for	  executing	  the	  operation.	  	  However,	  only	  two	  months	  before	  execution,	  the	  commander	  of	  
Atlantic	  Command	  successfully	  resisted	  any	  notion	  of	  providing	  such	  a	  platform	  under	  the	  
command	  of	  an	  Army	  general.	  	  This	  continued	  despite	  insistence	  from	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  that	  he	  comply.	  	  Eventually,	  the	  carrier	  battle	  group	  was	  dropped	  from	  the	  
plan.155	  	  During	  operations	  Desert	  Shield	  and	  Desert	  Storm	  in	  1990	  and	  1991,	  contrasting	  
cultural	  beliefs	  and	  values	  led	  to	  numerous	  and	  unsettling	  circumstances	  involving	  the	  different	  
services.	  	  According	  to	  Gordon	  and	  Trainor,	  the	  leaders	  of	  each	  service	  endeavored	  to	  “fight	  its	  
own	  war,”	  avoiding	  vigorously	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  harmonization	  of	  their	  plans	  with	  the	  others.	  	  
This	  was	  no	  more	  apparent	  than	  in	  the	  disunity	  between	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Army	  and	  Marine	  
forces	  involved	  in	  the	  operations.	  	  Army	  leaders,	  in	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  their	  service	  in	  
land	  warfare,	  sought	  to	  relegate	  the	  Marines	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  role	  in	  the	  conflict,	  and	  initially	  
did	  not	  even	  include	  a	  Marine	  officer	  during	  their	  planning	  for	  the	  ground	  invasion.	  	  The	  poor	  
coordination	  resulting	  from	  the	  behaviors	  of	  Army	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  planners	  created	  grave	  
operational	  vulnerabilities	  during	  execution	  of	  the	  attack	  that	  Iraqi	  commanders	  might	  have	  
exploited	  if	  they	  had	  been	  more	  determined	  and	  aggressive.156	  	  Inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  can	  be	  
more	  apparent	  within	  an	  academic	  context,	  however.	  	  The	  JPME	  II	  programs	  of	  JFSC	  each	  
employ	  a	  seminar	  exercise	  early	  in	  the	  course	  where	  officers	  are	  asked	  to	  disclose	  their	  beliefs	  
and	  understanding	  of	  the	  members	  and	  culture	  of	  each	  of	  the	  other	  services.	  	  This	  exercise	  is	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  Yates,	  Lawrence	  A.	  The	  U.S.	  Military	  Intervention	  in	  Panama:	  Origins,	  Planning,	  and	  Crisis	  Management,	  June	  
1987	  -­‐	  December	  1989.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  of	  Military	  History,	  United	  States	  Army,	  2008).,	  91.	  	  
156	  Michael	  R.	  Gordon	  and	  General	  Bernard	  E.	  Trainor,	  The	  Generals'	  War:	  The	  Inside	  Story	  of	  the	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Gulf	  
(Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1995).,	  472-­‐3.	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usually	  enlightening	  and	  entertaining.	  	  Almost	  without	  exception,	  it	  reveals	  the	  overly	  
stereotypical	  characterizations	  officers	  hold	  toward	  the	  other	  services	  and	  their	  members.157	  	  
The	  apparent	  prevalence	  of	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  among	  military	  officers	  evokes	  an	  
important	  question:	  What	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  within	  a	  program	  that	  
has	  joint	  acculturation	  as	  an	  intended	  outcome?	  	  This	  is	  no	  small	  concern	  where	  it	  pertains	  to	  
joint	  education	  because	  instilling	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  was	  deemed	  by	  the	  Skelton	  
commission	  in	  1989	  as	  most	  important	  among	  the	  four	  components	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  Brown	  and	  
Zagefka	  acknowledge	  that	  little	  empirical	  research	  exists	  to	  adequately	  characterize	  the	  
relationship	  between	  prejudice	  and	  acculturation	  in	  general,	  but	  argue	  the	  acculturation	  
choices	  of	  in-­‐group	  members	  are	  negatively	  influenced	  by	  perceived	  discrimination	  stemming	  
from	  out-­‐group	  member	  prejudices.158	  	  Restated	  in	  a	  military	  context,	  they	  say	  that	  where	  
inter-­‐prejudices	  are	  low,	  discriminatory	  behavior	  will	  be	  low	  and	  so	  officers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
be	  accepting	  and	  tolerant	  of	  other	  service	  cultures	  and	  develop	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  
distinctions	  between	  the	  cultures.	  	  Conversely,	  high	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  gravely	  
endanger	  the	  likelihood	  of	  achieving	  optimal	  acculturation.159	  	  Brown	  and	  Zagefka	  use	  the	  
terms	  “acculturation	  choices”	  and	  “acculturation	  preferences,”	  and	  from	  this	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  
acculturation	  is	  largely	  volitional	  behavior,	  and	  perhaps	  entirely	  so	  in	  the	  context	  of	  joint	  
acculturation	  and	  JPME	  II.	  	  Officers	  cannot	  be	  forced	  to	  trade	  off	  tightly-­‐held	  cultural	  beliefs	  
and	  resultant	  attitudes	  any	  more	  than	  an	  Army	  officer	  can	  be	  forced	  to	  adopt	  aspects	  of	  Navy	  
culture.	  	  Rather,	  joint	  acculturation	  must	  occur	  through	  persuasion	  by	  providing	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  This	  observation	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  author’s	  teaching	  experience	  covering	  41	  resident	  JCWS	  seminars	  from	  
2006-­‐2017.	  
158	  Brown	  and	  Zagefka,	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Acculturation:	  An	  Intergroup	  Perspective:	  141.	  The	  authors	  cite	  several	  
studies	  demonstrating	  a	  relationship	  between	  acculturation	  and	  perceived	  prejudice.	  
159	  Ibid.,	  175.	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information	  and	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  cultures	  of	  other	  services	  and	  their	  officers.	  	  
New	  information	  and	  enhanced	  understanding	  challenge	  and	  work	  to	  change	  underlying	  
beliefs,	  as	  well	  as	  work	  to	  correct	  stereotypes	  that	  lead	  to	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  
behaviors.160	  	  	  
Effective	  and	  substantive	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  is	  therefore	  contingent	  upon	  the	  
reduction	  of	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  between	  groups,	  and	  this	  is	  accomplished	  
through	  a	  contact	  experience	  involving	  officers	  of	  different	  services.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  of	  principal	  
importance	  to	  reduce	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  within	  the	  contact	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  
foster	  appreciable	  and	  beneficial	  levels	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  
services.	  	  Minimizing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  with	  the	  inter-­‐service	  contact	  experience	  of	  JPME	  II	  
is	  imperative	  to	  achieving	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  and	  for	  the	  development	  of	  trust	  between	  
officers.	  
	  
Discerning	  Between	  Cognitive	  Bias	  and	  Prejudice	  
The	  subject	  of	  prejudice	  deserves	  some	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  or	  
differentiation	  between	  cognitive	  biases	  and	  prejudice.	  	  Cognitive	  biases	  represent	  human	  
evolutional	  adaptation	  mechanisms	  to	  allow	  for	  rapid	  processing	  of	  situations	  and	  events,	  and	  
result	  from	  mental	  “shortcuts,”	  or	  heuristics,	  rather	  than	  reliance	  on	  more	  orderly	  and	  detailed	  
thinking	  and	  understanding.	  	  Theoretically,	  these	  heuristics	  compensate	  for	  limitations	  in	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  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  (New	  York:	  
Psychology	  Press,	  2011),	  78-­‐9.	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human	  mental	  capacity.161	  	  Humans	  rely	  on	  a	  repertoire	  of	  simple	  and	  fast	  heuristics	  for	  
decision	  making,	  and	  sometimes	  these	  produce	  decisional	  defaults	  because,	  as	  mental	  
shortcuts,	  they	  fail	  to	  consider	  all	  the	  information	  at	  hand.	  	  While	  permitting	  a	  quick	  study	  of	  
the	  events	  and	  circumstances	  we	  observe	  in	  reality,	  reliance	  on	  a	  particular	  heuristic	  can	  
produce	  a	  predictable	  partiality	  that	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	  cognitive	  bias.	  	  While	  often	  adequate	  
to	  the	  situation,	  biases	  can	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  systematic	  errors	  in	  judgment	  and	  decision	  
making.162	  	  	   	  
There	  are	  many	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  bias	  demonstrated	  by	  humans,	  and	  it	  is	  outside	  the	  
scope	  of	  this	  study	  to	  consider	  most	  of	  them	  as	  they	  have	  no	  direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  
inter-­‐service	  behavior.	  	  A	  few,	  however,	  are	  worthy	  of	  some	  discussion.	  	  Samuelson	  and	  
Zeckhauser	  describe	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  context	  of	  decision	  making	  known	  as	  “status	  quo	  bias,”	  
which	  describes	  the	  circumstance	  where	  subjects	  demonstrate	  a	  tendency	  to	  remain	  at	  status	  
quo—choosing	  to	  do	  nothing—because	  of	  perceptions	  that	  leaving	  would	  be	  more	  
disadvantageous	  than	  staying.	  	  This	  creates	  a	  form	  of	  mental	  rigidity,	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  
bias	  increases	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  subject	  preference	  for	  a	  particular	  alternative	  and	  with	  an	  
increase	  in	  available	  alternatives.	  	  Individuals	  opt	  for	  status	  quo	  alternatives	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
reasons,	  including	  convenience,	  policy	  or	  custom,	  conservatism,	  fear,	  and	  rationalization.	  	  And	  
there	  may	  be	  additional	  pressures	  for	  status	  quo	  decision	  making	  when	  subjects	  act	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  In	  his	  book	  “Thinking,	  Fast	  and	  Slow”	  Kahneman	  discusses	  in	  detail	  his	  characters	  termed	  System	  1	  and	  System	  
2	  thinking,	  which	  provide	  an	  illustrative	  description	  of	  the	  mental	  processes	  and	  heuristics	  producing	  cognitive	  
biases.	  
162Martie	  G.	  Haselton,	  Daniel	  Nettle	  and	  Damian	  R.	  Murray,	  "The	  Evolution	  of	  Cognitive	  Bias,"	  in	  The	  Handbook	  of	  
Evolutionary	  Psychology,	  ed.	  David	  M.	  Buss	  (Hoboken:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2005),	  726-­‐7.;	  Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  
Amos	  Tversky,	  "Judgement	  Under	  Uncertainty:	  Heuristics	  and	  Biases,"	  Science	  185,	  no.	  4157	  (1973):	  1124.	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accordance	  with	  their	  allegiance	  to	  a	  particular	  brand	  or	  organization.163	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  
powerful	  nature	  of	  organizational	  cultures	  can	  lead	  members	  to	  adopt	  certain	  cognitive	  biases	  
that	  influence	  the	  preferences	  and	  decisions	  by	  members	  to	  opt	  for	  present	  conditions	  and	  also	  
for	  solutions	  that	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  favor	  the	  organization.	  	  This	  is	  not	  an	  inherently	  negative	  
circumstance	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  in	  doing	  so	  inter-­‐service	  cooperation	  and	  interdependency	  
within	  a	  joint	  context	  is	  not	  compromised.	  	  	  
Kahneman	  also	  describes	  “confirmatory	  bias,”	  which	  leads	  a	  subject	  to	  more	  readily	  
adopt	  or	  favor	  information	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  subject	  judges	  the	  information	  as	  
compatible	  with	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  beliefs.164	  	  Likewise,	  the	  subject	  gives	  proportionally	  less	  
consideration	  to	  information	  or	  possibilities	  viewed	  as	  contradictory	  or	  counterfactual.	  	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  consequential	  when	  a	  service	  member	  is	  
perceived	  as	  being	  particularly	  representative	  of	  the	  negative	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  attributed	  
to	  them	  by	  someone	  from	  another	  service.	  	  Negative	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  become	  much	  
more	  rigid	  and	  entrenched	  as	  a	  result.	  	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  officers	  possessing	  
extreme	  and	  deeply	  entrenched	  stereotypes	  may	  be	  problematic	  to	  effective	  joint	  education.	  	  
Another	  relevant	  cognitive	  bias,	  which	  this	  study	  refers	  to	  in	  Chapter	  V,	  is	  the	  tendency	  of	  a	  
subject	  to	  make	  judgments	  based	  on	  their	  most	  recent	  or	  most	  salient	  experiences.	  	  This	  bias	  
stems	  from	  what	  Kahneman	  and	  Tversky	  term	  the	  “availability	  heuristic,”	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  ease	  to	  which	  instances	  and	  experiences	  come	  to	  mind.165	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  William	  Samuelson	  and	  Richard	  Zeckhauser,	  "Status	  Quo	  Bias	  in	  Decision	  Making,"	  Journal	  of	  Risk	  and	  
Uncertainty	  1,	  no.	  1	  (1988):	  10.	  	  	  	  




While	  not	  unrelated,	  we	  can	  differentiate	  bias	  from	  prejudice	  in	  a	  few	  key	  ways.	  	  First,	  a	  
bias	  can	  be	  either	  positive	  or	  negative	  in	  nature,	  leading	  to	  decisions	  and	  behavior	  that	  are	  
favorable	  or	  unfavorable	  toward	  a	  circumstance,	  person	  or	  group.	  	  They	  represent	  a	  tendency	  
that	  can	  sometimes,	  but	  not	  always,	  result	  in	  unfairness.	  	  Prejudice,	  however,	  almost	  always	  
denotes	  negativity	  or	  antipathy	  toward	  social	  subjects,	  and	  often	  leads	  to	  discrimination.	  	  This	  
is	  pre-­‐judgment	  based	  on	  group	  membership	  and	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  more	  extreme	  form	  of	  
bias.	  	  Cognitive	  biases	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  implicit	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  subjects	  are	  usually	  unaware	  
that	  illogical	  tendencies	  exist	  in	  their	  thought	  process	  and	  decision	  making.	  	  By	  having	  an	  
awareness	  of	  an	  illogical	  bias	  we	  might	  believe	  a	  subject	  would	  naturally	  try	  to	  correct	  for	  
errors	  in	  judgments.	  	  Prejudice,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  explicit	  as	  well	  as	  implicit.	  	  Subjects	  
are	  often	  very	  conscious	  of	  the	  antipathy	  they	  hold	  toward	  members	  of	  other	  groups,	  but	  
having	  an	  awareness	  of	  one’s	  prejudice	  toward	  others	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  
remediation.166	  	  However,	  by	  their	  nature,	  cognitive	  bias	  and	  prejudice	  can	  both	  lead	  to	  
discrimination.	  
	  
Intergroup	  Contact	  as	  a	  Means	  of	  Reducing	  Prejudice	  
Prejudice	  reduction	  research	  traces	  back	  more	  than	  60	  years	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Williams	  
(1947)	  and,	  in	  particular,	  Allport	  (1954),	  who	  formulated	  the	  original	  “Contact	  Hypothesis”	  that	  
Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  subsequently	  developed	  into	  their	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory	  (ICT).167	  	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166Lisa	  Legault	  et	  al.,	  "On	  the	  Self-­‐Regulation	  of	  Implicit	  and	  Explicit	  Prejudice:	  A	  Self-­‐Determination	  Theory	  
Perspective,"	  Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  Bulletin	  33,	  no.	  5	  (2007):	  733.	  	  	  	  	  
167	  See	  Miles	  Hewstone	  and	  Hermann	  Swart,	  "Fifty-­‐odd	  Years	  of	  Inter-­‐Group	  Contact:	  From	  Hypothesis	  to	  
Integrated	  Theory,"	  British	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Psychology	  50,	  no.	  3	  (2011),	  374-­‐86.	  and	  John	  F.	  Dovidio,	  Samuel	  L.	  
Gaertner	  and	  Kerry	  Kawakami,	  "Intergroup	  Contact:	  The	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  the	  Future,"	  Group	  Processes	  &	  
Intergroup	  Relations	  6,	  no.	  1	  (2003),	  5-­‐21.	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hypothesis	  is	  credited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  proclamations	  of	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  
intergroup	  contact	  and	  it	  subsequently	  set	  the	  direction	  for	  much	  of	  the	  prejudice	  reduction	  
research	  that	  followed.168	  	  Since	  the	  publication	  of	  Allport’s	  groundbreaking	  volume,	  “The	  
Nature	  of	  Prejudice,”	  the	  number	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  studies	  has	  grown	  nearly	  eight-­‐fold	  and	  
the	  research	  now	  substantially	  addresses	  the	  initially	  absent	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  
involved	  in	  the	  prejudice-­‐reducing	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact.169	  	  Several	  hundred	  intergroup	  
contact	  studies	  now	  demonstrate	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  and	  this	  is	  where	  
burgeoning	  empirical	  research	  lies	  regarding	  attitudinal	  change	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  
between	  groups.	  	  	  
Central	  to	  this	  expanding	  body	  of	  knowledge	  are	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  whose	  seminal	  
works	  in	  2006	  and	  2011	  reviewed	  more	  than	  500	  contact	  studies	  and	  concluded	  unequivocally	  
that	  close	  interpersonal	  contact	  between	  groups	  of	  different	  cultures	  reduces	  prejudice.170	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  these	  two	  and	  others	  in	  the	  social	  science	  field	  have	  distilled	  a	  coherent	  and	  compelling	  
understanding	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  intergroup	  contact	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  
and	  tensions	  between	  different	  groups.	  	  The	  contact	  studies	  examined	  by	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  
considered	  in-­‐group	  attitudes	  toward	  a	  spectrum	  of	  out-­‐group	  categories	  to	  include	  racial,	  
ethnic,	  elderly,	  homosexual,	  and	  the	  disabled.	  	  As	  such,	  ICT	  stands	  as	  a	  general	  social	  
psychological	  theory	  rather	  than	  specifically	  addressing	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  circumstances.171	  	  To	  
transform	  Allport's	  hypothesis	  into	  an	  integrative	  theory,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  describe	  the	  
conditions	  and	  mediators	  at	  play	  in	  contact	  situations	  to	  explain	  the	  "when"	  and	  "how"	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  16-­‐7.	  
169	  Hewstone	  and	  Swart,	  Fifty-­‐odd	  Years	  of	  Inter-­‐Group	  Contact:	  From	  Hypothesis	  to	  Integrated	  Theory:	  375.	  
170	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  A	  Meta-­‐Analytic	  Test	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,	  751-­‐83;	  See	  also	  Hewstone	  and	  Swart,	  
Fifty-­‐odd	  Years	  of	  Inter-­‐Group	  Contact:	  From	  Hypothesis	  to	  Integrated	  Theory,	  374-­‐86	  
171	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  A	  Meta-­‐Analytic	  Test	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory:	  768.	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prejudice	  is	  reduced	  and	  also	  predict	  how	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  contact	  will	  generalize	  to	  other	  
groups	  and	  situations.	  	  
	  
Facilitating	  Conditions	  as	  Moderators	  of	  Prejudice	  Reduction	  
To	  address	  the	  question	  of	  when	  intergroup	  contact	  reduces	  prejudice	  between	  
members	  of	  different	  groups,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  borrow	  on	  the	  earlier	  works	  of	  Williams	  and	  
Allport.	  	  Williams	  was	  the	  first	  to	  articulate	  four	  conditions	  that	  increase	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  
intergroup	  contact,	  and	  these	  included	  a	  shared	  status	  and	  interests	  among	  participants;	  a	  
venue	  fostering	  personal	  intimate	  intergroup	  contact;	  participants	  who	  are	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  
stereotypes	  of	  their	  group;	  and	  intergroup	  involvement	  in	  common	  activities.172	  	  Building	  upon	  
Williams’	  initial	  observations,	  Allport	  subsequently	  reformulated	  these	  conditions	  to	  argue	  that	  
positive	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  are	  optimized	  when	  there	  is	  (1)	  equal	  group	  status	  within	  
the	  situation;	  (2)	  common	  goals	  between	  groups;	  (3)	  intergroup	  cooperation;	  and	  (4)	  
institutional	  support	  for	  the	  contact	  experience	  in	  the	  form	  of	  authorities,	  laws,	  or	  customs.173	  	  
Pettigrew,	  however,	  termed	  these	  facilitating	  conditions	  because,	  while	  they	  serve	  to	  optimize	  
the	  positive	  outcomes	  of	  intergroup	  contact,	  they	  are	  not	  judged	  as	  essential	  for	  any	  reduction	  
in	  prejudice	  to	  occur.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  these	  facilitating	  
conditions	  more	  closely	  to	  understand	  their	  application	  within	  a	  contact	  experience	  to	  achieve	  
optimal	  outcomes.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  Dovidio,	  Gaertner	  and	  Kawakami,	  Intergroup	  Contact:	  The	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  the	  Future:	  7.	  
173	  These	  are	  not	  directly	  stated	  in	  the	  book	  but	  were	  distilled	  by	  Pettigrew	  in	  consultation	  with	  Allport,	  Pettigrew	  
1971;	  Specifically,	  Allport	  stated	  that	  prejudice	  may	  be	  reduced	  by	  equal	  status	  contact	  between	  dissimilar	  groups	  
in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  common	  interests,	  and	  such	  reduction	  could	  be	  amplified	  if	  contact	  is	  institutionally	  sanctioned;	  
See	  Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice,	  281.	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With	  the	  first	  condition,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  state	  that	  subjects	  are	  expected	  to	  receive	  
equal	  status	  within	  the	  contact	  encounter.	  	  In	  practice	  this	  means	  the	  same	  opportunity	  is	  
available	  for	  everyone	  to	  participate	  in	  group	  activities,	  submit	  views	  and	  opinions,	  make	  
decisions,	  and	  access	  resources.174	  	  Where	  equal	  status	  is	  not	  established	  or	  maintained	  within	  
a	  contact	  experience,	  intergroup	  prejudices	  may	  persist,	  or	  even	  be	  reinforced,	  and	  
acculturation	  is	  jeopardized.	  	  Worse	  yet,	  in	  a	  circumstance	  of	  unequal	  status	  between	  members	  
of	  different	  groups,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  acculturation	  may	  be	  imposed,	  deliberately	  or	  unwittingly,	  
to	  the	  benefit	  of	  one	  culture	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  another.175	  	  Second,	  common	  goals	  are	  also	  
needed	  within	  the	  contact	  encounter	  to	  establish	  cooperation	  between	  members	  of	  both	  
groups.	  	  This	  creates	  interdependency	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  whereby	  each	  
needs	  the	  other	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  reaching	  the	  common	  goal.176	  	  Johnson	  and	  Eagly	  support	  
this	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  attitudinal	  change	  resulting	  from	  exposure	  to	  
information	  from	  others	  is	  greater	  where	  subjects	  had	  outcome-­‐relevant	  involvement.177	  	  Third,	  
the	  importance	  of	  intergroup	  cooperation	  as	  a	  facilitating	  condition	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  having	  a	  
common	  goal	  and	  means	  that	  members	  of	  both	  groups	  must	  actively	  work	  together	  toward	  a	  
common	  end.	  	  In	  effect,	  this	  also	  goes	  to	  say	  that	  the	  encounter	  must	  remain	  free	  of	  intergroup	  
competition,	  which	  could	  actually	  reinforce	  certain	  prejudices	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  medium	  to	  
exercise	  discrimination.178	  	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  cite	  athletic	  competition	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  
where	  a	  team	  composed	  of	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  must	  work	  together	  to	  succeed	  in	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  Redfield,	  Linton	  and	  Herskovits,	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  Study	  of	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  F.	  Pettigrew,	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  Review	  of	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  no.	  1	  (1998),	  65-­‐85.	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  Blair	  T.	  Johnson	  and	  Alice	  H.	  Eagly,	  "Effects	  of	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  on	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  Meta-­‐Analysis."	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Bulletin	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reaching	  a	  common	  goal.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  when	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  work	  
cooperatively	  toward	  a	  common	  goal	  it	  not	  only	  affords	  the	  development	  of	  friendships,	  but	  
also	  fosters	  trust.179	  	  	  
Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  describe	  the	  fourth	  condition,	  institutional	  support,	  as	  the	  
authoritative	  sanction	  or	  support	  to	  create	  a	  norm	  of	  social	  acceptance	  in	  the	  contact	  
encounter.180	  	  Positive	  and	  effective	  command	  support	  for	  the	  contact	  experience	  is	  critical	  for	  
members	  of	  different	  groups	  to	  understand	  that	  such	  contact	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  their	  
mission,	  and	  this	  condition	  also	  involves	  institutional	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  professional	  and	  
well-­‐trained	  cadre	  committed	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  integration	  (or	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice).181	  
Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  also	  appear	  to	  add	  a	  fifth	  condition	  to	  those	  articulated	  by	  Allport,	  
whereby,	  for	  optimal	  intergroup	  contact,	  the	  experience	  must	  be	  of	  sufficient	  duration	  and	  
intensity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  close	  interaction	  to	  enable	  self-­‐disclosure	  between	  members	  of	  
different	  groups	  and	  other	  friendship-­‐developing	  mechanisms	  to	  work.	  	  This	  enhancing	  
condition	  is	  termed	  friendship	  potential	  and	  stems	  from	  Pettigrew’s	  earlier	  proposition	  that	  
intergroup	  contact	  should	  be	  typified	  by	  “extensive	  and	  repeated	  contact	  across	  a	  range	  of	  
social	  contexts,	  which	  over	  time	  would	  encourage	  greater	  degrees	  of	  shared	  experience,	  self-­‐
disclosure,	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  friendship-­‐building	  processes.”182	  	  Put	  more	  simply,	  the	  contact	  
experience	  must	  provide	  people	  with	  ample	  opportunity	  to	  become	  friends.	  	  Schmid	  validates	  
this	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  amount	  and	  quality	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  are	  important	  considerations	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University	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and	  that	  the	  number	  and	  quality	  of	  friendships	  that	  develop	  between	  members	  of	  different	  
groups	  are	  a	  powerful	  reflection	  of	  such.183	  	  	  
Of	  all	  facilitating	  conditions,	  the	  need	  for	  duration	  and	  intensity	  is	  especially	  important	  
because	  cross-­‐group	  friendships	  are	  strongly	  associated	  with	  lower	  intergroup	  prejudice	  
overall.	  	  It	  is	  particularly	  so	  for	  such	  affective	  prejudice	  measures	  as	  feelings	  of	  sympathy	  and	  
admiration	  for	  members	  of	  the	  out-­‐group.	  	  By	  contrast,	  less	  intimate	  contact	  with	  out-­‐group	  
members,	  such	  as	  that	  between	  coworkers	  or	  neighbors,	  yielded	  far	  smaller	  effects.184	  	  
Reflecting	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  the	  limited	  opportunity	  for	  informal	  social	  
contact	  could	  be	  particularly	  consequential	  to	  the	  self-­‐disclosure	  among	  students	  from	  
different	  services,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  development	  of	  lasting	  friendships.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  
through	  informal	  social	  contact,	  students	  begin	  to	  see	  each	  other	  as	  much	  more	  than	  neighbors	  
or	  co-­‐workers,	  and	  so	  the	  prejudice-­‐reducing	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  yielded	  greater	  
results.185	  	  	  
The	  emphasis	  by	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  on	  the	  development	  of	  friendships	  between	  
members	  of	  different	  groups	  stems	  from	  recent	  contact	  literature	  suggesting	  that	  a	  structured	  
contact	  experience	  employing	  both	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  components,	  the	  affective	  
component	  is	  more	  consequential.186	  	  Their	  conclusion	  is	  that	  affective	  outcomes—emotions,	  
feelings,	  and	  liking—are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  positively	  influenced	  by	  intergroup	  contact	  than	  
cognitively	  oriented	  outcomes—stereotypes	  and	  beliefs.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  supported	  by	  Olson	  and	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  Quarterly	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  no.	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  Rupert	  et	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  Brown,	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Intergroup	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  European	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Psychology	  37,	  no.	  4	  (2007).	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  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	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  107.	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Zanna,	  who	  argue	  that	  in	  a	  collective	  environment	  both	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  means	  of	  
persuasion	  must	  be	  used	  in	  tandem,	  and	  that,	  of	  the	  two,	  the	  affective	  approach	  will	  be	  
especially	  powerful	  regardless.187	  	  If	  the	  affective	  changes	  resulting	  from	  intergroup	  contact	  are	  
strong	  enough,	  changes	  in	  behavior	  will	  occur.188	  	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  caution,	  however,	  that	  
there	  is	  likely	  an	  upper	  limit	  beyond	  which	  greater	  self-­‐disclosure	  will	  not	  or	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  
and	  predict	  that	  with	  continued	  exposure	  the	  effects	  of	  contact—reduction	  in	  prejudice—
would	  begin	  to	  level	  off	  with	  diminishing	  gains.189	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  state	  that	  the	  situational	  considerations	  just	  described	  are	  considered	  
facilitating	  conditions	  within	  ICT,	  representing	  optimal	  conditions	  for	  achieving	  greater	  positive	  
outcomes.	  	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  argue	  they	  are	  not	  necessary	  because	  the	  process	  by	  which	  
contact	  produces	  a	  reduction	  in	  prejudice	  resembles	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  "familiarity	  breeding	  
liking."	  	  However,	  they	  conclude	  that	  when	  incorporated	  within	  a	  structured	  contact	  experience	  
these	  facilitating	  conditions	  substantively	  contribute	  to	  achieving	  greater	  positive	  outcomes.190	  	  
	  
Mediators	  to	  Overcoming	  Prejudice	  
In	  addition	  to	  describing	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  optimal	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  
occurs,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  also	  present	  a	  conceptual	  model	  for	  how	  such	  a	  reduction	  takes	  
place,	  though	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  such	  a	  process	  in	  reality	  remains	  complex	  and	  
only	  incompletely	  understood.	  	  Nevertheless,	  their	  research	  concerning	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  
prejudice	  is	  reduced	  also	  suggests	  a	  correlation	  to	  the	  process	  by	  which	  new	  cultures	  are	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formed.	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  ICT,	  they	  identify	  knowledge,	  anxiety,	  and	  empathy	  as	  three	  
“mediators”	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  The	  fundamental	  idea	  of	  the	  process	  behind	  
prejudice	  reduction	  is	  that,	  through	  contact,	  the	  in-­‐group	  member	  gains	  useful	  knowledge	  
regarding	  out-­‐group(s),	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  reduces	  anxiety	  within	  the	  contact	  situation.	  	  By	  having	  
less	  anxiety	  the	  in-­‐group	  member	  can	  develop	  empathy,	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  out-­‐
group	  perspectives.	  	  It	  is	  this	  circumstance	  that	  fosters	  the	  development	  of	  trusting	  and	  
meaningful	  relationships	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups.191	  	  Considered	  independently,	  
they	  conclude	  that	  among	  the	  mediators,	  reducing	  anxiety	  and	  developing	  empathy	  exert	  the	  
most	  powerful	  influence	  with	  each	  accounting	  for	  as	  much	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  contact	  situation’s	  
positive	  effects.	  	  While	  still	  bringing	  about	  a	  reduction	  in	  prejudice,	  enhancing	  knowledge	  of	  
out-­‐groups	  as	  a	  mediator	  exerts	  only	  minor	  influence	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  two.192	  	  	  	  	  
Perhaps	  more	  interestingly,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  identify	  four	  additional	  and	  sequential	  
processes	  for	  further	  research	  that	  may	  shed	  light	  on	  additional	  mediators.	  	  These	  processes	  
include	  learning	  about	  the	  out-­‐group	  culture,	  changing	  intergroup	  behavior,	  restructuring	  the	  
intergroup	  relationship,	  and	  perceiving	  shifts	  in	  intergroup	  norms.193	  	  These	  additional	  
processes	  were	  first	  described	  in	  earlier	  work	  by	  Pettigrew	  as	  a	  model	  for	  how	  prejudice	  is	  
reduced	  between	  groups	  and	  are	  noteworthy	  because	  they	  appear	  analogous	  to	  Schein’s	  four	  
stages	  of	  how	  new	  culture	  emerges.	  	  For	  example,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp’s	  first	  two	  processes—	  
learning	  about	  out-­‐groups	  and	  changing	  intergroup	  behavior—describe	  an	  outcome	  that	  
generally	  reflects	  the	  outcome	  of	  Schein’s	  first	  two	  stages,	  group	  formation	  and	  group	  building,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  Ibid.,	  77.;	  Hewstone	  and	  Swart,	  Fifty-­‐odd	  Years	  of	  Inter-­‐Group	  Contact:	  From	  Hypothesis	  to	  Integrated	  Theory:	  
376.	  
192	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  79-­‐81,107.	  
193	  Ibid.,	  86-­‐90.	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where	  the	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  establish	  a	  “functional	  familiarity”	  with	  each	  other	  
allowing	  them	  to	  coexist	  and	  work	  together	  as	  an	  inclusive	  group.	  	  Members	  devote	  an	  
increasing	  amount	  of	  effort	  toward	  common	  goals	  and	  less	  to	  personal	  issues	  they	  may	  hold	  
against	  others	  in	  the	  group.194	  	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp’s	  fourth	  process	  also	  appears	  comparable	  
to	  the	  fourth	  stage	  of	  Schein’s	  model	  in	  that	  continued	  success	  by	  the	  new	  group	  reinforces	  the	  
intergroup	  relationship	  or	  culture,	  and	  such	  becomes	  slowly	  taken	  for	  granted	  as	  a	  valid	  
perspective	  or	  way	  to	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  and	  to	  the	  external	  world.195	  	  While	  Pettigrew	  and	  
Tropp	  describe	  the	  development	  of	  affective	  ties	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  as	  a	  
discrete	  procedural	  step,	  Schein’s	  model	  depicts	  the	  establishment	  and	  deepening	  of	  emotional	  
intimacy	  between	  group	  members	  as	  occurring	  across	  the	  first	  three	  stages,	  whereby	  the	  third	  
stage	  member	  differences	  are	  valued.196	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  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition,	  77,	  82.;	  Pettigrew,	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory:	  70-­‐1.	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  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	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  Edition,	  83-­‐4.	  




Figure	  1.	  Comparison	  of	  Prejudice	  Reduction	  Processes	  and	  Stages	  for	  Emerging	  Culture	  
	  
This	  comparison	  is	  compelling	  because	  it	  suggests	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  reduction	  
of	  prejudice	  and	  how	  cultures	  emerge	  or	  even	  change,	  and	  this	  is	  consequential	  to	  
understanding	  the	  importance	  of	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  where	  and	  when	  optimal	  
joint	  acculturation	  is	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  	  The	  new	  “joint”	  group,	  comprised	  of	  officers	  of	  
different	  services	  and	  cultures,	  will	  not	  progress	  toward	  a	  joint	  “culture”	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
deep-­‐seated	  prejudices	  between	  members	  of	  the	  different	  groups.	  	  By	  failing	  to	  establish	  
affective	  ties	  between	  members,	  the	  joint	  group	  will	  remain,	  at	  best,	  in	  stage	  two	  of	  Schein’s	  
model—unsuccessful	  in	  achieving	  functional	  familiarity	  and	  the	  behavioral	  norms	  enabling	  the	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group	  to	  consistently	  achieve	  common	  goals.197	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  minimization	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  represents	  a	  necessary	  but	  insufficient	  condition	  for	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  
There	  is	  another	  interesting	  similarity	  that	  appears	  between	  prejudice	  reduction	  and	  joint	  
acculturation.	  	  The	  emphasis	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  place	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
duration	  and	  intensity	  of	  the	  contact	  experience	  and	  reduced	  levels	  of	  prejudice	  between	  
groups	  echoes	  a	  similar	  observation	  made	  decades	  earlier.	  	  Then,	  Redfield	  et	  al	  associated	  the	  
intensity	  and	  duration	  of	  the	  contact	  experience	  with	  greater	  anxiety	  reduction	  and,	  
subsequently,	  greater	  acculturation,	  adding	  that	  recognition	  of	  attendant	  social,	  economic,	  or	  
political	  advantages	  afforded	  by	  acculturation	  contributed	  to	  the	  positive	  effects	  as	  well.198	  	  
In	  their	  reformulation	  of	  the	  contact	  hypothesis	  into	  an	  integrative	  theory,	  Pettigrew	  
and	  Tropp	  describe	  how	  intergroup	  contact	  acts	  to	  reduce	  prejudice.	  	  Beginning	  with	  the	  five	  
facilitating	  conditions	  of	  intergroup	  contact,	  the	  different	  groups	  proceed	  from	  a	  stage	  of	  initial	  
contact,	  where	  anxieties	  are	  overcome,	  to	  one	  of	  established	  contact,	  when	  prejudices	  begin	  to	  
diminish,	  then	  finally	  to	  the	  stage	  where	  they	  become	  a	  unified	  group	  where	  meaningful	  
relationships	  form	  between	  members	  and	  prejudice	  is	  minimized.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Differential	  Effects	  on	  Prejudice	  Reduction	  	  	  
Minimizing	  prejudice	  between	  groups	  requires	  attitudinal	  change,	  and	  attitudes	  reflect	  
a	  positive	  or	  negative	  orientation	  toward	  an	  object	  and	  have	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  
components.	  	  Likewise,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  say	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  in	  
those	  two	  attitudinal	  dimensions.	  	  Yet,	  historically,	  research	  has	  studied	  the	  effects	  of	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  Ibid.,	  79,	  82-­‐3.	  
198	  Redfield,	  Linton	  and	  Herskovits,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Acculturation:	  152.	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intergroup	  contact	  within	  one	  dimension	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  other	  without	  consideration	  of	  
the	  complex	  relationship	  and	  interplay	  between	  these	  dimensions.199	  	  They	  conclude	  through	  
their	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  contact	  studies	  that	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  components	  of	  attitude	  do	  
not	  change	  in	  tandem	  and	  that	  intergroup	  contact	  seems	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  positive	  effects	  
within	  the	  affective	  attitudinal	  dimensions	  (emotions,	  favorability,	  and	  liking)	  than	  cognitive	  
dimensions	  (beliefs,	  stereotypes,	  and	  judgments).200	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  while	  in-­‐group	  
members	  may	  feel	  more	  positively	  toward	  the	  specific	  out-­‐group	  members	  participating	  in	  the	  
contact	  experience,	  underlying	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  could	  remain	  largely	  intact.	  	  This	  also	  
suggests	  that	  affective	  changes	  may	  be	  a	  better	  indicator	  of	  how	  an	  individual	  may	  generalize	  
their	  contact	  experience	  to	  future	  situations	  and	  later	  behavior	  toward	  out-­‐groups.	  	  Though	  
their	  research	  suggests	  that	  intergroup	  contact	  may	  produce	  greater	  positive	  outcomes	  within	  
the	  affective	  dimension	  than	  with	  the	  cognitive,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  are	  careful	  to	  
acknowledge	  that	  contact	  may	  impart	  other	  more	  subtle	  but	  substantive	  cognitive	  changes.	  	  
Further,	  they	  concede	  that	  more	  pronounced	  cognitive	  change	  could	  come	  through	  contact	  
experiences	  involving	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  out-­‐group	  members	  and	  meaningful	  relationships	  
by	  in-­‐group	  members	  with	  them.201	  	  Thus,	  intergroup	  contact	  approaches	  to	  reduce	  prejudice,	  
and	  by	  extension	  to	  foster	  acculturation,	  require	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  components,	  and	  of	  
these	  the	  affective	  component	  is	  much	  more	  important.	  	  A	  cognitive	  attitude	  focuses	  on	  how	  
much	  change	  occurs	  with	  what	  people	  think	  of	  other	  groups,	  rather	  than	  how	  they	  feel	  toward	  
other	  groups,	  which	  is	  affective	  attitude.	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  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  92-­‐4.	  
200	  Ibid.,	  95,	  98.;	  Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice,	  13,	  268.	  
201	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  102.	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In	  his	  book	  “Thinking,	  Fast	  and	  Slow,”	  Kahneman	  attempts	  to	  explain	  how	  biases	  
influence	  human	  decision	  making	  by	  describing	  two	  systems	  of	  thinking	  that	  the	  mind	  uses	  in	  
processing	  external	  information	  and	  events.	  	  While	  his	  description	  of	  these	  systems	  is	  notional,	  
the	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  systems—System	  1	  and	  System	  2—provides	  a	  degree	  of	  
support	  to	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp’s	  notion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  affective	  realm	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice.	  	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  reactive	  immediacy	  of	  System	  
1	  thinking,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  deliberate	  and	  orderly	  process	  of	  System	  2,	  or	  how	  the	  intuitive,	  
emotional	  influence	  of	  the	  first	  can	  hijack	  or	  disrupt	  the	  rational	  thought	  process	  of	  the	  
second.202	  	  Indeed,	  it	  might	  very	  well	  be	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  contact	  experience,	  the	  intuitive,	  
feeling	  side	  of	  a	  subject’s	  System	  1	  thinking	  will	  experience	  dissonance	  resulting	  from	  
disagreement	  between	  their	  immediate	  expectations	  or	  beliefs	  regarding	  members	  of	  other	  
groups	  and	  what	  is	  actually	  observed.	  	  According	  to	  Kahneman,	  this	  “cognitive	  strain”	  on	  
System	  1	  thinking	  invokes	  greater	  involvement	  by	  the	  more	  rational	  System	  2	  thinking	  in	  
making	  decisions	  and	  this	  leads	  to	  more	  rational	  behavior.	  	  This	  circumstance	  stands	  in	  contrast	  
to	  the	  “cognitive	  ease”	  subjects	  may	  have	  otherwise	  enjoyed	  outside	  of	  a	  contact	  experience	  
where	  System	  1	  thinking	  alone	  would	  have	  sufficed.203	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand,	  however,	  
that	  while	  some	  similarities	  may	  be	  seen	  between	  System	  1	  and	  System	  2	  thinking	  as	  described	  
by	  Kahneman	  and	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp’s	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  domains,	  respectively,	  this	  
study	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  these	  concepts	  are	  analogous.	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Individual	  Differences	  Matter	  
While	  ICT	  describes	  the	  process	  and	  facilitating	  conditions	  by	  which	  prejudices	  toward	  
members	  of	  other	  groups	  can	  be	  overcome,	  several	  scholars	  emphasize	  that	  the	  individual	  
differences	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  contact	  experience	  influence	  outcomes	  as	  well,	  and	  such	  
differences	  are	  unavoidable	  in	  even	  the	  most	  careful	  selection	  of	  participants.	  	  Indeed,	  stark	  
differences	  in	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  of	  subjects	  can	  exist,	  even	  among	  individuals	  who	  have	  a	  
similar	  cultural	  origin	  and	  reside	  within	  their	  “acculturative	  arena.”	  	  These	  differences	  often	  
matter.204	  	  	  
Stereotypes	  can	  limit	  the	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact,	  and	  primary	  among	  
the	  differences	  in	  individuals	  is	  how	  deeply	  stereotypes	  are	  instilled.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  past	  
experience	  is	  cumulative,	  and	  so	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  are	  substantially	  
limited	  with	  individuals	  who	  demonstrate	  more	  rigid	  attitudes	  of	  social	  dominance	  resulting	  
from	  strongly	  held	  cultural	  beliefs,	  ideologies,	  or	  social	  hierarchy.	  	  The	  prejudices	  or	  biases	  of	  
such	  individuals	  are	  used	  in	  a	  competitive	  fashion	  to	  reinforce	  a	  social	  hierarchy	  or	  to	  achieve	  
dominance	  over	  a	  perceived	  out-­‐group	  or	  a	  group	  of	  a	  lower	  status.	  	  Higher	  levels	  of	  anxiety	  
result	  from	  more	  deeply	  ingrained	  prejudices,	  and	  this	  can	  lower	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  contact	  
and	  its	  positive	  effects.	  	  Simply	  put,	  if	  a	  person	  is	  more	  anxious	  in	  the	  contact	  encounter	  they	  
are	  less	  willing	  to	  participate.205	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  ICT	  facilitating	  conditions,	  such	  a	  dominant	  
orientation	  stemming	  from	  deeply	  instilled	  prejudices	  diminishes	  the	  perception	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  Sam	  and	  Berry,	  Acculturation:	  When	  Individuals	  and	  Groups	  of	  Different	  Cultural	  Backgrounds	  Meet:	  473.	  
205	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  77-­‐8.;	  Landis,	  Hope	  and	  Day,	  




participants	  in	  the	  contact	  experience	  share	  equal	  status.206	  	  Overcoming	  such	  deeply	  instilled	  
individual	  differences	  may	  be	  difficult,	  regardless	  of	  the	  duration	  and	  intensity	  of	  the	  contact	  
experience.	  	  Stereotypes	  more	  tightly	  held	  induce	  more	  cognitive	  dissonance	  when	  overturning	  
them,	  and	  this	  results	  in	  higher	  levels	  of	  anxiety	  and	  mental	  instability.	  	  Likewise,	  this	  can	  occur	  
when	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  expected	  and	  observed	  behavior	  of	  out-­‐group	  members	  in	  a	  
contact	  situation	  is	  substantial.207	  	  
While	  research	  of	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  demonstrates	  that	  intergroup	  contact	  reduces	  
prejudice,	  these	  scholars	  observe	  that	  the	  converse	  also	  holds	  true:	  prejudice	  can	  restrict	  or	  
reduce	  intergroup	  contact.208	  	  Individuals	  holding	  more	  tightly	  to	  stereotypes	  create	  another	  
circumstance	  affecting	  the	  success	  of	  programs	  seeking	  to	  reduce	  prejudice	  through	  intergroup	  
contact—highly	  prejudiced	  people	  will	  not	  participate	  voluntarily	  and	  this	  creates	  selection	  
bias.	  	  Brown	  and	  Zagefka	  agree	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  contact	  are	  greater	  among	  
participants	  who	  hold	  less	  prejudice	  at	  the	  start	  because	  such	  individuals	  are	  likely	  to	  seek	  
contact	  where	  others	  might	  avoid	  it.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  greater	  positive	  outcomes	  are	  gained	  because	  
the	  participants	  of	  both	  groups	  are,	  from	  the	  start,	  more	  tolerant	  and	  open-­‐minded.209	  	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  forcing	  individuals	  with	  deeply	  instilled	  prejudices	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  intergroup	  
contact	  experience	  can	  bring	  about	  adverse	  or	  negative	  outcomes.	  	  Situations	  involving	  
involuntary	  participants	  who	  feel	  threatened	  within	  the	  contact	  situation	  strongly	  predict	  
negative	  effects	  as	  a	  result.	  	  Indeed,	  such	  effects	  often	  arise	  in	  the	  workplace	  environment	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where	  intergroup	  competition	  exists	  and	  in	  situations	  where	  intergroup	  conflict	  is	  present.210	  	  
This	  is	  to	  say	  that,	  instead	  of	  correcting	  negative	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs,	  involuntary	  encounters	  
could	  actually	  reinforce	  them.	  	  	  
Though	  possible	  in	  both	  voluntary	  and	  involuntary	  contact	  encounters,	  the	  participation	  
by	  out-­‐group	  members	  who	  largely	  reflect	  the	  attributes	  associated	  to	  them	  by	  stereotypes	  can	  
also	  serve	  to	  more	  deeply	  instill	  or	  reinforce	  the	  prejudices	  held	  by	  in-­‐group	  members.	  	  In	  
effect,	  such	  individuals	  enable	  confirmation	  bias,	  where	  in-­‐group	  members	  find	  the	  very	  
characteristics,	  attitudes,	  and/or	  behaviors	  they	  expect	  in	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  out-­‐group,	  
and	  this	  serves	  to	  confirm	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  beliefs	  and	  stereotypes.	  	  However,	  Pettigrew	  and	  
Tropp	  temper	  their	  findings	  regarding	  the	  influence	  of	  selection	  bias	  in	  structured	  intergroup	  
experiences.	  	  They	  do	  so	  because	  of	  the	  two	  causal	  paths—contact	  reducing	  prejudice	  and	  
prejudice-­‐reducing	  contact—the	  first	  is	  more	  strongly	  demonstrated	  than	  the	  second.211	  	  
Perhaps	  more	  specific	  to	  this	  study,	  ICT	  holds	  that	  other	  individual	  predictors	  are	  
consistently	  associated	  with	  the	  scope	  and	  strength	  of	  prejudices	  held	  by	  individuals.	  	  These	  
include	  factors	  relating	  to	  the	  individual’s	  social	  context	  and	  socio-­‐location,	  economic	  status,	  
political	  abilities,	  personality	  orientation,	  group	  identification,	  perception	  of	  threat,	  and	  
experience.212	  	  These	  predictors,	  which	  are	  specific	  to	  each	  individual,	  interact	  with	  the	  
facilitating	  conditions	  of	  prejudice	  reduction	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome,	  positively	  or	  negatively,	  
of	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  Regardless,	  when	  controlling	  for	  such	  predictors,	  prejudice-­‐reducing	  
effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  remain	  strongly	  demonstrated.	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Prejudice	  Reduction	  as	  a	  Foundation	  for	  Joint	  Acculturation	  	  
JPME	  II	  is	  the	  principle	  means	  for	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  in	  the	  U.S.	  military.	  	  
Yet,	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  largely	  volitional	  behavior—the	  tradeoff	  or	  change	  in	  cultural	  values	  
and	  beliefs	  cannot	  easily	  be	  forced	  upon	  an	  officer	  who	  does	  not	  welcome	  a	  different	  attitude	  
or	  perspective.	  	  This	  chapter	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  relationship	  exists	  between	  joint	  
acculturation	  and	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice—mainly	  that	  the	  minimization	  of	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  within	  a	  contact	  experience	  represents	  a	  necessary	  but	  insufficient	  condition	  
for	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  to	  occur.	  	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  while	  officers	  will	  not	  
necessarily	  acculturate	  in	  an	  environment	  absent	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  it	  will	  be	  
exceptionally	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  for	  them	  to	  do	  so	  voluntarily	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  deep-­‐
seated	  prejudicial	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors.	  	  	  
JPME	  II	  cannot	  force	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  Rather,	  to	  enable	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  to	  
occur,	  it	  must	  instead	  provide	  the	  ideal	  intergroup	  contact	  experience	  and	  sufficient	  time	  to	  
disabuse	  officers	  from	  the	  harmful	  prejudices	  they	  harbor.	  	  This	  is	  accomplished	  by	  creating	  an	  
environment	  characterized	  by	  greater	  understanding,	  lowered	  anxiety,	  and	  increased	  empathy	  
between	  members	  of	  different	  groups.	  	  With	  sufficient	  duration	  and	  intensity,	  such	  an	  open	  
and	  accepting	  environment	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  representing	  
a	  particularly	  powerful	  positive	  outcome	  of	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  Prejudice	  reduction	  can	  also	  
lead	  to	  greater	  trust.	  	  Tropp	  observes	  that	  the	  willingness	  of	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  to	  
form	  deep	  and	  lasting	  friendships	  also	  hinges	  on	  the	  trust	  that	  develops	  between	  them.	  	  While	  
a	  feeling	  of	  distrust	  is	  often	  the	  case	  between	  groups	  at	  the	  start	  of	  a	  contact	  experience,	  the	  
prejudice-­‐reducing	  effects	  of	  a	  structured	  contact	  encounter	  also	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  increased	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trust	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups.	  	  Such	  trust	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  feeling	  of	  
confidence	  and	  security	  in	  the	  intentions	  of	  others	  and	  implies	  an	  absence	  of	  threat.213	  	  Earlier,	  
this	  chapter	  illustrated	  that	  trust	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  is	  imperative	  to	  true	  
jointness.	  	  It	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  such	  trust	  is	  antecedent	  to	  any	  volitional	  change	  or	  
tradeoff	  of	  cultural	  values	  and	  beliefs	  resulting	  from	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  This	  makes	  joint	  
acculturation	  a	  by-­‐product	  not	  only	  of	  the	  reduction	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  but	  also	  of	  the	  
increased	  trust	  established	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  services.	  	  The	  increased	  trust	  resulting	  
from	  a	  structured	  JPME	  II	  contact	  experience	  enables	  joint	  acculturation	  to	  occur	  more	  broadly	  
and	  deeply.	  	  JPME	  II	  is	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  intergroup	  contact	  experience	  by	  which	  officers	  
of	  different	  services	  may	  gain	  better	  understanding	  of	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  diminish	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  and	  to	  develop	  trust.214	  	  
	  
Assessing	  JPME	  II	  Outcomes	  
Growing	  pressure	  to	  increase	  throughput,	  lower	  costs,	  and	  provide	  greater	  accessibility	  
is	  leading	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  in	  more	  tailored	  ways.	  	  Yet,	  doing	  so	  without	  considering	  
the	  potential	  difference	  in	  their	  outcomes	  may	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  
jointness.	  	  Pisel	  correctly	  observes	  that	  the	  “inculcation	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,”	  
known	  in	  other	  terms	  as	  joint	  acculturation,	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  
JFSC	  unique,	  and	  a	  certain	  measure	  of	  direct	  student	  interaction	  remains	  “indispensable”	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  and	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  in	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  the	  Legacy	  of	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew,	  ed.	  
Ulrich	  Wagner	  and	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  (Malden:	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  Wiley	  &	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  2009).,	  92-­‐4.	  	  
214	  .	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	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toward	  this	  end.215	  	  At	  present,	  it	  remains	  largely	  unknown	  how	  well	  the	  various	  delivery	  
methods	  for	  JPME	  II	  delivered	  by	  JFSC	  serve	  to	  reduce	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  among	  students	  
and,	  therefore,	  even	  less	  is	  understood	  regarding	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  
achieved	  with	  officers	  from	  different	  services.	  	  This	  is	  because	  scant	  research	  exists	  regarding	  
the	  efficacy	  of	  JPME	  II	  offered	  through	  JFSC	  in	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  to	  foster	  optimal	  
acculturation.	  	  The	  singular	  case	  is	  the	  research	  by	  Poole,	  who	  investigated	  the	  impact	  of	  in-­‐
resident	  JPME	  II	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  mid-­‐grade	  officers	  from	  each	  of	  the	  different	  military	  
services,	  concluding	  that	  the	  contact	  experience	  provided	  by	  the	  resident	  method	  of	  JFSC	  not	  
only	  incorporated	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  Pettigrew’s	  earlier	  formulation	  of	  ICT	  but	  also	  
resulted	  in	  statistically	  significant	  attitudinal	  change.216	  	  Though	  the	  data	  considered	  in	  his	  study	  
largely	  rested	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  changes,	  Poole	  did	  not	  establish	  any	  
relationship	  between	  these	  changes	  and	  any	  consequent	  change	  in	  the	  joint	  beliefs	  or	  
perspectives	  (i.e.	  joint	  acculturation)	  which	  might	  have	  taken	  place.	  	  Ruth	  conducted	  a	  similar	  
study	  of	  the	  change	  of	  attitude	  by	  senior	  officers	  attending	  the	  year-­‐long	  Industrial	  College	  of	  
the	  Armed	  Forces,	  which	  is	  an	  accredited	  JPME	  II	  institution	  but	  with	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  
mission	  that	  lacks	  the	  mission	  task	  to	  instill	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives.	  	  While	  his	  research	  
considered	  ICT	  and	  concluded	  that	  significant	  changes	  in	  attitude	  occurred,	  such	  changes	  were	  
not	  categorically	  demonstrated	  across	  all	  services.217	  	  More	  importantly,	  his	  research	  
specifically	  addressed	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  change	  and	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  subject	  of	  joint	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acculturation.	  	  The	  differences	  in	  the	  research	  approaches	  of	  Poole	  and	  Ruth	  also	  make	  it	  
difficult	  to	  compare	  any	  similarities	  that	  may	  exist	  in	  their	  findings.	  	  However,	  these	  two	  have	  
focused	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  ICT	  toward	  understanding	  the	  outcomes	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  With	  respect	  
to	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  under	  consideration	  by	  this	  study—resident,	  satellite,	  and	  
hybrid—the	  facilitating	  conditions	  specified	  by	  ICT	  provide	  a	  useful	  basis	  by	  which	  to	  mark	  
significant	  similarities	  and	  distinctions	  among	  them.	  	  Accordingly,	  these	  will	  allow	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  hypotheses	  regarding	  the	  impacts	  made	  on	  student	  officers	  attending	  each	  of	  
the	  three	  delivery	  methods,	  which	  will	  in	  turn	  help	  in	  understanding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  JPME	  II	  
programs	  offered	  through	  JFSC.	  	  Chapter	  III	  discusses	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  in	  greater	  
detail	  and,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  ICT,	  describes	  the	  resulting	  hypotheses	  











	  “If	  you're	  not	  measuring	  things,	  you	  don't	  care	  and	  you	  don't	  know.”	  
-­‐	  Steve	  Howard	  
	  
A	  Closer	  Look	  at	  the	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  Programs	  
As	  Chapter	  II	  established,	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  through	  the	  JFSC	  are	  intended	  to	  
be	  the	  primary	  means	  for	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  services.	  	  The	  
previous	  chapter	  demonstrated	  that,	  given	  its	  volitional	  nature,	  optimal	  acculturation	  would	  be	  
difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  within	  a	  contact	  experience	  
such	  as	  the	  JFSC	  programs.	  	  Therefore,	  JPME	  II	  programs	  must	  minimize	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  if	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  is	  to	  occur.	  	  In	  an	  environment	  where	  pressures	  exist	  to	  
create	  additional	  JPME	  II	  offerings,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  how	  effectively	  the	  three	  different	  
methods	  of	  delivery—Resident,	  Satellite,	  and	  Hybrid—are	  fulfilling	  the	  critical	  outcome	  of	  joint	  
acculturation	  by	  minimizing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  among	  the	  students	  attending	  them.	  	  In	  
moving	  forward	  with	  new	  and	  creative	  methods	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  
understand	  whether	  differences	  in	  outcomes	  exist	  and,	  if	  so,	  what	  these	  differences	  mean	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  ICT.	  	  This	  study	  conducts	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  survey	  data	  collected	  by	  
the	  JFSC	  for	  each	  program	  to	  help	  answer	  the	  research	  question,	  Do	  the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  
course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  prejudice	  among	  
military	  officers?	  	  	  
The	  three	  delivery	  methods	  are	  first	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  five	  facilitating	  
conditions	  of	  ICT,	  highlighting	  where	  similarities	  and	  distinctions	  exist	  between	  them.	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Additionally,	  it	  examines	  the	  influence	  of	  individual	  professional	  background	  factors	  that	  can	  
moderate	  the	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  These	  differences	  lead	  to	  key	  hypotheses	  
regarding	  the	  outcomes	  expected	  from	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  the	  survey	  data.	  	  This	  chapter	  
concludes	  with	  the	  detailed	  presentation	  of	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  
outcome	  of	  each	  program	  and	  to	  find	  support	  for	  the	  hypotheses.	  
	   As	  was	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  JFSC	  now	  employs	  three	  distinct	  and	  accredited	  programs	  
for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  delivery	  methods	  is	  the	  in-­‐resident	  JCWS,	  the	  
second	  is	  the	  JCWS	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program,	  and	  the	  third	  is	  the	  recently	  accredited	  
JCWS-­‐Hybrid.	  	  All	  three	  programs	  share	  a	  common	  OPMEP	  mission	  statement,	  which	  includes	  
the	  task	  to	  “instill	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective,”	  and	  they	  have	  common	  learning	  areas	  as	  
well.1	  	  As	  the	  first	  of	  these	  delivery	  methods,	  the	  JCWS	  program	  (resident	  method)	  represents	  
the	  principle	  JPME	  II	  course	  of	  instruction,	  producing	  more	  than	  900	  graduates	  annually.2	  	  It	  is	  a	  
10-­‐week	  resident	  program	  offered	  four	  times	  each	  year	  and	  conducted	  with	  students	  residing	  
at	  or	  near	  JFSC	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  course.3	  	  Resident	  students	  are	  primarily	  active	  
component	  officers,	  who	  attend	  in	  person	  at	  the	  JFSC	  in	  Norfolk,	  Virginia	  and	  are	  organized	  into	  
seminars	  typically	  numbering	  between	  16-­‐18	  students.	  	  Service	  representation	  within	  each	  
seminar	  is	  balanced,	  with	  the	  number	  of	  officers	  attending	  from	  each	  service	  divided	  among	  13	  
or	  14	  seminars.	  	  Students	  are	  also	  assigned	  to	  seminars	  based	  on	  their	  rank	  and	  seniority,	  
where	  those	  in	  the	  rank	  of	  major	  and	  junior	  lieutenant	  colonel/commander	  attend	  as	  part	  of	  an	  
intermediate	  seminar.	  	  The	  more	  senior	  officers	  attend	  as	  part	  of	  a	  senior	  seminar.	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  Officer	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Education	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  (Washington	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  College:	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3	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  officers	  already	  residing	  in	  the	  Norfolk	  Area	  occupy	  approximately	  10-­‐20	  percent	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  a	  given	  
JCWS	  class.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  in	  temporary	  duty	  status	  and	  are	  separated	  from	  their	  domestic	  demands.	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Department	  of	  Defense	  civilians	  and	  international	  fellows—officers	  from	  foreign	  militaries—
also	  attend	  the	  resident	  program,	  with	  typically	  one	  or	  two	  assigned	  to	  each	  seminar.	  	  Among	  
the	  three	  delivery	  methods,	  resident	  seminars	  reflect	  a	  particularly	  high	  level	  of	  functional	  and	  
experiential	  diversity.	  	  This	  is	  because	  officers	  in	  these	  seminars	  belong	  to	  various	  combined,	  
joint,	  and	  service-­‐level	  commands	  from	  around	  the	  world	  and	  this	  diversity	  is	  complemented	  by	  
the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  international	  fellows.	  	  The	  resident	  curriculum	  is	  structured	  to	  educate	  
students	  in	  joint	  matters	  by	  addressing	  the	  learning	  areas	  prescribed	  by	  the	  chairman	  through	  
the	  OPMEP.	  	  It	  is	  designed	  using	  Bloom’s	  taxonomy	  of	  learning,	  beginning	  with	  lesson	  
objectives	  oriented	  on	  knowledge	  and	  comprehension	  levels	  in	  the	  front	  end	  of	  the	  course	  and	  
moving	  progressively	  through	  application,	  synthesis,	  and,	  ultimately,	  evaluation	  levels	  of	  
learning.4	  	  The	  JCWS	  faculty	  delivering	  the	  resident	  curriculum	  are	  comprised	  almost	  entirely	  of	  
active	  and	  retired	  joint-­‐qualified	  military	  officers	  and,	  of	  these,	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  are	  JQOs	  
and	  almost	  10	  percent	  have	  terminal	  degrees.5	  
The	  second	  delivery	  method	  is	  the	  JCWS	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program	  (satellite	  
method),	  which	  is	  a	  single	  JCWS	  seminar	  conducted	  away	  from	  the	  JFSC	  campus,	  usually	  at	  the	  
location	  of	  a	  combatant	  command	  headquarters.	  	  This	  program	  began	  as	  a	  pilot	  in	  2013,	  and	  
later	  became	  a	  permanent	  alternative	  to	  the	  resident	  program	  in	  Norfolk;	  it	  graduates	  
approximately	  72	  students	  annually.	  	  Though	  conducted	  at	  various	  geographic	  locations,	  the	  
satellite	  method	  follows	  the	  same	  basic	  model	  as	  JCWS	  in	  that	  it	  is	  10	  weeks	  long,	  offered	  four	  
times	  per	  year,	  and	  executes	  concurrently	  with	  the	  resident	  program	  in	  Norfolk.	  	  It	  also	  has	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  David	  R.	  Krathwohl,	  Benjamin	  S.	  Bloom	  and	  Bertram	  B.	  Masia,	  Taxonomy	  of	  Educational	  Objectives:	  The	  
Classification	  of	  Educational	  Goals,	  Book	  2	  Affective	  Domain,	  Vol.	  2	  (New	  York:	  Longmans,	  1964).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Process	  for	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education	  (PAJE)	  Self-­‐Study	  Report:	  Joint	  Advanced	  Warfighting	  School	  (JAWS)	  
and	  Joint	  and	  Combined	  Warfighting	  School	  (JCWS).	  (Norfolk,	  VA:	  [March	  2014]),	  Chapters	  6,	  8.	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same	  student	  prerequisites	  and,	  with	  some	  notable	  exceptions,	  the	  same	  curriculum.6	  	  Satellite	  
students	  attend	  in	  person	  and	  are	  primarily	  active	  component	  military	  officers	  in	  the	  rank	  of	  
major/lieutenant	  commander	  through	  colonel/captain	  and	  are	  usually	  assigned	  to	  the	  same	  
joint	  command	  proximate	  to	  the	  location	  of	  each	  satellite	  seminar.	  	  To	  date,	  no	  international	  
fellows	  have	  attended	  as	  part	  of	  a	  satellite	  seminar.	  	  Though	  virtually	  all	  satellite	  students	  have	  
accumulated	  some	  measure	  of	  joint	  duty	  experience,	  the	  professional	  and	  experiential	  diversity	  
within	  the	  seminar	  is	  narrower	  than	  that	  of	  typical	  resident	  seminars	  and	  student	  dialogue	  is	  
often	  limited	  to	  the	  cultural	  and	  operational	  perspective	  of	  the	  sponsoring	  command.	  	  The	  
satellite	  mirrors	  many	  of	  the	  same	  structural	  aspects	  of	  the	  resident	  approach,	  particularly	  in	  
seminar	  size,	  and	  the	  content,	  organization,	  and	  delivery	  of	  curriculum.	  	  However,	  qualitative	  
differences	  do	  exist	  between	  the	  satellite	  and	  the	  resident	  programs.	  	  	  
First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  satellite	  seminar	  is	  conducted	  away	  from	  Norfolk,	  and	  this	  often	  
means	  satellite	  students	  have	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  live	  guest	  speakers,	  subject	  matter	  experts	  
such	  as	  the	  JFSC	  Defense	  Intelligence	  Agency	  and	  Department	  of	  State	  chairs,	  a	  joint	  
professional	  library,	  and	  other	  resources	  freely	  available	  to	  resident	  students.	  	  Second,	  the	  
satellite	  program	  only	  offers	  two	  electives	  to	  its	  students	  versus	  the	  more	  than	  two	  dozen	  
available	  in	  the	  resident	  program.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  satellite	  program	  does	  not	  have	  an	  intramural	  
sports	  program.	  	  The	  faculty	  conducting	  the	  satellite	  are	  temporarily	  drawn	  from	  JCWS	  and	  
return	  to	  teach	  in	  resident	  seminars	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  their	  satellite	  seminar.	  	  As	  such,	  they	  
are	  primarily	  active	  and	  retired	  JQOs,	  and	  possess	  either	  a	  master’s	  or	  terminal	  degree.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Kenneth	  Pisel,	  "JPME	  II	  Available	  at	  Satellite	  Sites,"	  Joint	  Force	  Quarterly,	  no.	  82	  (3rd	  Quarter	  2016):	  129.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  
	  
The	  third	  delivery	  method	  considered	  by	  this	  study	  is	  the	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  (hybrid	  method),	  
recently	  accredited	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  and	  renamed	  from	  its	  original	  title,	  AJPME.7	  	  
Initiated	  in	  2003,	  this	  program	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  first	  two	  delivery	  methods	  in	  that	  it	  
exclusively	  supports	  officers	  from	  the	  reserve	  components.8	  	  Also	  unlike	  the	  others,	  the	  hybrid	  
method	  employs	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  online	  and	  in-­‐resident	  education	  conducted	  over	  40	  
weeks.	  	  The	  program	  executes	  three	  different	  classes	  or	  cohorts	  running	  concurrently,	  but	  
independently,	  each	  year,	  producing	  approximately	  225	  graduates	  in	  2016.	  	  The	  students	  are	  
exclusively	  reserve	  component	  and	  National	  Guard	  officers,	  typically	  ranging	  in	  rank	  from	  
major/lieutenant	  commander	  to	  major	  general/rear	  admiral.	  	  Like	  their	  counterparts	  attending	  
the	  resident	  and	  satellite	  programs,	  these	  officers	  received	  their	  pre-­‐commissioning	  and	  
occupational	  specialty	  education	  from	  their	  respective	  active	  component	  service,	  and	  many	  
have	  accumulated	  substantial	  active	  duty	  experience.	  	  While	  sharing	  some	  measure	  of	  
commonality	  in	  military	  origin	  and	  experiences	  with	  their	  active	  component	  counterparts,	  
substantive	  differences	  undoubtedly	  exist	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  have	  shared,	  or	  been	  
subjected	  to,	  the	  culture-­‐shaping	  mechanisms	  of	  their	  respective	  service.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  
unlike	  active	  component	  officers,	  the	  military	  career	  of	  reserve	  and	  National	  Guard	  officers	  is	  
typically	  secondary	  to	  the	  career	  path	  they	  follow	  as	  a	  private	  citizen.	  	  Each	  hybrid	  seminar	  has	  
approximately	  25	  students	  representing	  the	  reserve	  component	  of	  each	  service	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Though,	  with	  its	  recent	  accreditation,	  it	  is	  now	  authorized	  to	  accept	  officers	  from	  the	  active	  component	  
beginning	  in	  2017.	  	  The	  chairman	  recently	  accredited	  AJPME	  to	  grant	  JPME	  II	  credit,	  renaming	  the	  course	  JCWS-­‐
Hybrid,	  and	  has	  allowed	  attendance	  by	  active	  component	  officers.	  See	  OPMEP	  Change	  1	  dated	  30	  June	  2016.	  
8	  Title	  10	  USC,	  Chapter	  38,	  Section	  666	  directed	  a	  parallel	  effort	  for	  RC	  officers:	  “The	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  shall	  
establish	  personnel	  policies	  emphasizing	  education	  and	  experience	  in	  joint	  matters	  for	  reserve	  officers	  not	  on	  the	  
active-­‐duty	  list.	  Such	  policies	  shall,	  to	  the	  extent	  practicable	  for	  reserve	  component,	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  policies	  [for	  




Army	  and	  Air	  National	  Guard.	  	  Historically,	  active	  component	  officers	  have	  not	  attended	  the	  
hybrid	  program	  primarily	  because	  it	  was	  not	  accredited	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  With	  the	  
recent	  accreditation	  of	  this	  program,	  officers	  from	  the	  active	  component	  may	  soon	  begin	  
enrolling.	  	  International	  officers	  are	  not	  included	  in	  hybrid	  seminars.	  	  The	  curriculum	  employed	  
by	  the	  program	  is	  closely	  based	  on	  that	  of	  the	  resident	  program,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  identical	  as	  a	  
substantial	  portion	  of	  it	  is	  adapted	  for	  online	  delivery.	  	  Like	  the	  satellite	  program,	  the	  hybrid	  
program	  differs	  from	  the	  resident	  program	  in	  some	  respects.	  	  First,	  the	  curriculum	  is	  adapted	  in	  
some	  cases	  to	  facilitate	  delivery	  in	  a	  distance-­‐learning	  environment,	  and	  accordingly	  some	  
group-­‐centered	  work	  has	  become	  individual	  effort.	  	  During	  the	  long	  distance-­‐learning	  periods,	  
hybrid	  students	  also	  have	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  guest	  speakers,	  subject	  matter	  experts	  such	  as	  
the	  JFSC	  Defense	  Intelligence	  Agency	  and	  Department	  of	  State	  chairs,	  a	  joint	  professional	  
library,	  and	  other	  JFSC	  resources	  freely	  available	  to	  resident	  students.	  	  Finally,	  students	  in	  the	  
hybrid	  program	  neither	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  electives	  nor	  to	  play	  in	  an	  
intramural	  sports	  program.	  	  The	  hybrid	  program	  faculty	  also	  differs	  from	  those	  in	  JCWS	  who	  
serve	  the	  resident	  and	  satellite	  programs	  in	  that	  they	  are	  primarily	  reserve	  component	  and	  
National	  Guard	  officers.	  	  Though	  the	  level	  of	  joint-­‐duty	  experience	  varies	  among	  the	  hybrid	  
faculty,	  only	  about	  30	  percent	  were	  JQOs	  and	  none	  had	  terminal	  degrees	  as	  of	  the	  latest	  PAJE	  
self-­‐study	  report	  in	  2013.9	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  .	  Process	  for	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education	  (PAJE)	  Self-­‐Study	  Report:	  Advance	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  




Table	  1.	  Structural	  Similarity	  Between	  Delivery	  Methods	  
	  
Applying	  the	  Five	  Facilitating	  Conditions	  of	  ICT	  
Each	  of	  these	  three	  delivery	  methods	  shares	  a	  common	  OPMEP	  mission	  that	  uniquely	  
charges	  them	  to	  instill	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  in	  their	  students.	  	  We	  may	  infer	  from	  this	  
that	  each	  program	  should	  produce	  a	  comparable	  student	  outcome	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
joint	  acculturation	  they	  achieve.	  	  As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  explained,	  joint	  acculturation,	  as	  
volitional	  behavior,	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  is	  minimized	  
within	  a	  structured	  contact	  encounter.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  ICT,	  the	  five	  facilitating	  
conditions	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  by	  which	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  three	  delivery	  
methods	  and	  to	  develop	  hypotheses	  relating	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  delivery	  method	  on	  the	  
reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  Applying	  these	  conditions	  highlights	  where	  strong	  
similarities	  exist	  between	  the	  methods,	  and	  this	  seems	  most	  apparent	  with	  the	  second	  and	  
third	  facilitating	  conditions.	  	  The	  second	  facilitating	  condition	  states	  that	  within	  the	  contact	  
encounter	  common	  goals	  are	  needed	  to	  create	  interdependency	  between	  members	  of	  
different	  groups,	  while	  the	  third	  condition	  specifies	  intergroup	  cooperation,	  which	  requires	  that	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members	  of	  different	  groups	  actively	  cooperate	  toward	  a	  common	  end.10	  	  Common	  goals	  and	  
intergroup	  cooperation	  are	  driven	  largely	  by	  curriculum,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  
correlation	  between	  the	  curricula	  of	  the	  three	  programs.	  	  To	  differing	  degrees,	  the	  curriculum	  
for	  each	  prescribes	  numerous	  group-­‐centered	  practical	  exercises	  where	  each	  group	  is	  assigned	  
clearly	  articulated	  outcomes	  they	  must	  achieve	  and	  where	  the	  service	  representation	  in	  each	  
group	  is	  balanced	  according	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  seminar.	  	  	  Similarity	  also	  exists	  between	  
the	  three	  programs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  fourth	  condition,	  institutional	  support,	  which	  is	  official	  
sanction	  or	  support	  to	  create	  a	  norm	  of	  social	  or	  authoritative	  acceptance	  in	  the	  contact	  
encounter.11	  	  This	  seems	  no	  more	  apparent	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  JFSC	  itself	  that	  executes	  all	  three,	  
providing	  common	  leadership	  endorsement	  and	  institutional	  resources	  and	  support	  for	  each	  
program.	  	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  students	  attending	  these	  programs,	  this	  
condition	  is	  strongly	  supported	  by	  the	  accreditation	  of	  each	  program	  by	  the	  chairman	  to	  deliver	  
JPME	  II,	  and	  beyond	  these	  three	  methods	  the	  students	  would	  have	  little	  or	  no	  opportunity	  to	  
receive	  JPME	  II	  from	  other	  accredited	  institutions.12	  	  	  
Allport’s	  facilitating	  conditions	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice,	  as	  articulated	  by	  ICT,	  also	  
provide	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  by	  which	  to	  establish	  important	  and	  perhaps	  consequential	  
differences	  between	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods.	  	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  significant	  
differences	  exist	  between	  the	  principle	  method	  of	  resident	  delivery	  and	  the	  alternative	  
approaches,	  and	  this	  is	  of	  potential	  consequence	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudices	  are	  reduced.	  	  The	  first	  condition	  of	  equal	  status	  states	  that	  students	  within	  a	  contact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew,	  "Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,"	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Psychology	  49,	  no.	  1	  (1998):	  67.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Ibid.,	  67.;	  See	  also	  Rupert	  Brown	  and	  Hanna	  Zagefka,	  "The	  Dynamics	  of	  Acculturation:	  An	  Intergroup	  
Perspective,"	  Advances	  in	  Experimental	  Social	  Psychology	  44	  (2011),	  129-­‐84.	  
12	  Officers	  attending	  a	  Senior	  Level	  Colleges	  are	  normally	  selected	  by	  a	  competitive	  screening	  board,	  and	  successful	  
screening	  normally	  correlates	  to	  the	  officer’s	  potential	  for	  selection	  to	  Colonel/Captain.	  
100	  
	  
encounter	  must	  perceive	  that	  they	  have	  equal	  opportunity	  to	  participate,	  to	  contribute,	  and	  to	  
equal	  consideration	  of	  their	  opinions	  and	  perspectives.	  	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  same	  
opportunity	  is	  available	  for	  everyone	  to	  participate	  in	  group	  activities,	  submit	  views	  and	  
opinions,	  make	  decisions,	  and	  to	  access	  resources.13	  	  Whenever	  a	  program	  fails	  to	  establish	  or	  
maintain	  equal	  status	  within	  the	  contact	  experience,	  intergroup	  prejudices	  may	  persist,	  or	  even	  
strengthen,	  and	  this	  jeopardizes	  acculturation.	  	  With	  the	  seminar	  environment,	  this	  means	  that	  
no	  one	  person	  or	  group	  should	  be	  preponderant,	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  address	  disparity	  in	  rank	  
and	  service	  representation	  to	  the	  fullest	  extent	  possible.	  	  	  
For	  the	  resident	  program,	  the	  joint	  staff	  governs	  the	  compositional	  makeup	  of	  each	  
class	  through	  a	  size	  and	  composition	  directive.	  	  This	  directive	  provides	  for	  proportional	  service	  
representation	  in	  each	  class	  and	  enables	  the	  creation	  of	  intermediate	  and	  senior	  seminars	  to	  
address	  any	  disparity	  in	  rank.	  	  The	  hybrid	  program	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  size	  and	  composition	  
directive,	  but	  the	  availability	  of	  faculty	  provided	  by	  the	  reserve	  and	  National	  Guard	  components	  
to	  the	  program	  influences,	  to	  some	  degree,	  the	  composition	  of	  hybrid	  seminars.14	  	  The	  
composition	  of	  the	  satellite	  seminar,	  however,	  is	  determined	  largely	  by	  the	  command(s)	  
hosting	  the	  program,	  which	  selects	  officers	  from	  the	  staff	  to	  attend.	  	  Their	  attendance	  is	  also	  
subject	  to	  approval	  by	  their	  respective	  services.15	  	  These	  additional	  influences	  on	  the	  hybrid	  and	  
satellite	  programs	  increases	  the	  possibility	  that	  seminars	  in	  these	  programs	  can	  suffer	  from	  
service	  cultural	  dominance,	  where	  a	  preponderance	  of	  students	  belongs	  to	  a	  single	  service.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  (New	  York:	  
Psychology	  Press,	  2011):	  61.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Stated	  by	  Colonel	  Ernest	  Parker,	  Deputy	  Director,	  JCDES,	  in	  a	  discussion	  on	  October	  14,	  2016.	  
15	  See	  Pisel,	  JPME	  II	  Available	  at	  Satellite	  Sites:	  131.;	  Students	  are	  nominated	  by	  their	  command	  and	  approved	  by	  
their	  service	  for	  attendance.	  If	  a	  satellite	  seminar	  is	  short	  of	  students	  from	  the	  air,	  land,	  or	  sea	  components,	  
another	  combatant	  command	  or	  the	  services	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  fill	  the	  slots.	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The	  satellite	  and	  hybrid	  programs	  have	  neither	  the	  capacity	  nor	  the	  density	  of	  students	  to	  
address	  significant	  differences	  in	  rank	  within	  a	  particular	  seminar.	  	  With	  students	  ranging	  in	  
rank	  from	  major/lieutenant	  commander	  to	  colonel/captain	  in	  the	  satellite	  seminars	  and	  
major/lieutenant	  commander	  to	  major	  general/rear	  admiral	  in	  the	  hybrid	  seminars	  a	  
dominance	  through	  social	  status	  can	  emerge	  as	  well.	  	  This	  can	  be	  especially	  so	  with	  the	  satellite	  
seminar,	  where	  the	  students	  are	  assigned	  to	  the	  same	  headquarters.	  	  Satellite	  students	  may	  be	  
prone	  to	  maintaining	  formal	  work	  relationships	  while	  in	  the	  contact	  encounter	  and	  may	  even	  
be	  in	  attendance	  with	  their	  rater	  or	  senior	  rater.16	  	  All	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  service	  preponderance,	  
disparity	  in	  military	  rank,	  and	  the	  continuation	  of	  work	  relationships	  in	  a	  seminar	  can	  pose	  
challenges	  to	  student	  perceptions	  that	  they	  hold	  equal	  status	  within	  the	  seminar	  and	  that	  their	  
participation,	  contributions,	  and	  opinions	  carry	  equivalent	  weight	  and	  value.	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  
the	  satellite	  and	  hybrid	  methods	  appear	  less	  suited	  than	  the	  resident	  method	  to	  support	  a	  
perception	  of	  equal	  status	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  every	  student	  in	  the	  contact	  experience.	  
Though	  comparable	  in	  many	  ways,	  significant	  differences	  also	  exist	  between	  the	  
programs	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  establish	  and	  reinforce	  the	  conditions	  of	  common	  goals	  
and	  intergroup	  cooperation.	  	  The	  curriculum	  and	  in-­‐resident	  execution	  of	  the	  resident	  method	  
appear	  to	  afford	  the	  greatest	  opportunity	  to	  establish	  and	  reinforce	  these	  conditions	  among	  
groups	  of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  services,	  while	  the	  satellite	  and	  hybrid	  methods	  are	  
more	  limited	  by	  their	  structural	  nature.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  an	  intramural	  sports	  program	  in	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  In	  personal	  discussions	  on	  various	  dates,	  faculty	  members	  Commander	  Jeff	  Hoppe	  (Seminar	  22)	  and	  Lieutenant	  
Colonel	  Leamond	  Stuart	  (Seminar	  24)	  stated	  that	  such	  was	  the	  case	  in	  their	  satellite	  seminars.	  On	  another	  
occasion,	  Dr.	  Fred	  Kienle	  (Seminar	  21)	  stated	  that	  students	  seemed	  to	  remain	  more	  formal—reluctant	  to	  resort	  to	  
the	  use	  of	  first	  names	  and	  to	  see	  past	  rank	  during	  class	  activities	  and	  exercises—in	  the	  satellite	  environment	  than	  
in	  the	  resident,	  presumably	  because	  of	  their	  ongoing	  work	  relationships.	  	  See	  Fred	  Kienle,	  Jay	  Sawyer	  and	  Kristi	  
Church,	  Seminar	  22	  After	  Action	  Report,	  [2016]),	  Week	  2,	  11.	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satellite	  and	  hybrid	  programs	  deprives	  students	  of	  an	  additional	  but	  important	  mechanism	  by	  
which	  to	  establish	  common	  intergroup	  goals	  and	  intergroup	  collaboration.	  	  Pettigrew	  cited	  
athletic	  teams	  as	  an	  especially	  effective	  technique	  for	  satisfying	  these	  conditions.17	  	  Further,	  
the	  lack	  of	  electives	  and	  the	  reduced	  opportunity	  for	  intergroup	  collaboration	  in	  the	  hybrid	  
program	  further	  limit	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  interdependency	  can	  be	  created	  and	  reinforced	  
between	  officers	  of	  different	  services.	  	  Such	  interdependency	  is	  key	  for	  students	  to	  achieve	  
better	  understanding	  of	  officers	  from	  different	  services	  and	  to	  establish	  trust.	  	  It	  also	  appears	  
possible	  that	  the	  particular	  student	  composition	  of	  a	  seminar	  may	  influence	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
a	  method	  to	  establish	  common	  intergroup	  goals	  and	  intergroup	  collaboration.	  	  Though	  having	  
common	  inter-­‐group	  goals	  and	  collaboration,	  some	  satellite	  students	  cited	  the	  lack	  of	  diversity	  
within	  their	  seminar	  as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  their	  success	  in	  achieving	  the	  goals	  set	  for	  them	  during	  
the	  course.18	  
Despite	  each	  program’s	  common	  support	  by	  the	  JFSC	  and	  JPME	  II	  accreditation,	  
differences	  may	  also	  exist	  in	  the	  perceptions	  of	  students	  regarding	  the	  degree	  of	  institutional	  
support	  for	  each	  program.19	  	  Specifically,	  observable	  and	  perceived	  differences	  between	  the	  
satellite	  and	  resident	  student	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  classroom	  resources,	  student	  diversity,	  
curriculum,	  and	  information	  technology	  support	  could	  create	  an	  impression	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  
satellite	  students	  that	  their	  program	  is	  not	  of	  the	  same	  quality	  as	  the	  resident	  program	  in	  
Norfolk.20	  	  According	  to	  the	  post-­‐course	  surveys,	  all	  four	  satellite	  seminars	  conducted	  in	  2016	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  64.	  
18	  Kienle,	  Sawyer	  and	  Church,	  Seminar	  22	  After	  Action	  Report,	  Week	  10:	  10.	  
19	  This	  observation	  was	  made	  by	  Dr.	  Fred	  Kienle	  in	  a	  personal	  discussion	  on	  September	  9,	  2016	  and	  he	  related	  this	  
to	  differences	  in	  material	  support	  and	  proximity/accessibility	  of	  college	  and	  university	  leadership	  relative	  to	  the	  
resident	  program.	  
20	  See	  After	  Action	  Reviews	  by	  Satellite	  Seminars,	  particularly	  Seminar	  22	  which	  provide	  much	  more	  fidelity;	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reported	  the	  lowest	  confidence	  of	  all	  JCWS	  seminars	  with	  respect	  to	  support	  services.	  	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  acknowledge,	  however,	  that	  the	  satellite	  program	  is	  inherently	  expeditionary—	  
taking	  a	  scale	  version	  of	  the	  resident	  program	  “on	  the	  road”—and	  the	  program	  does	  not	  
typically	  remain	  in	  the	  same	  location	  after	  graduating	  a	  seminar.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  limited	  
functional,	  experiential,	  and	  international	  diversity	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  students	  attending	  the	  
satellite	  program	  with	  many	  preferring	  greater	  diversity	  in	  the	  seminar.21	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  
however,	  that	  satellite	  students	  might	  rather	  have	  attended	  the	  resident	  program	  instead	  as	  
post-­‐course	  survey	  comments	  reflected	  a	  strong	  desire	  among	  this	  group	  for	  the	  convenience	  
of	  receiving	  JPME	  II	  while	  remaining	  close	  to	  family.	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  similar	  perception	  
exists	  within	  the	  hybrid	  program,	  though	  the	  program	  remains	  the	  principle	  means	  for	  officers	  
in	  the	  reserve	  components	  to	  receive	  JPME	  II.	  	  	  	  
Lastly,	  considerable	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  programs	  under	  Pettigrew	  and	  
Tropp’s	  enhancing	  condition	  of	  friendship	  potential.	  	  This	  condition	  says	  the	  contact	  experience	  
must	  be	  of	  sufficient	  duration	  and	  intensity,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  close	  interaction	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  
social	  contexts,	  to	  enable	  self-­‐disclosure	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  and	  other	  
friendship-­‐developing	  mechanisms	  to	  work.	  	  This	  is	  because	  prejudices	  and	  tensions	  are	  
reduced	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  as	  greater	  understanding	  is	  achieved	  and	  
deeper	  relationships	  are	  established,	  and	  so	  ample	  time	  must	  be	  afforded	  for	  lasting	  
friendships	  to	  form.	  	  ICT	  fails	  to	  provide	  even	  a	  broad	  sense	  of	  what	  measures	  might	  be	  suitable	  
for	  duration,	  intensity,	  and	  range	  of	  social	  contexts	  associated	  with	  the	  condition	  of	  friendship	  
potential.	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  considers	  total	  curriculum	  hours,	  the	  total	  hours	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




intergroup	  collaboration,	  and	  the	  relative	  amount	  of	  time	  available	  for	  informal	  volitional	  social	  
contact	  respectively	  to	  distinguish	  the	  three	  methods.	  	  
	  
The	  Resident	  Method	  
Through	  scheduled	  lesson	  and	  practical	  exercises,	  students	  attending	  the	  resident	  
program	  experience	  more	  than	  262	  total	  curriculum	  hours	  in	  which	  they	  are	  in	  formal	  contact	  
with	  the	  students	  from	  other	  services.	  	  This	  amounts	  to	  approximately	  5.6	  hours	  of	  
collaborative	  effort	  and	  intergroup	  contact	  each	  day	  of	  the	  course.22	  	  Within	  this,	  the	  resident	  
method	  provides	  approximately	  202	  hours	  of	  intergroup	  collaboration	  in	  the	  form	  of	  guided	  
discussions,	  case	  studies,	  and	  practical	  exercises.	  	  Student	  intergroup	  contact	  within	  the	  
resident	  program	  is	  supplemented	  substantially	  by	  informal	  student	  activities	  occurring	  outside	  
of	  the	  classroom,	  which	  include	  intramural	  sports,	  various	  offsite	  activities,	  and	  numerous	  
voluntary	  social	  activities	  organized	  by	  the	  student	  social	  coordinator	  in	  each	  seminar	  as	  well	  as	  
by	  other	  students.	  	  Resident	  students	  attend	  primarily	  in	  a	  temporary	  duty	  status	  which	  
geographically	  separates	  them	  from	  family	  and	  the	  workplace	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  course,	  
and	  this	  affords	  much	  greater	  opportunity	  for	  informal	  social	  contact.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  
resident	  student	  experience	  extends	  well	  beyond	  the	  classroom	  and	  scheduled	  duty	  day,	  and,	  
in	  turn,	  provides	  the	  highest	  relative	  level	  of	  time	  available	  for	  informal	  volitional	  social	  contact	  
among	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  .	  JCWS	  Program	  Curriculum	  Overview	  Brief:	  Process	  for	  the	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education.	  (Presentation	  to	  the	  
Joint	  Staff	  J-­‐7	  PAJE	  team	  at	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College,	  Norfolk,	  VA,	  March	  3,	  2014:	  Slide	  19	  adjusted	  for	  loss	  of	  4	  
hours	  due	  to	  conversion	  from	  eight-­‐week	  to	  six-­‐week	  electives.	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The	  Satellite	  Method	  
Because	  the	  satellite	  program	  curriculum	  is	  nearly	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  resident	  
program	  and	  delivers	  it	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  duration	  and	  intensity	  for	  the	  two	  are	  
effectively	  the	  same,	  reflecting	  approximately	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  curriculum	  hours	  and	  hours	  
of	  student	  intergroup	  collaboration.	  	  However,	  the	  satellite	  method	  is	  less	  optimal	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  opportunities	  for	  informal	  volitional	  social	  contact	  that	  occur	  between	  students	  outside	  
of	  the	  classroom.	  	  According	  to	  Pisel,	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  conducting	  the	  satellite	  seminar	  is	  
to	  improve	  accessibility	  of	  JPME	  II	  by	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  students	  to	  travel	  to	  Norfolk.23	  	  
By	  remaining	  at	  their	  home	  station,	  satellite	  students	  are	  not	  isolated	  from	  the	  competing	  
demands	  of	  family	  and	  workplace	  responsibilities	  as	  are	  the	  students	  attending	  the	  resident	  
program.	  	  Though	  serving	  the	  interests	  of	  personal	  convenience,	  this	  likely	  works	  against	  the	  
friendship	  potential	  of	  the	  satellite	  program	  to	  reduce	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.24	  	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  satellite	  students	  have	  sometimes	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  balance	  concerns	  for	  
meeting	  expectations	  of	  the	  program,	  academic	  and	  otherwise,	  due	  to	  family	  commitments.25	  	  
The	  result	  is	  that	  student	  participation	  in	  informal	  volitional	  social	  activities	  after	  class	  is	  
substantially	  less	  in	  satellite	  seminars,	  as	  compared	  to	  resident	  seminars,	  because	  personal	  and	  
family	  responsibilities	  hinder	  such	  contact	  with	  students	  from	  other	  services.26	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Pisel,	  JPME	  II	  Available	  at	  Satellite	  Sites:	  131.	  
24	  Convenience	  was	  not	  a	  specific	  interest	  or	  priority	  of	  the	  Skelton	  committee’s	  recommendations	  for	  Joint	  
Education,	  as	  was	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  commission’s	  decision	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  three-­‐month	  course	  where	  students	  
would	  be	  in	  temporary	  duty	  status	  instead	  of	  a	  longer	  5.5	  month	  course	  where	  families	  would	  accompany	  
students.	  See	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  
Hundredth	  Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  [1989]),	  109-­‐10.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Kienle,	  Sawyer	  and	  Church,	  Seminar	  22	  After	  Action	  Report,	  Week	  10:	  11-­‐12.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Pilot	  Program	  for	  JPME	  
Phase	  II	  on	  an	  Other-­‐than-­‐in-­‐Residence	  Basis	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  [2014]),	  17,	  24.;	  See	  also	  Kienle,	  Sawyer	  and	  
Church,	  Seminar	  22	  After	  Action	  Report,	  Week	  2:	  11-­‐13;	  Week	  4:	  9-­‐11;	  Week	  5:	  13.	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The	  Hybrid	  Method	  
From	  a	  duration	  standpoint,	  students	  attending	  the	  hybrid	  program	  receive	  
approximately	  250	  total	  curriculum	  hours	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  web-­‐based	  collaborative	  
distance	  learning	  and	  during	  two	  “face-­‐to-­‐face”	  sessions	  conducted	  at	  the	  JFSC	  in	  travel	  
status.27	  	  While	  this	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  resident	  and	  satellite	  programs,	  it	  is	  
less	  intensive	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total	  hours	  of	  intergroup	  collaboration.	  	  According	  to	  the	  
AJPME	  2013	  PAJE	  Self-­‐Study	  Report,	  the	  latest	  formal	  source	  available,	  the	  course	  provided	  
approximately	  101	  total	  hours	  of	  intergroup	  collaboration	  in	  the	  form	  of	  guided	  discussions,	  
practical	  exercises,	  and	  case	  studies.28	  	  Though	  this	  report	  and	  figure	  predate	  the	  modification	  
of	  AJPME	  curriculum	  in	  2015	  to	  more	  closely	  reflect	  that	  of	  JCWS,	  these	  two	  programs	  were	  
already	  highly	  correlated.	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  assumes	  the	  amount	  of	  intergroup	  
collaboration	  did	  not	  increase	  substantially	  from	  any	  subsequent	  adjustments.	  	  We	  can	  
attribute	  the	  lower	  intensity	  in	  part	  to	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  resident	  curriculum	  for	  online	  
delivery,	  where	  some	  group-­‐centered	  exercises	  and	  requirements	  have	  become	  individual	  
efforts.29	  	  Also,	  while	  most	  of	  the	  intergroup	  collaborative	  activities	  in	  the	  program	  occur	  during	  
the	  two	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  sessions,	  totaling	  approximately	  139	  hours,	  the	  limited	  duration	  of	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  JFSC	  Academic	  Board	  Read	  Ahead:	  Realignment	  of	  Advanced	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  (AJPME)	  
Curriculum	  for	  Calendar	  Year	  2015	  Implementation	  (Norfolk,	  VA:	  [March	  24,	  2015]).	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Process	  for	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education	  (PAJE)	  Self-­‐Study	  Report:	  Advance	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  
Education	  (AJPME),	  Appendix	  E.	  	  	  	  
29	  Colonel	  Tricia	  York,	  Director,	  Joint	  Continuing	  and	  Distance	  Education	  School,	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College.	  Interview	  
by	  Author.	  Digital	  Recording.	  Norfolk,	  June	  1,	  2016.	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sessions	  requires	  that	  many	  of	  these	  activities	  be	  more	  abbreviated	  than	  in	  the	  resident	  and	  
satellite	  programs.30	  	  	  	  
This	  means	  that,	  although	  the	  amount	  of	  intergroup	  collaborative	  activity	  in	  hybrid	  
remains	  substantial,	  the	  program	  on	  the	  whole	  employs	  fewer	  and	  shorter	  opportunities	  for	  
intergroup	  collaboration	  to	  achieve	  common	  prescribed	  goals.	  	  It	  is	  also	  less	  intensive	  with	  
respect	  to	  student	  engagement	  and	  activity	  when	  total	  hours	  and	  total	  possible	  workdays	  are	  
considered.31	  	  Hybrid	  students	  “attend”	  for	  a	  much	  longer	  period,	  but	  devote	  much	  less	  time	  
each	  week	  to	  meeting	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  program	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  two.	  	  By	  one	  
estimate,	  the	  average	  level	  of	  daily	  effort	  is	  less	  than	  a	  third	  that	  of	  the	  resident	  and	  satellite	  
programs.	  	  This	  assessment	  of	  duration	  and	  intensity,	  however,	  does	  not	  consider	  qualitative	  
differences	  between	  online	  and	  in-­‐resident	  contact	  between	  students,	  which	  may	  be	  
substantive	  and	  consequential.32	  	  Also	  unanswered	  is	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  prejudice	  
reduction,	  and	  in	  turn	  acculturation,	  can	  meaningfully	  occur	  in	  a	  totally	  non-­‐resident	  format	  
because	  such	  situations	  may	  be	  affectively	  insufficient	  to	  evoke	  the	  changes	  in	  behavior	  that	  
are	  often	  the	  precedents	  to	  a	  change	  in	  attitude.33	  	  While	  acknowledging	  recent	  advances	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  This	  conclusion	  stems	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  JCWS-­‐Hybrid	  Roadmap	  and	  lesson	  instructional	  plans;	  For	  face-­‐to	  
face	  session	  hours	  see:	  http://jfsc.ndu.edu/Academics/Joint-­‐Continuing-­‐and-­‐Distance-­‐Education-­‐School/AJPME-­‐
Overview.	  
31	  This	  was	  arrived	  at	  by	  dividing	  the	  total	  curriculum	  and	  research	  hours	  by	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  workdays	  for	  
each	  program;	  JCWS/NSRP	  is	  6.7	  hours	  (236	  hours/50	  workdays)	  and	  Hybrid	  is	  2.0	  (406	  hours/200	  workdays)	  
32	  Recent	  studies	  of	  JPME	  II	  have	  been	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  cautious	  about	  the	  use	  of	  distance-­‐learning	  
approaches	  because	  of	  the	  perceived	  qualitative	  differences	  between	  distance	  and	  in-­‐resident	  approaches	  to	  the	  
professional	  education	  of	  military	  officers.	  	  Correspondingly,	  this	  study	  also	  notes	  that	  the	  more	  than	  forty	  years	  of	  
intergroup	  contact	  studies	  informing	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp’s	  ICT	  were	  conducted	  overwhelmingly	  in	  a	  resident	  
format.	  	  	  
33	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  possibilities	  of	  non-­‐resident	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II,	  the	  2003	  BAH	  report	  concluded	  
“affective	  learning	  is	  best	  done	  in	  resident;	  DL	  presents	  other	  challenges,”	  and	  more	  recently	  the	  2010	  HASC	  Study	  
reasserted	  “the	  value	  of	  in-­‐residence	  officer	  PME.”	  Further,	  the	  BAH	  report	  stated	  that	  “distance	  learning	  should	  
not	  be	  the	  option	  of	  choice	  in	  an	  advanced,	  professional	  program	  designed	  not	  just	  to	  convey	  knowledge	  but	  to	  
develop	  professional	  values,	  build	  bonds	  of	  trust,	  and	  stimulate	  critical	  and	  creative	  thought.”	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distance	  learning	  technology	  and	  approaches,	  the	  examination	  of	  qualitative	  differences	  
between	  online	  and	  in-­‐resident	  delivery	  methods	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
remains	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  	  	  
Like	  the	  satellite,	  opportunities	  for	  informal	  volitional	  social	  contact	  between	  students	  
after	  class	  hours	  is	  also	  limited	  in	  the	  hybrid	  program—specifically	  to	  the	  three	  weeks	  of	  in-­‐
resident	  attendance	  while	  in	  travel	  status	  and	  conducted	  across	  two	  separate	  sessions.	  	  	  The	  
fact	  that	  students	  attending	  the	  hybrid	  program	  are	  largely	  in	  a	  travel	  status	  does	  mean	  they	  
are	  isolated	  from	  the	  distractions	  of	  family	  and	  workplace	  responsibilities.	  	  However,	  the	  longer	  
duty	  days	  for	  students	  during	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  sessions	  serve	  to	  limit	  the	  friendship	  potential	  
enabled	  by	  informal	  volitional	  social	  contact	  outside	  of	  class	  hours.34	  	  Assuming	  that	  little	  such	  
contact	  occurs	  between	  students	  while	  they	  are	  away,	  the	  hybrid	  program	  would	  seem	  to	  
afford	  much	  less	  opportunity,	  relative	  to	  the	  resident	  program,	  for	  students	  to	  reach	  a	  point	  
where	  self-­‐disclosure	  can	  occur	  between	  officers	  of	  different	  services	  and	  where	  meaningful	  
friendships	  can	  form.	  
	   	  





Table	  2.	  Relative	  Comparison	  of	  Delivery	  Methods	  by	  Facilitating	  Conditions	  
	  
	   Table	  2	  summarizes	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  of	  each	  delivery	  method	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  each	  approach	  favors	  the	  five	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  ICT	  relative	  to	  each	  other.	  	  	  
	  
Professional	  Differences	  in	  the	  Student	  Populations	  
As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  discussed,	  the	  individual	  predictors	  of	  prejudice,	  or	  professional	  
background	  factors,	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  contact	  experience	  can	  influence	  outcomes	  as	  well,	  
and	  differences	  between	  subjects	  are	  unavoidable	  in	  even	  the	  most	  careful	  selection	  of	  
participants.	  	  Indeed,	  stark	  differences	  can	  exist	  in	  the	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  of	  individuals,	  even	  
between	  those	  having	  similar	  cultural	  origins,	  and	  reside	  within	  their	  “acculturative	  arena,”	  and	  
these	  differences	  matter.35	  	  Indeed,	  the	  compositional	  differences	  between	  the	  student	  
populations	  of	  each	  program	  allow	  for	  distinctions	  between	  them	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Pettigrew	  and	  
Tropp’s	  individual	  predictors	  of	  prejudice.	  	  Generally,	  this	  means	  that	  each	  group	  could	  be	  
distinct	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  realize	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  intergroup	  contact.	  	  We	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  D.	  L.	  Sam	  and	  J.	  W.	  Berry,	  "Acculturation:	  When	  Individuals	  and	  Groups	  of	  Different	  Cultural	  Backgrounds	  Meet,"	  
Perspectives	  on	  Psychological	  Science	  5,	  no.	  4	  (2010):	  473.	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primarily	  characterize	  the	  resident	  student	  population	  as	  career,	  active	  component	  officers	  
assigned	  to	  various	  commands—combined,	  joint,	  and	  service—and	  may	  or	  may	  not	  possess	  any	  
joint	  duty	  experience.	  	  Likewise,	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  satellite	  student	  population	  is	  
principally	  career,	  active	  component	  officers,	  but	  differs	  from	  the	  resident	  population	  in	  that	  
the	  students	  in	  each	  seminar	  usually	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  joint	  command	  and	  nearly	  all	  have	  
some	  measure	  of	  joint-­‐duty	  experience.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  resident	  and	  satellite	  populations,	  
the	  hybrid	  student	  population	  is	  comprised	  entirely	  of	  officers	  from	  the	  reserve	  components,	  
and	  these	  usually	  possess	  much	  less	  active	  duty	  experience	  than	  active	  component	  officers	  and	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  any	  joint-­‐duty	  experience.	  	  All	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  noteworthy	  differences	  
exist	  in	  the	  professional	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  students	  attending	  the	  three	  programs,	  and	  these	  
differences	  may	  be	  consequential	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  each	  program	  reduces	  their	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudices	  and	  achieves	  positive	  attitudinal	  change.	  	  Understanding	  the	  influence	  of	  
professional	  background	  factors	  is	  significant	  when	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  achieve	  optimal	  joint	  
acculturation.	  
To	  account	  for	  these	  compositional	  differences,	  this	  study	  considers	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
several	  independent	  variables	  (IV)	  relating	  to	  ICT	  predictors	  of	  individual	  prejudices.	  	  
Specifically,	  it	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  professional	  background	  factors	  of	  total	  active	  service,	  
total	  joint	  experience,	  military	  rank,	  level	  of	  education,	  age,	  and	  service	  component	  on	  student	  
attitudinal	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  attending	  one	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods.36	  	  As	  predictors	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Leung	  (1988)	  and	  Harry	  (1992)	  also	  associated	  similar	  factors	  as	  having	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  acculturation;	  See	  
Esther	  K.	  Leung,	  "Cultural	  and	  Acculturational	  Commonalities	  and	  Diversities	  among	  Asian	  Americans:	  
Identification	  and	  Programming	  Considerations,"	  in	  Schools	  and	  the	  Culturally	  Diverse	  Exceptional	  Student:	  
Promising	  Practices	  and	  Future	  Directions,	  eds.	  Alba	  A.	  Ortiz	  and	  Bruce	  A.	  Ramirez	  (Reston:	  The	  Council	  for	  
Exceptional	  Children,	  1988),	  88-­‐9.;	  Also	  Beth	  Harry,	  "Developing	  Cultural	  Self-­‐Awareness:	  The	  First	  Step	  in	  Values	  
Clarification	  for	  Early	  Interventionists,"	  Topics	  in	  Early	  Childhood	  Special	  Education	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1992),	  14.	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individual	  prejudice,	  this	  study	  uses	  these	  factors	  to	  highlight	  the	  most	  prominent	  professional	  
differences	  between	  the	  populations	  attending	  each	  of	  the	  delivery	  methods	  and	  between	  the	  
resident/satellite	  and	  hybrid	  populations,	  in	  particular.	  	  Given	  that	  officers	  attending	  the	  
resident	  and	  satellite	  programs	  are	  primarily	  active	  component,	  career	  military	  officers	  at	  the	  
mid-­‐to-­‐late	  point	  in	  their	  professional	  timeline,	  these	  populations	  are	  expected	  to	  reflect	  a	  
normal	  distribution	  along	  each	  of	  the	  professional	  background	  factors	  except	  for	  total	  joint	  
experience.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  expected	  with	  officers	  attending	  the	  hybrid	  program	  where,	  
by	  nature	  of	  their	  status	  in	  the	  reserve	  component	  and	  National	  Guard,	  a	  tremendous	  diversity	  
may	  exist	  across	  many	  of	  the	  factors	  and	  the	  distribution	  could	  be	  anything	  but	  typical.	  	  
Generally,	  students	  attending	  the	  hybrid	  program	  are	  expected	  to	  possess,	  on	  average,	  less	  
overall	  total	  active	  service	  time	  and	  total	  joint	  experience	  than	  students	  in	  the	  resident	  and	  
satellite	  programs,	  while	  also	  being	  higher	  in	  age	  and	  in	  level	  of	  education,	  on	  average.	  	  
	  
Hypotheses	  Toward	  the	  Reduction	  of	  Inter-­‐service	  Prejudice	  
As	  stated	  earlier,	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  research	  question:	  Do	  the	  
various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  
prejudice	  among	  military	  officers?	  From	  a	  treatment	  standpoint,	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  
three	  delivery	  methods	  with	  respect	  to	  facilitating	  conditions	  and	  the	  condition	  of	  friendship	  
potential	  leads	  to	  a	  corresponding	  hypothesis	  that	  helps	  us	  understand	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  
programs	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  ICT,	  the	  resident	  method	  would	  
seem	  to	  provide	  the	  greatest	  potential	  for	  reduction.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  more	  closely	  addresses	  
equal	  status	  in	  the	  seminar	  room;	  along	  with	  the	  satellite	  program,	  it	  provides	  the	  greatest	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amount	  of	  intergroup	  activity	  to	  establish	  common	  goals	  and	  intergroup	  collaboration;	  and	  it	  
offers	  the	  greatest	  friendship	  potential	  of	  the	  three	  methods.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  adopts	  the	  
following	  hypothesis:	  	  
H1:	  The	  Resident	  method	  will	  achieve	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  the	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods.	  
From	  a	  subject	  standpoint,	  the	  professional	  background	  factors	  considered	  by	  this	  study	  
provide	  a	  different	  azimuth	  to	  follow	  in	  seeking	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question.	  	  The	  
cultures	  of	  each	  service	  are	  powerful	  and	  they	  inculcate	  officer	  prejudices	  and	  perceptions	  
progressively	  deeper	  from	  the	  first	  day	  of	  indoctrination.	  	  As	  officers	  accumulate	  greater	  
amounts	  of	  active	  duty	  experience	  in	  their	  respective	  service,	  to	  include	  the	  more	  intensive	  
experiences	  while	  deployed	  and	  while	  attending	  formal	  professional	  military	  education,	  these	  
biases	  can	  become	  stronger	  and	  deeper.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  course	  of	  transmission	  for	  
ethnocentrism	  is	  through	  teaching	  and	  learning.	  37	  	  Conversely,	  accumulated	  experience	  while	  
serving	  with	  officers	  of	  other	  services	  in	  a	  joint	  environment	  serves	  as	  the	  direct	  social	  contact	  
that	  works	  instead	  to	  acculturate	  officers	  to	  the	  joint	  values	  and	  beliefs.	  	  Hybrid	  students,	  as	  
reserve	  and	  National	  Guard	  officers,	  will	  in	  most	  cases	  possess	  substantially	  less	  service-­‐
accumulated	  experience	  than	  their	  active	  component	  counterparts	  and,	  as	  such,	  should	  appear	  
less	  beholden	  to	  service	  biases	  and	  prejudice.	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  they	  will	  also	  possess	  less	  
accumulated	  joint	  experience	  and,	  in	  turn,	  demonstrate	  lower	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
at	  the	  start	  of	  their	  JPME	  II	  experience.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  all	  students	  attending	  the	  
hybrid	  programs	  are	  volunteers,	  unlike	  many	  students	  in	  the	  resident	  program	  who	  attend	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Gordon	  Willard	  Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice	  (New	  York:	  Addison-­‐Wesley,	  1979),	  576,	  291-­‐2.	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involuntarily.	  	  Aside	  from	  any	  motivation	  by	  these	  officers	  to	  improve	  their	  prospects	  for	  
promotion,	  this	  circumstance	  may	  also	  reflect	  the	  self-­‐selection	  condition	  described	  by	  
Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  where	  people	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  prejudice	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  
contact	  encounters	  with	  members	  of	  out-­‐groups.38	  	  Despite	  receiving	  treatment	  through	  the	  
hybrid	  program,	  which	  is	  hypothetically	  less	  optimal,	  this	  study	  adopts	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  
predicts	  that	  hybrid	  students	  will	  display	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  than	  their	  active	  component	  counterparts	  as	  a	  result	  of	  having	  fewer	  and	  weaker	  pre-­‐
existing	  biases	  based	  on	  professional	  background	  factors.	  	  Resultantly,	  this	  study	  also	  adopts	  
the	  following	  hypothesis:	  	  
H2:	  	  Hybrid	  students	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  self-­‐reported	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  relative	  to	  resident/satellite	  students.	  	  
	  
	  
Method	  of	  Analysis:	  Confidentiality,	  IRB	  Approval,	  and	  Informed	  Consent	  
	  
This	  study	  uses	  de-­‐identified	  archival	  survey	  data	  routinely	  collected	  by	  the	  JFSC	  
Institutional	  Research	  and	  Assessment	  Division	  (IRAAD)	  and	  provided	  for	  analysis.	  	  Student	  
responses	  are	  identifiable	  only	  by	  an	  IRAAD-­‐assigned	  student	  number	  and	  by	  no	  means	  exist	  for	  
the	  researcher	  to	  establish	  the	  identity	  of	  any	  human	  subject.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  no	  contact	  
at	  any	  time	  between	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  human	  subjects	  providing	  the	  data	  requested	  by	  
IRAAD	  and	  used	  for	  this	  study.	  	  These	  conditions	  obviate	  the	  need	  for	  approval	  by	  an	  
Institutional	  Research	  Board.	  	  Also,	  because	  this	  study	  used	  archival	  data	  previously	  collected	  
by	  the	  JFSC	  during	  the	  execution	  of	  each	  program,	  informed	  consent	  was	  not	  applicable.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




As	  stated	  previously,	  the	  participants	  considered	  in	  this	  study	  are	  American	  military	  
officers	  in	  the	  rank	  of	  major/lieutenant	  commander	  through	  major	  general.	  	  The	  total	  study	  
sample	  consists	  of	  those	  officers—active,	  reserve,	  and	  National	  Guard—attending	  one	  of	  the	  
three	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  JFSC	  during	  calendar	  year	  2016.	  	  As	  indicated	  
previously	  in	  this	  chapter,	  compositional	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  students	  receiving	  JPME	  
II	  through	  each	  of	  the	  delivery	  methods.	  	  Because	  of	  these	  differences,	  each	  student	  group	  is	  
considered	  a	  separate	  population	  by	  this	  study.	  	  The	  resident	  group	  represents	  a	  sample	  from	  
the	  larger	  population	  of	  active	  component	  officers,	  the	  satellite	  group	  from	  the	  population	  of	  
active	  officers	  assigned	  to	  the	  combatant	  commands,	  and	  the	  hybrid	  group	  from	  the	  population	  
of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  the	  reserve	  components.	  	  Though	  the	  differences	  between	  these	  
populations	  is	  largely,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  due	  to	  professional	  background	  factors,	  officers	  
belonging	  to	  the	  same	  service	  share	  a	  common	  service	  cultural	  foundation	  regardless	  of	  
whether	  they	  are	  active	  or	  reserve	  component.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
reduction	  this	  allows	  for	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  analytical	  findings	  for	  the	  different	  populations.	  	  
	  
Sampling	  Frame	  
This	  study	  considered	  all	  students	  attending	  each	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  during	  
the	  2016	  academic	  year.	  	  In	  selecting	  the	  sample	  from	  each	  group,	  students	  had	  to	  meet	  three	  
criteria.	  	  First	  is	  that	  they	  had	  completed	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐survey	  responses,	  as	  these	  allow	  
for	  a	  longitudinal	  analysis	  of	  attitudinal	  change	  for	  students	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  
methods.	  	  Second,	  they	  must	  identify	  as	  a	  U.S.	  military	  officer	  so	  as	  to	  exclude	  responses	  from	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civilian	  students	  or	  international	  officers	  in	  the	  data	  set.	  	  Although	  civilian	  students	  and	  
international	  officers	  also	  attend	  these	  programs,	  this	  study	  excludes	  their	  survey	  responses	  in	  
order	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  consideration	  to	  a	  joint	  military	  context,	  and	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
in	  particular,	  rather	  than	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  civilian	  interagency	  or	  combined	  operations.	  	  	  
Third,	  they	  must	  have	  provided	  a	  response	  to	  all	  questions	  concerning	  the	  professional	  
background	  factor	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  complete	  dataset	  for	  regression	  analysis.	  	  The	  sample	  
sizes	  for	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  programs—645	  and	  153	  officers	  respectively—are	  large	  
enough	  to	  provide	  a	  confidence	  level	  of	  95	  percent	  that	  each	  sample	  reflects	  their	  larger	  
population.	  	  Only	  with	  the	  satellite	  program	  does	  the	  sample	  size	  fall	  short,	  offering	  less	  than	  
90	  percent	  confidence,	  with	  sample	  size	  of	  approximately	  57.	  
	  
Measures	  
Presently,	  there	  is	  little	  research	  devoted	  specifically	  to	  studying	  the	  change	  in	  attitudes	  
of	  military	  officers	  towards	  others	  from	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  military	  as	  a	  result	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  
Both	  Poole	  and	  Ruth	  argue	  that	  attendance	  of	  resident	  JPME	  II	  does	  indeed	  result	  in	  a	  
statistically	  significant	  and	  favorable	  attitudinal	  change	  in	  military	  officers.39	  	  Though	  each	  
studied	  attitudinal	  change	  within	  different	  resident	  JPME	  II	  programs,	  their	  research	  
approaches	  were	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  measured	  the	  attitudinal	  change	  of	  officers	  through	  
administration	  of	  pre-­‐course	  and	  post-­‐course	  surveys	  as	  this	  study	  does.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  See	  James	  Harold	  Poole,	  "Outcomes	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact:	  An	  Assessment	  of	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  
Education"	  (Doctoral	  Dissertation,	  University	  of	  Phoenix,	  2007),	  and	  Alfonz	  D.	  Ruth,	  "A	  Study	  of	  Perceptions	  of	  
Senior	  Military	  Officers	  Toward	  Jointness	  before	  and	  after	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  at	  the	  Industrial	  
College	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces"	  (PhD	  Dissertation,	  Howard	  University,	  2007)..	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The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  study	  was	  collected	  by	  IRAAD	  using	  the	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  
Survey	  instrument,	  which	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  establishing	  self-­‐reported	  changes	  in	  subject	  attitude	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  attendance	  of	  one	  of	  the	  three	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods.	  	  The	  JFSC	  Acculturation	  
Survey	  employs	  a	  semantic-­‐differential	  scale	  to	  measure	  self-­‐reported	  change	  in	  officer	  
attitudes,	  where	  positive	  attitudinal	  changes	  are	  understood	  as	  the	  correction	  of	  underlying	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudices—specifically	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs—as	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  
understanding	  of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  other	  services	  and	  their	  associated	  service	  culture.	  	  The	  
use	  of	  standardized	  questionnaires	  where	  subjects	  self-­‐report	  changes	  in	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  
on	  a	  bipolar	  evaluative	  scale	  is	  particularly	  widespread	  and	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  70	  percent	  
of	  the	  data	  collected	  across	  515	  studies	  analyzed	  by	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  in	  2006.40	  	  Though	  
widely	  employed	  for	  pragmatic	  reasons,	  they	  are	  not	  without	  criticism,	  particularly	  for	  their	  
limitation	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  express	  a	  personal	  construction	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  
perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  resulting	  from	  contact.41	  	  Methodological	  factors	  such	  as	  question	  
wording	  and	  order	  can	  also	  influence	  such	  surveys.42	  	  Yet,	  according	  to	  research	  by	  Crites	  et	  al.,	  
semantic	  differential	  scales	  possess	  “good	  and	  stable	  psychometric	  properties”	  with	  respect	  to	  
assessment	  of	  subject	  attitudes,	  possessing	  the	  highest	  values	  for	  internal	  consistency	  in	  both	  
cognitive	  and	  affective	  dimensions	  among	  the	  four	  different	  scales	  considered.43	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  "A	  Meta-­‐Analytic	  Test	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  Theory,"	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  90,	  no.	  5	  (2006):	  755.;	  See	  also	  Oliver	  Christ	  and	  Ulrich	  Wagner,	  "10	  
Methodological	  Issues	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,"	  in	  Advances	  in	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  eds.	  Gordon	  Hodson	  
and	  Miles	  Hewstone	  (New	  York:	  Psychology	  Press,	  2013):	  233;	  James	  M.	  Olson	  and	  Mark	  P.	  Zanna,	  "Attitudes	  and	  
Attitude	  Change,"	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Psychology	  44,	  no.	  1	  (1993):	  123.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Christ	  and	  Wagner,	  10	  Methodological	  Issues	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact:	  236.;	  John	  Dixon,	  Kevin	  
Durrheim	  and	  Colin	  Tredoux,	  "Beyond	  the	  Optimal	  Contact	  Strategy:	  A	  Reality	  Check	  for	  the	  Contact	  Hypothesis."	  
American	  Psychologist	  60,	  no.	  7	  (2005):	  701-­‐2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Olson	  and	  Zanna,	  Attitudes	  and	  Attitude	  Change:	  124.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Stephen	  L.	  Crites,	  Leandre	  R.	  Fabrigar	  and	  Richard	  E.	  Petty,	  "Measuring	  the	  Affective	  and	  Cognitive	  Properties	  of	  
Attitudes:	  Conceptual	  and	  Methodological	  Issues,"	  Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology	  Bulletin	  20,	  no.	  6	  (1994),	  619-­‐
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Measuring	  the	  Dimensions	  of	  Prejudice	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  prejudice,	  ICT	  describes	  both	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  dimensions	  of	  
attitude.	  	  Stereotypes,	  beliefs,	  and	  judgments	  reflect	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  of	  prejudice	  while	  
emotions,	  favorability,	  and	  liking	  reflect	  the	  affective	  dimension.44	  	  The	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  
Survey,	  however,	  primarily	  measures	  the	  cognitive	  dimensions	  of	  prejudice	  (stereotypes	  and	  
beliefs)	  and	  employs	  semantic-­‐differential	  scales	  to	  capture	  student	  responses.	  	  
Correspondingly,	  this	  limits	  the	  analysis	  of	  data	  by	  this	  study	  strictly	  to	  the	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  
dimension.	  	  For	  all	  questions,	  students	  provide	  their	  responses	  regarding	  each	  service	  using	  a	  
seven-­‐point	  bipolar	  scale,	  which	  determines	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  officers	  associate	  particular	  
attributes	  or	  beliefs	  with	  the	  members	  and	  cultures	  of	  the	  other	  services.	  	  To	  assess	  attitudinal	  
changes	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dimension,	  this	  study	  coded	  questions	  one	  through	  nine	  as	  measures	  
of	  stereotypes	  because	  they	  assess	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  officers	  associate	  specific	  attributes	  to	  
others.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  questions	  was	  evaluative	  in	  nature	  and	  asked	  students	  to	  report	  their	  
attitude	  toward	  officers	  from	  other	  services	  according	  to	  nine	  characteristics	  and	  values	  such	  as	  
motivation,	  competence,	  respect,	  and	  loyalty.45	  	  Likewise,	  the	  study	  coded	  questions	  10	  and	  11	  
as	  measures	  of	  beliefs	  in	  that	  they	  asked	  officers	  to	  report	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  endorse	  
certain	  beliefs	  about	  the	  disposition	  of	  each	  branch	  of	  service	  toward	  jointness	  and	  to	  joint	  
operations.	  	  Because	  the	  student	  responses	  ranged	  from	  “Not	  at	  all”	  to	  “Very	  Much,”	  these	  two	  
questions	  related	  to	  the	  potency	  of	  student	  beliefs.	  	  In	  general,	  these	  first	  11	  survey	  questions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34.;	  For	  original	  description	  and	  validity	  of	  semantic	  differential	  scales	  see	  Osgood,	  Suci,	  &	  Tannenbaum,	  the	  
Measurement	  of	  Meaning,	  (1957).	  
44	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  96.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  Evaluative,	  Potency	  and	  Activity	  (EPA)	  dimensions	  of	  the	  semantic	  differential	  scale	  see	  
David	  R.	  Heise,	  "Chapter	  14:	  The	  Semantic	  Differential	  and	  Attitude	  Research,"	  in	  Attitude	  Measurement,	  ed.	  Gene	  
F.	  Summers	  (Chicago:	  Rand	  McNally,	  1970).	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attempt	  to	  assess	  changes	  in	  officer	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  as	  aspects	  of	  the	  cognitive	  
dimension	  of	  prejudice.46	  	  Though	  the	  survey	  also	  employed	  two	  additional	  questions	  to	  assess	  
changes	  in	  favorability	  and	  emotion—aspects	  of	  the	  affective	  dimension—the	  use	  of	  a	  single	  
question	  each	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  favorability	  and	  emotion	  dimensions	  would	  
adversely	  impact	  the	  construct	  validity	  of	  this	  study.47	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  scope	  of	  analysis	  is	  
necessarily	  limited	  to	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  of	  prejudice.	  
Additionally,	  the	  survey	  tool	  collected	  student	  professional	  background	  data,	  which	  
included	  total	  active	  service	  time,	  total	  joint	  experience,	  military	  rank,	  age,	  and	  service	  
component.	  	  The	  National	  Defense	  University	  Student	  Management	  System	  was	  the	  source	  for	  
data	  indicating	  the	  level	  of	  education	  for	  each	  student.	  	  The	  study	  used	  this	  data	  for	  analysis	  of	  
professional	  background	  factors	  as	  predictors	  of	  prejudice	  and	  to	  assess	  their	  influence	  on	  
subsequent	  changes	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  particular	  treatment	  method.	  	  	  All	  
student	  responses	  were	  subsequently	  grouped	  by	  survey	  and	  by	  delivery	  method.	  	  Appendix	  A	  
includes	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  Survey.	  	  
	  
Research	  Design	  
Because	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  randomly	  assign	  officers	  from	  the	  different	  populations	  
across	  the	  three	  treatment	  methods,	  this	  study	  employed	  an	  ex-­‐post-­‐facto	  quasi-­‐experimental	  
research	  design.	  	  Given	  the	  archival	  nature	  of	  the	  data,	  manipulation	  or	  influence	  over	  
independent	  variables	  was	  not	  possible.	  	  The	  model	  is	  a	  three-­‐group	  pre-­‐test/post-­‐test	  design	  
consisting	  of	  three	  treatment	  groups.	  	  These	  groups	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  subjects	  in	  each	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,	  320,	  96.	  
47	  Heise,	  Chapter	  14:	  The	  Semantic	  Differential	  and	  Attitude	  Research,	  239.	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the	  three	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods:	  resident	  (X1),	  satellite	  (X2),	  and	  hybrid	  (X3).	  	  This	  study	  used	  
de-­‐identified	  archival	  data	  provided	  by	  JFSC	  consisting	  of	  pre-­‐course	  survey	  data	  (O1)	  to	  gauge	  
the	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  present	  prior	  to	  treatment	  and	  a	  post-­‐course	  survey	  (O2)	  to	  
measure	  their	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  after	  treatment.	  	  A	  graphical	  depiction	  of	  the	  
research	  design	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  2.	  	  
	  
	  	  
	  Figure	  2.	  Research	  Design	  
	  
The	  longitudinal	  approach,	  rather	  than	  cross-­‐sectional,	  used	  by	  this	  study	  affords	  some	  
freedom	  from	  the	  causal	  sequence	  problem	  whereby	  attitudinal	  changes	  must	  be	  correlated	  to	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intergroup	  contact.	  	  The	  analysis	  considered	  data	  taken	  only	  at	  two	  points—pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
course,	  and	  this	  introduces	  some	  difficulties	  in	  fully	  interpreting	  the	  longitudinal	  mediation	  of	  
effects.48	  	  An	  observational	  approach	  to	  this	  study	  was	  infeasible	  given	  the	  simultaneous	  
execution	  of	  delivery	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  necessary,	  but	  insufficient,	  condition	  of	  proximity.	  	  
Neither	  was	  it	  appropriate	  to	  employ	  an	  experimental	  approach	  given	  the	  initial	  nature	  of	  the	  
study	  of	  the	  different	  delivery	  methods.	  	  The	  study	  scope	  and	  consideration	  of	  three	  different	  
delivery	  methods	  also	  limits	  the	  statistical	  methods	  appropriate	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  data.	  	  A	  
cross-­‐lagged	  approach	  was	  not	  feasible	  because	  the	  data	  only	  draws	  from	  attitudinal	  change	  
and	  not	  the	  non-­‐experimental	  data,	  such	  as	  the	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  contact	  time	  across	  the	  
three	  delivery	  methods,	  which	  would	  be	  required.	  	  Estimating	  the	  change	  in	  subject	  attitudes	  
over	  time	  and	  with	  further	  contact	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study,	  but	  there	  is	  promise	  in	  the	  
use	  of	  latent	  growth	  curve	  models	  to	  estimate	  the	  duration	  and	  intensity	  of	  contact	  required	  to	  
achieve	  specific	  levels	  of	  attitudinal	  change.49	  	  
	  
Dependent	  and	  Independent	  Variables	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  this	  study	  is	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  (DV)	  and	  changes	  
are	  measured	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  survey	  results	  (O2-­‐O1).	  	  These	  
results	  reflect	  the	  cognitive	  outcomes	  resulting	  from	  the	  particular	  treatment	  a	  student	  
undergoes	  and	  as	  influenced	  by	  the	  professional	  background	  the	  student	  possesses	  at	  the	  start	  
of	  treatment.	  	  As	  such,	  collection	  of	  data	  relies	  on	  student	  self-­‐reporting	  of	  perceived	  changes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  James	  P.	  Selig	  and	  Kristopher	  J.	  Preacher,	  "Mediation	  Models	  for	  Longitudinal	  Data	  in	  Developmental	  
Research,"	  Research	  in	  Human	  Development	  6,	  no.	  2-­‐3	  (2009);	  Also	  Hermann	  Swart	  et	  al,	  "Affective	  Mediators	  of	  
“Intergroup	  Contact:	  A	  Three-­‐Wave	  Longitudinal	  Study	  in	  South	  Africa."	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  
Psychology	  101,	  no.	  6	  (2011):	  1224.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Christ	  and	  Wagner,	  10	  Methodological	  Issues	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact:	  247.	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resulting	  from	  their	  respective	  treatment.	  	  Delivery	  method	  reflects	  the	  level	  of	  treatment	  of	  
the	  subjects	  in	  this	  study,	  which	  are	  resident	  method	  (X1),	  satellite	  method	  (X2),	  and	  hybrid	  
method	  (X3).	  	  
This	  study	  also	  considers	  the	  influence	  of	  several	  independent	  variables	  associated	  with	  
the	  professional	  background	  of	  each	  subject	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  These	  factors	  are	  
expected	  to	  positively	  or	  negatively	  influence	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  across	  all	  
delivery	  methods	  and	  to	  highlight	  differences	  that	  may	  exist	  between	  the	  change	  and	  final	  level	  
of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  achieved	  between	  the	  resident/satellite	  and	  hybrid	  populations.4	  	  
	  
Total	  Active	  Service	  (IV1)—This	  variable	  reflects	  the	  subject’s	  accumulated	  military	  
service	  while	  in	  Title	  10	  active-­‐duty	  status,	  as	  measured	  in	  years.	  	  
	  
Total	  Active	  Joint	  Experience	  (IV2)—This	  variable	  reflects	  the	  accumulated	  time	  spent	  
serving	  in	  joint	  operational-­‐level	  headquarters	  while	  in	  Title	  10	  active-­‐duty	  status	  as	  
measured	  in	  months.	  	  	  	  
	  
Rank	  (IV3)—This	  variable	  considers	  the	  social	  status	  of	  a	  subject	  in	  a	  military	  context	  and	  
is	  measured	  by	  the	  officer	  grades	  O3	  through	  O8.	  	  Because	  rank	  is	  progressive,	  awarded	  
at	  predictable	  intervals	  according	  to	  accumulated	  service	  and	  performance,	  it	  can	  also	  




Level	  of	  Education	  (IV4)—This	  variable	  considers	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  civilian	  education	  
attained	  by	  a	  subject	  as	  measured	  by	  academic	  degree.	  	  
	  
Age	  (IV5)—This	  variable	  considers	  the	  age	  of	  the	  subject	  undergoing	  treatment	  and	  is	  
measured	  in	  years.	  	  
	  
Service	  Component	  (IV6)—This	  variable	  indicates	  the	  particular	  service	  component	  to	  
which	  the	  subject	  belongs.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  additional	  independent	  variables	  that	  consider	  the	  experiential	  background	  of	  
subjects	  with	  greater	  fidelity	  and	  may	  offer	  deeper	  insight	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  in	  hybrid	  students.	  	  These	  include	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  accumulated	  attending	  formal,	  
in-­‐resident	  PME	  courses	  and	  also	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  accumulated	  while	  deployed	  for	  major	  
military	  operations.	  	  Though	  the	  previous	  independent	  variables	  consider	  the	  duration	  of	  
service	  component	  and	  joint	  experience	  that	  serve	  to	  instill	  or	  offset	  officer	  prejudices,	  these	  
variables	  consider	  the	  effect	  of	  service	  component-­‐related	  experience	  that	  is	  particularly	  
intensive.	  	  However,	  these	  variables	  are	  not	  specifically	  considered	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
study	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  distilling	  consistent	  and	  meaningful	  data	  from	  student	  self-­‐
reported	  data.	  	  Rather,	  they	  remain	  broadly	  implicit	  within	  the	  broader	  independent	  variable	  of	  
total	  active	  service	  (IV1).	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Threats	  to	  Internal	  Validity	  
Selection	  bias	  represents	  an	  important	  risk	  to	  the	  internal	  validity	  of	  this	  study	  primarily	  
due	  to	  the	  inability	  to	  use	  random	  assignment	  of	  subjects	  among	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods.	  	  
The	  groups	  are	  different	  from	  the	  beginning	  with	  particular	  compositional	  variances	  between	  
the	  group	  receiving	  the	  hybrid	  treatment	  and	  the	  other	  two	  groups	  receiving	  resident	  or	  
satellite	  treatment.	  	  While	  the	  latter	  delivery	  methods	  treat	  primarily	  active	  component	  
officers,	  the	  hybrid	  method	  treats	  reserve	  component	  and	  National	  Guard	  officers	  exclusively,	  
and	  these	  officers	  possess	  substantively	  different	  professional	  backgrounds	  than	  the	  active	  
component	  officers	  in	  the	  other	  two	  groups.	  	  This	  study	  does	  not	  have	  the	  latitude	  to	  randomly	  
assign	  officers	  across	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods,	  though	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  pre-­‐course	  
survey	  helps	  to	  control	  for,	  but	  not	  totally	  eliminate,	  this	  bias.	  	  	  
To	  some	  extent,	  history	  also	  represents	  a	  risk	  to	  internal	  validity	  in	  that	  significant	  
events	  involving	  the	  U.S.	  military	  that	  occur	  during	  the	  study	  window	  could	  alter	  the	  conditions	  
of	  the	  study	  and	  influence	  student	  attitudes	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  attribute	  
changes	  due	  to	  the	  course	  delivery	  method	  or	  to	  professional	  background.	  
Maturation	  presents	  another	  risk.	  	  The	  subjects	  of	  this	  study	  are	  people,	  and	  time	  and	  
the	  effects	  of	  time	  on	  the	  subjects	  of	  this	  study	  present	  some	  risk	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  findings.	  	  
This	  is	  because	  people	  can	  experience	  attitudinal	  changes	  driven	  by	  circumstances	  and	  
conditions	  unrelated	  and	  independent	  of	  the	  treatment	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  
these	  changes	  can	  affect	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Such	  circumstances	  could	  include	  
unexpected	  change	  in	  follow-­‐on	  duty	  assignment,	  selection	  for	  promotion	  or	  separation,	  or	  a	  
serious	  domestic	  situation,	  and	  these	  can	  influence	  the	  particular	  physical	  and/or	  psychological	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condition	  of	  subjects	  participating	  in	  the	  study.	  	  The	  longer	  duration	  of	  the	  hybrid	  program—40	  
weeks—make	  this	  approach	  particularly	  susceptible.	  
Testing	  can	  also	  threaten	  internal	  validity	  because	  the	  research	  design	  includes	  both	  
pre-­‐course	  and	  post-­‐course	  surveys	  of	  nearly	  identical	  content	  and	  structure.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  
possible	  students	  may	  develop	  an	  understanding	  and	  familiarity	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  format	  of	  
the	  study.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  may	  apply	  a	  strategy	  to	  deliberately	  improve	  or	  diminish	  their	  
outcome	  and	  alter	  the	  findings.	  	  The	  risk	  posed	  by	  this	  effect	  is	  difficult	  to	  judge,	  but	  it	  is	  
mitigated	  somewhat	  by	  the	  10-­‐week	  and	  40-­‐week	  periods	  separating	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  
pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  tests	  in	  the	  resident/satellite	  and	  hybrid	  methods,	  respectively.	  	  	  
	   Interaction	  effects	  between	  the	  independent	  variables	  used	  by	  this	  study	  could	  limit	  the	  
generalizability	  of	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  each	  variable,	  meaning	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  main	  
effect	  of	  each	  could	  be	  misleading	  or	  incomplete.	  	  While	  the	  interactive	  effects	  between	  the	  
independent	  variables	  in	  this	  study	  remain	  unknown,	  they	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  minimal.	  	  
The	  effect	  the	  treatment	  methods	  could	  have	  on	  groups	  different	  than	  their	  respective	  
populations	  in	  this	  study	  is	  also	  unknown.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  there	  could	  be	  substantive	  
differences	  in	  outcomes	  if	  active	  component	  officers	  were	  to	  attend	  the	  hybrid	  program	  instead	  
of	  the	  resident,	  or	  if	  reserve	  component	  officers	  were	  to	  attend	  the	  resident	  program	  rather	  
than	  the	  hybrid.	  	  Of	  the	  three	  methods,	  students	  will	  experience	  only	  one	  treatment	  method	  
and	  random	  assignment	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  A	  small	  number	  of	  reserve	  component	  officers	  often	  
attend	  the	  resident	  program	  and	  this	  may	  offer	  some	  basis	  to	  assess	  differential	  effects	  of	  
resident	  and	  hybrid	  treatment	  on	  that	  population,	  but	  this	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  	  As	  
well,	  the	  hybrid	  program	  may	  be	  open	  to	  active	  component	  officers	  in	  the	  future,	  creating	  the	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opportunity	  to	  consider	  its	  differential	  effects	  with	  that	  population.	  	  These	  analyses,	  however,	  
remain	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  
	  
Threats	  to	  External	  Validity	  	  
In	  this	  study,	  the	  subjects	  in	  each	  treatment	  group	  represent	  specific	  subsets	  of	  the	  
broader	  population	  of	  military	  officers	  in	  the	  active	  and	  reserve	  components	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
National	  Guard.	  	  This	  means	  any	  results	  derived	  exclusively	  from	  one,	  or	  even	  two,	  groups	  
cannot	  be	  generalized	  across	  the	  broader	  population	  of	  military	  officers	  without	  some	  risk	  to	  
the	  validity	  of	  the	  claim.	  	  The	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  is	  an	  inherently	  complex	  process	  that	  is	  not	  
only	  difficult	  to	  define,	  but	  difficult	  to	  measure.	  	  This	  study	  provides	  an	  operational	  definition	  of	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  research,	  and	  though	  this	  definition	  is	  broad	  based	  in	  
its	  consideration	  of	  opinions	  in	  the	  field,	  it	  remains	  subject	  to	  challenge	  and	  debate.	  	  Also,	  
measuring	  attitudinal	  changes	  rests	  on	  self-­‐reporting	  of	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  survey	  
questions,	  and	  the	  survey	  tool	  used	  in	  this	  study	  to	  measure	  these	  changes	  is	  not	  presently	  
validated	  to	  assure	  that	  it	  indeed	  measures	  what	  it	  is	  said	  to	  measure.	  	  Concern	  over	  construct	  
validity	  means	  that	  generalizations	  stemming	  from	  this	  study	  may	  be	  based	  on	  imperfect	  
calibration	  and	  measurement	  represented	  in	  the	  operational	  definition	  and	  survey	  instrument,	  
and	  this	  may	  limit	  the	  acceptability	  of	  results	  and	  subsequent	  findings.50	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  See	  Krathwohl,	  Bloom	  and	  Masia,	  Taxonomy	  of	  Educational	  Objectives:	  The	  Classification	  of	  Educational	  Goals,	  
Book	  2	  Affective	  Domain,	  17,	  61.;	  Krathwohl	  cautions	  that	  measurement	  of	  affective	  outcomes	  much	  beyond	  2.1	  -­‐	  
Acquiescence	  in	  responding—may	  be	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  measure	  within	  an	  environment	  where	  an	  
authoritative	  expectation	  of	  performance	  and	  attitude	  exist.	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Statistical	  Approach	  	  
The	  research	  question	  and	  corresponding	  statements	  of	  hypothesis	  guiding	  this	  
research	  are:	  
Research	  Question:	  	  Do	  the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐
reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  prejudice	  among	  military	  officers?	  
H1:	  	  Resident	  method	  will	  achieve	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  the	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods.	  
H2:	  	  Hybrid	  students	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  self-­‐
reported	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  relative	  to	  resident/satellite	  students.	  	  
By	  considering	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  means	  for	  each	  group,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  
looks	  to	  identify	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  final	  levels	  and	  overall	  change	  in	  the	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  achieved	  by	  each	  of	  the	  treatment	  methods.	  	  To	  test	  H1,	  the	  analysis	  
considers	  the	  final	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  across	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  to	  
determine	  if	  a	  difference	  exists	  between	  them.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  study	  will	  employ	  analysis	  of	  
variance	  (ANOVA)	  of	  the	  mean	  post-­‐treatment	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  level	  (O!)	  for	  
each	  group	  to	  identify	  if	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  three	  delivery	  
methods.	  	  The	  analysis	  will	  consider	  the	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  cognitive	  
dimension.	  	  This	  is	  accorded	  by	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  survey	  questions	  as	  measuring	  
stereotypes	  (Q1-­‐Q9)	  and	  beliefs	  (Q10-­‐Q11).	  	  For	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs,	  this	  study	  employs	  a	  
meta-­‐variable	  that	  reflects	  the	  average	  of	  the	  post-­‐course	  survey	  responses	  associated	  with	  
each	  aspect	  to	  produce	  a	  single	  representative	  O!	  measure	  for	  each.	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	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analysis	  is	  to	  find	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  resident	  method	  does	  or	  does	  not	  achieve	  
the	  highest	  reduction	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dimension.	  	  
In	  testing	  H2,	  this	  study	  considers	  the	  change	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  as	  measured	  by	  
the	  change	  from	  O!	  to	  O!,	  for	  each	  delivery	  method,	  and	  will	  also	  examine	  the	  influence	  of	  
subject	  professional	  background	  factors	  on	  the	  change	  in	  individual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice.	  	  First	  it	  will	  employ	  an	  analysis	  of	  variance	  (ANOVA)	  of	  the	  mean	  change	  in	  the	  level	  
of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  level	  (O! − O!)	  for	  each	  group	  to	  identify	  if	  statistically	  significant	  
differences	  exist	  between	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods.	  	  As	  with	  H1,	  this	  analysis	  also	  considers	  
the	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  exclusively	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  using	  a	  meta-­‐variable	  
reflecting	  the	  average	  of	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  survey	  responses	  to	  produce	  a	  single	  
representative	  O!	  and	  	  O!	  measures	  respectively	  for	  both	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs.	  	  The	  
outcome	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  hybrid	  students	  do	  or	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  
the	  greatest	  reduction	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dimension.	  	  Such	  analysis	  of	  
the	  mean	  change	  in	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  (O! − O!)	  for	  each	  method	  could	  prove	  insufficient,	  
as	  it	  would	  only	  determine	  if	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  exists	  between	  the	  change	  in	  
means	  of	  each	  method.	  	  In	  consideration	  of	  the	  possibility	  for	  Type	  I	  &	  II	  errors,	  the	  level	  of	  
significance	  (α)	  for	  rejecting	  the	  null	  hypotheses	  associated	  with	  the	  alternative	  hypotheses	  
adopted	  by	  this	  study	  is	  set	  at	  5	  percent	  (α	  =	  0.05).	  
In	  order	  to	  provide	  additional	  explanatory	  power	  regarding	  the	  ANOVA	  findings	  for	  H1	  
and	  H2,	  this	  study	  will	  also	  employ	  multiple	  regression	  to	  predict	  or	  estimate	  change	  in	  
individual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  (O2	  –	  O1)	  according	  to	  the	  independent	  variables	  of	  
total	  active	  service,	  total	  joint	  experience,	  military	  rank,	  level	  of	  education,	  age,	  and	  service	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component.	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  regression	  analysis	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  factors	  
of	  professional	  background	  correlate	  to	  the	  reduction	  in	  individual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice.	  	  In	  turn,	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  findings	  regarding	  the	  suitability	  of	  students	  with	  certain	  
professional	  background	  characteristics	  in	  attending	  a	  particular	  delivery	  method.	  	  	  	  	  
Through	  the	  ANOVA	  of	  post-­‐course	  outcomes	  and	  the	  differences	  in	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
course	  results,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  multiple	  regression	  analysis	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  professional	  
background	  factors	  on	  individual	  outcomes,	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  help	  
answer	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  method	  in	  
the	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis.	  





“The	  greatest	  value	  of	  a	  picture	  is	  when	  it	  forces	  us	  to	  notice	  what	  we	  
never	  expected	  to	  see.”	  
-­‐	  John	  Tukey	  
	  
To	  this	  point,	  much	  has	  been	  said	  regarding	  the	  history	  and	  importance	  of	  joint	  
education,	  joint	  acculturation,	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  and	  how	  JPME	  II	  must	  reduce	  the	  
antipathies	  of	  military	  officers	  toward	  those	  from	  other	  services	  so	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  
can	  occur.	  	  As	  previous	  stated,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  answer	  the	  primary	  research	  
question:	  Do	  the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐
reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  prejudice	  among	  military	  officers?	  
The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  important	  because	  of	  increasing	  pressures	  to	  offer	  JPME	  II	  
in	  more	  tailored	  ways,	  which	  may	  undermine	  the	  explicit	  intent	  of	  the	  original	  GNA	  legislation	  
concerning	  joint	  education	  requiring	  JPME	  II	  to	  instill	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  in	  military	  
officers.	  	  Achievement	  of	  this	  end	  necessitates	  that	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  alternatives	  first	  reduce	  the	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  harbored	  by	  officers	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  personal	  experience	  and	  
indoctrination	  by	  their	  respective	  service	  organizational	  culture.	  	  The	  minimization	  of	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  enables	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  seminar	  environment.	  	  To	  
arrive	  at	  an	  answer,	  this	  study	  examines	  the	  three	  existing	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  
the	  JFSC,	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  will	  test	  two	  hypotheses	  in	  particular:	  
H1:	  	  The	  Resident	  method	  will	  achieve	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  the	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods.	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H2:	  	  Hybrid	  students	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  self-­‐reported	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  relative	  to	  resident/satellite	  students.	  	  
The	  first	  hypothesis	  stems	  from	  the	  shorter,	  but	  more	  intensive,	  nature	  of	  the	  resident	  method	  
relative	  to	  the	  hybrid	  approach,	  and	  the	  greater	  degree	  of	  informal,	  volitional	  social	  contact	  it	  
affords	  overall.	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  the	  reserve	  component	  officers	  attending	  
the	  hybrid	  program	  will	  demonstrate	  greater	  pre-­‐to-­‐post	  attitudinal	  change	  because	  they	  are	  
believed	  to	  possess	  fewer,	  and	  less	  deeply-­‐instilled,	  prejudices	  from	  the	  start.	  	  As	  reserve	  
component	  officers,	  this	  difference	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  lower	  degree	  of	  indoctrination	  into,	  and	  
subsequent	  reinforcement	  by,	  their	  respective	  service	  culture	  relative	  to	  their	  active-­‐
component	  counterparts.	  	  	  	  
	  
Development	  of	  the	  Data	  Set	  
Student	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  responses	  to	  the	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  Survey,	  as	  
collected	  by	  the	  JFSC	  IRAAD,	  provide	  the	  primary	  data	  set	  used	  for	  analysis.	  	  This	  data	  includes	  
student	  responses	  from	  the	  four	  resident	  classes,	  four	  satellite	  seminars,	  and	  three	  hybrid	  
classes	  executed	  in	  calendar	  year	  2016.	  	  For	  each	  student,	  the	  data	  set	  provides	  their	  responses	  
to	  11	  questions	  in	  the	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  Survey,	  which	  attempts	  to	  gauge	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  in	  the	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  dimension.	  	  The	  first	  nine	  of	  these	  questions	  employed	  a	  
seven-­‐point	  semantic	  differential	  scale	  using	  a	  different	  bipolar	  word	  pair	  for	  each,	  and	  
students	  used	  each	  scale	  to	  indicate	  their	  attitude	  towards	  officers	  from	  each	  of	  the	  services.	  	  
The	  use	  of	  bipolar	  word	  pairs	  aids	  in	  assessing	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  subject	  attributes	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specific	  stereotypes	  to	  officers	  of	  other	  services.	  	  An	  example	  drawn	  from	  the	  survey	  
instrument	  is	  depicted	  in	  figure	  3.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Example	  of	  Questions	  Oriented	  on	  Stereotypes	  Attributed	  to	  Members	  of	  Other	  Services	  	  
	  
The	  final	  two	  questions	  also	  employ	  a	  similar	  semantic-­‐differential	  scale	  to	  establish	  subject	  
beliefs	  toward	  the	  disposition	  of	  each	  service	  organizational	  culture	  to	  joint	  operations,	  and	  an	  
example	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  presented	  in	  figure	  4.	  
	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Example	  of	  Questions	  Oriented	  on	  Beliefs	  Toward	  Other	  Service	  Cultures	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For	  each	  of	  these	  questions,	  a	  leftmost	  response	  is	  considered	  negative	  and	  a	  rightmost	  
positive.	  	  Accordingly,	  subject	  prejudice	  toward	  others	  is	  seen	  as	  increasingly	  lower	  as	  the	  
subject	  response	  moves	  from	  the	  left	  to	  right	  on	  the	  seven-­‐point	  scale—a	  higher	  response	  
indicates	  less	  underlying	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  question	  posed.	  
The	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  survey	  instrument	  used	  for	  data	  collection	  is	  predicated	  on	  
a	  similar	  instrument	  used	  earlier	  by	  the	  college	  and	  validated	  in	  1999.	  	  While	  the	  college	  has	  
modified	  the	  instrument	  over	  time,	  it	  has	  largely	  preserved	  the	  semantic	  differential	  scales	  
used	  to	  measure	  attitudinal	  change.	  	  IRAAD	  collects	  the	  data	  from	  students	  using	  Verint	  
software	  hosted	  on	  a	  joint	  staff	  server	  during	  the	  first	  day	  of	  class	  for	  resident	  and	  satellite	  
students	  and	  during	  the	  first	  week	  for	  hybrid	  students.	  	  Each	  student	  receives	  an	  email	  
containing	  a	  unique	  link	  to	  the	  server	  where	  their	  survey	  response	  is	  matched	  with	  their	  unique	  
student	  identifier	  provided	  by	  the	  University	  Student	  Management	  System	  (USMS).	  	  The	  server	  
sends	  automated	  reminders	  until	  students	  complete	  their	  survey.	  	  IRAAD	  collects	  post-­‐course	  
survey	  data	  in	  this	  same	  way	  during	  the	  final	  week	  of	  each	  class,	  and	  student	  responses	  are	  
matched	  to	  their	  pre-­‐course	  responses	  using	  their	  unique	  student	  identifier.	  	  IRAAD	  further	  
verifies	  proper	  pairing	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  data	  by	  confirming	  the	  student’s	  Gmail	  address.	  	  
The	  survey	  also	  collects	  demographic	  data	  corresponding	  to	  the	  student	  professional	  
background	  factors	  of	  active	  service,	  joint	  experience,	  age,	  education	  level,	  rank,	  and	  service	  
component.1	  	  Before	  delivering	  the	  data	  set	  for	  use	  in	  this	  study,	  IRAAD	  stripped	  all	  personally	  
identifiable	  data	  where	  only	  the	  unique	  student	  identifier	  matches	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  initial	  data	  set	  included	  2,191	  different	  observations,	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course,	  from	  a	  total	  of	  1,214	  different	  
students.	  	  Analysis	  excluded	  the	  observations	  collected	  from	  international	  officers	  and	  civilians	  as	  well	  as	  U.S.	  
civilians	  attending	  any	  of	  the	  three	  treatment	  methods;	  additionally,	  there	  were	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  reserve	  
component	  officers	  who	  attended	  the	  resident	  method,	  and	  these	  observations	  were	  screened	  to	  create	  an	  
exclusively	  active	  component	  population	  relative	  to	  treatment	  method.	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observations.	  	  Access	  to	  this	  secondary	  data	  came	  through	  formal	  request	  to	  and	  consent	  from	  
the	  JFSC	  Dean	  of	  Academics.	  
Subsequent	  preparation	  of	  the	  data	  set	  included	  removal	  of	  any	  unmatched	  
observations	  in	  order	  for	  each	  subject	  in	  the	  final	  dataset	  to	  have	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  
observations.	  	  Also	  excluded	  were	  the	  observations	  from	  both	  international	  and	  civilian	  
students	  so	  the	  data	  set	  would	  comprise	  observations	  collected	  exclusively	  from	  U.S.	  military	  
officers,	  active	  and	  reserve	  component,	  to	  maintain	  a	  strictly	  U.S.	  military	  service	  culture	  
context	  and	  to	  more	  closely	  reflect	  the	  populations	  associated	  with	  each	  delivery	  method.2	  	  In	  
this	  combined	  data	  set	  (“long”	  format)	  there	  were	  two	  observations	  for	  each	  subject.	  	  	  A	  
second	  data	  set	  (“wide”	  format)	  was	  created	  where	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  responses	  for	  
each	  student	  were	  merged	  within	  a	  single	  row	  or	  record.	  	  After	  the	  preparation	  described	  
above,	  both	  datasets	  included	  complete	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  survey	  responses	  from	  645	  
resident,	  57	  satellite,	  and	  153	  hybrid	  students.	  
For	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  observations,	  student	  responses	  to	  each	  question	  
occupied	  the	  entire	  range	  afforded	  by	  the	  seven-­‐point	  scale	  used	  by	  the	  instrument.	  	  Largely,	  
subject	  responses	  fell	  between	  the	  range	  of	  “3”	  and	  “6”	  and	  indicated	  positive	  change	  in	  post-­‐
course	  responses	  over	  pre-­‐course.	  	  A	  small	  number	  of	  subjects	  provided	  peculiar	  responses	  to	  
the	  survey	  questions.	  	  Some	  responded	  with	  “7”	  for	  most	  or	  all	  questions	  in	  their	  pre-­‐course	  
survey	  suggesting,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  they	  may	  harbor	  comparatively	  little	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice.	  	  While	  such	  could	  plausibly	  be	  the	  case,	  this	  left	  little	  or	  no	  room	  for	  the	  survey	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  dataset	  included	  a	  small	  number	  of	  outlier	  observations	  (n	  =	  10)	  detected	  by	  Tukey’s	  interquartile	  range	  
(IQR)	  approach,	  which	  identified	  outliers	  ranging	  above	  and	  below	  the	  1.5*IQR.	  	  This	  method	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  
the	  distribution	  or	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  data,	  which	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  extreme	  values.	  	  This	  
study	  opted	  to	  retain	  them	  in	  the	  analysis	  because	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  their	  removal	  would	  have	  only	  a	  very	  
modest	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  results.	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instrument	  to	  measure	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  treatment.	  	  Also,	  a	  small	  number	  indicated	  a	  
precipitous	  drop	  in	  their	  post-­‐course	  survey	  responses	  over	  their	  pre-­‐course	  responses	  
suggesting	  these	  individuals	  might	  have	  had	  a	  particularly	  negative	  contact	  experience	  that	  
confirmed	  or	  even	  intensified	  their	  negative	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  towards	  the	  others.	  	  Many	  
post-­‐course	  observations	  indicated	  a	  censoring	  or	  “ceiling”	  effect	  at	  the	  positive	  end	  of	  the	  
survey	  instrument—“right	  censoring”—which	  suggests	  the	  true	  data	  point	  for	  these	  responses	  
may	  lie	  beyond	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  survey	  instrument.	  	  The	  unknown	  answer	  is	  by	  how	  much	  
would	  the	  subject	  have	  exceeded	  the	  scale.	  	  This	  was	  true	  for	  both	  pre-­‐course	  (n	  =	  22)	  and	  
post-­‐course	  (n	  =	  67)	  results,	  with	  the	  hybrid	  group	  demonstrating	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  
cases	  relative	  to	  sample	  size	  (11%).	  	  It	  remains	  impossible	  to	  determine	  the	  true	  values,	  if	  
different	  in	  reality,	  so	  the	  analysis	  retained	  these	  observations	  to	  derive	  as	  much	  value	  as	  
possible	  from	  them.	  
As	  a	  preliminary,	  the	  data	  set	  was	  analyzed	  to	  assess	  the	  reliability	  and	  internal	  
consistency	  of	  the	  survey	  instrument	  in	  measuring	  a	  single	  latent	  construct.	  	  As	  stated	  
previously,	  the	  semantic	  differential	  scale	  used	  by	  the	  survey	  instrument	  to	  collect	  student	  
responses	  is	  a	  widely	  employed	  psychometric	  tool	  in	  attitudinal	  research.	  	  Analysis	  of	  student	  
responses	  to	  the	  11	  survey	  questions	  measuring	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  change	  resulting	  from	  
change	  in	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  resulted	  in	  a	  very	  high	  and	  acceptable	  Crohnbach’s	  
alpha	  (α	  =	  0.97).	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Creation	  of	  a	  Composite	  Cognitive	  Index	  Variable	  
As	  a	  final	  step,	  this	  study	  created	  a	  composite	  variable	  to	  simplify	  the	  interpretation	  and	  
assessment	  of	  the	  11	  different	  independent	  variables,	  represented	  by	  the	  11	  survey	  questions	  
measuring	  the	  level	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  dimension.	  	  Principal	  
component	  analysis	  confirmed	  that	  subject	  responses	  to	  these	  survey	  questions	  loaded	  on	  a	  
single	  significant	  component,	  and	  this	  supported	  the	  aggregation	  of	  subject	  responses	  to	  all	  
questions	  into	  a	  single	  composite	  measure.3	  	  Rather	  than	  simply	  using	  the	  mean	  of	  a	  subject	  
response	  to	  the	  survey	  questions,	  this	  study	  computed	  a	  composite	  factor	  score.	  	  The	  principal	  
component	  analysis	  also	  indicated	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  each	  question	  “loaded”	  on	  the	  common	  
component,	  and	  these	  values	  were	  used	  to	  weight	  subject	  responses	  ahead	  of	  establishing	  the	  
mean.	  	  Rather	  than	  using	  common	  values	  for	  these	  weights	  for	  all	  treatments,	  the	  observations	  
were	  weighted	  by	  the	  values	  specific	  to	  their	  treatment	  group	  to	  preserve	  intrinsic	  differences	  
between	  the	  samples.4	  	  These	  treatment	  method-­‐specific	  weights	  derived	  from	  the	  average	  of	  
the	  service-­‐specific	  loadings	  for	  each	  method	  to	  create	  a	  mean	  loading	  for	  each	  variable.	  	  This	  is	  
to	  say	  the	  weight	  applied	  to	  resident	  student	  responses	  to	  question	  1	  equated	  to	  the	  mean	  of	  
the	  loadings	  by	  Army,	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  officers.	  	  This	  technique	  was	  necessary	  
because	  subject	  responses	  in	  the	  data	  set	  are	  service-­‐specific,	  and	  this	  led	  to	  service-­‐specific	  
loadings	  in	  the	  factor	  analysis.	  	  This	  approach	  also	  avoided	  disproportionate	  influence	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Though	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  unbalanced	  dataset	  characterized	  by	  having	  a	  very	  different	  sample	  size	  for	  each	  
delivery	  method	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  the	  circumstance	  of	  having	  a	  small	  sample	  size	  for	  the	  satellite	  method	  (n	  
=	  54)	  limits	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  the	  analyses	  performed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  A	  posteriori	  power	  analysis	  using	  
a	  sample	  size	  of	  57	  and	  significance	  level	  (α)	  of	  .05	  indicates	  that	  analysis	  will,	  in	  some	  cases,	  be	  limited	  to	  
detection	  of	  medium	  (P	  =	  .81)	  and	  large	  (P	  >	  .99)	  effects.	  	  Effectively,	  this	  means	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  Type	  II	  error	  is	  
increased,	  where	  the	  conclusion	  is	  reached	  that	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  when	  in	  fact	  there	  was	  a	  false	  negative.	  
4	  Christine	  DiStefano,	  Min	  Zhu	  and	  Diana	  Mindrila,	  "Understanding	  and	  using	  Factor	  Scores:	  Considerations	  for	  the	  
Applied	  Researcher,"	  Practical	  Assessment,	  Research	  &	  Evaluation	  14,	  no.	  20	  (2009):	  3.	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loadings	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  sample	  sizes	  and	  by	  any	  differences	  in	  service	  composition.	  	  Table	  





Table	  3.	  Treatment	  Method-­‐Specific	  Weights	  Used	  to	  Produce	  Factor	  Scores	  
	  
After	  applying	  the	  method-­‐specific	  weights	  to	  the	  subject	  responses	  for	  each	  question,	  
an	  intermediate	  composite	  variable	  was	  created	  by	  taking	  the	  mean	  of	  subject	  responses	  for	  
each	  service.	  	  It	  was	  necessary	  to	  create	  this	  intermediate	  composite	  variable	  because,	  again,	  
subject	  responses	  to	  each	  question	  are	  service-­‐specific,	  where	  students	  provide	  four	  responses	  
to	  each	  survey	  question—one	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  services.	  	  Therefore,	  each	  observation	  
yielded	  four	  intermediate	  composite	  variables—one	  for	  each	  service.	  	  The	  final	  composite	  
variable	  used	  for	  analysis	  resulted	  from	  taking	  the	  mean	  of	  three	  of	  the	  intermediate	  
variables—	  those	  corresponding	  to	  the	  three	  services	  other	  than	  the	  service	  corresponding	  to	  
the	  subject.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  final	  composite	  variable	  for	  an	  Army	  officer	  would	  be	  the	  mean	  
of	  the	  intermediate	  variables	  corresponding	  to	  the	  Navy,	  Air	  Force,	  and	  Marine	  Corps.	  	  Using	  
the	  mean	  score	  is	  typical	  practice	  for	  creating	  composite	  variables	  when	  using	  psychometric	  
scales.	  	  Additionally,	  this	  non-­‐refined	  approach	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  factor	  scores	  is	  thought	  to	  
METHOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Resident 0.79 0.76 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.64
Satellite 0.81 0.73 0.60 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.45 0.60




be	  more	  stable	  across	  samples	  than	  refined	  methods.5	  	  The	  final	  composite	  variable	  computed	  
for	  subject	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  observations	  is	  termed	  in	  this	  study	  as	  the	  cognitive	  index	  
score	  because	  it	  reflects	  subject	  attitude	  in	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  attributable	  to	  their	  inter-­‐
service	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs.	  
	  
Initial	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Data	  
To	  start,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  included	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  indicated	  in	  table	  4,	  
and	  this	  shows	  students	  in	  each	  group	  demonstrating	  positive	  change	  in	  their	  attitudinal	  
disposition	  toward	  others	  from	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment.	  	  This	  change	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  correction	  




Table	  4.	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Samples	  for	  Each	  Method	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  James	  W.	  Grice	  and	  Richard	  J.	  Harris,	  "A	  Comparison	  of	  Regression	  and	  Loading	  Weights	  for	  the	  Computation	  of	  
Factor	  Scores,"	  Multivariate	  Behavioral	  Research	  33,	  no.	  2	  (1998),	  221-­‐247.	  	  	  	  	  
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
Mean 3.97 4.26 0.29 3.48 3.81 0.33 3.91 4.35 0.44
Std	  Error 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Std	  Deviation 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.51 0.5 0.51
Median 3.97 4.33 0.27 3.47 3.74 0.42 3.88 4.44 0.38
n	  =	  645 n	  =	  57 n	  =	  153
Resident	   Satellite Hybrid
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Figure	  5	  displays	  box	  plots	  created	  from	  subject	  responses	  for	  each	  method,	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
treatment,	  and	  these	  provided	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  group	  means	  and	  
the	  variance	  of	  responses	  for	  each	  group.	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  Student	  Responses	  Pre-­‐	  and	  Post-­‐Treatment	  for	  Each	  Method	  
	  
In	  these	  plots,	  the	  “whiskers”	  above	  and	  below	  each	  box	  represent	  the	  complete	  range	  of	  
subject	  responses,	  the	  box	  indicates	  the	  range	  where	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  subject	  responses	  fall,	  
with	  the	  portions	  above	  and	  below	  representing	  the	  top	  and	  bottom	  quartiles	  respectively.	  	  The	  
heavy	  line	  bisecting	  each	  box	  indicates	  the	  group	  mean,	  and	  the	  small	  circles	  beyond	  the	  





Figure	  6.	  Group	  Means	  Pre-­‐	  and	  Post-­‐Treatment	  for	  Each	  Method	  	  
	  
Figure	  6	  provides	  another	  illustration	  of	  the	  change	  in	  group	  means	  as	  a	  result	  of	  treatment.	  	  
These	  plots	  indicate	  that	  although	  each	  treatment	  group	  begins	  and	  ends	  in	  a	  generally	  
different	  place,	  the	  changes	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐course	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  extremely	  different.	  	  Of	  
the	  three	  groups,	  subjects	  undergoing	  the	  hybrid	  method	  appear,	  on	  the	  surface,	  to	  achieve	  the	  
largest	  positive	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment	  change	  (Δ	  =	  0.44)	  in	  disposition	  toward	  members	  of	  
other	  services,	  followed	  by	  the	  satellite	  (Δ	  =	  0.33)	  and	  then	  the	  resident	  (Δ	  =	  0.29).	  	  
Additionally,	  this	  initial	  look	  also	  suggests	  that	  subjects	  in	  the	  satellite	  method	  both	  start	  and	  
finish	  at	  much	  lower	  levels	  than	  subjects	  in	  either	  the	  resident	  or	  hybrid	  group,	  and	  this	  is	  
indicative	  of	  higher	  overall	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
treatment.	  	  Looking	  further	  into	  this	  difference,	  a	  graph	  of	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  means	  for	  
each	  of	  the	  four	  satellite	  seminars	  indicated	  little	  difference	  between	  them	  with	  each	  seminar	  
beginning	  and	  ending	  at	  roughly	  the	  same	  places.	  	  One-­‐way	  type	  III	  sum	  of	  squares	  analysis	  of	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variance	  (ANOVA)	  indicated	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  (p	  >=	  0.65)	  between	  the	  four	  
separate	  satellite	  seminars	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  means.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  
none	  of	  the	  four	  satellite	  seminars	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  appeared	  as	  an	  outlier	  to	  which	  the	  
lower	  overall	  group	  means	  might	  be	  attributed.	  	  However,	  the	  power	  of	  this	  analysis	  with	  the	  
small	  sample	  size	  for	  each	  seminar	  (n	  <=	  15)	  is	  limited	  to	  detection	  of	  large	  effects	  only	  and	  at	  a	  
lower	  threshold	  of	  statistical	  significance	  (P	  =	  0.83	  at	  p	  =	  0.20).	  	  Although	  these	  results	  could	  
possibly	  be	  due	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  of	  the	  satellite	  method	  (n	  =	  57)	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  
two,	  consistency	  between	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  group	  means	  of	  the	  individual	  satellite	  
seminars	  suggests	  against	  sample	  size	  being	  responsible	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  satellite	  seminar	  
performance	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  methods.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  professional	  background	  
factors	  considered	  by	  this	  study,	  the	  satellite	  subjects	  possessed	  slightly	  more	  joint	  experience	  
(20.9	  months)	  and	  slightly	  less	  active	  service	  (16.9	  years)	  as	  a	  group	  than	  resident	  students,	  but	  
only	  with	  active	  service	  was	  the	  difference	  statistically	  significant	  (p	  <	  .01).	  	  	  
In	  turn,	  these	  offer	  little	  explanation	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  satellite	  group	  pre-­‐	  and	  
post-­‐course	  means	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  two	  treatment	  groups.	  	  What	  seems	  clear,	  given	  the	  
comparable	  change	  in	  group	  mean	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment,	  is	  that	  the	  efficacy	  of	  treatment	  is	  
likely	  not	  the	  issue.	  	  Rather,	  the	  difference	  seems	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  satellite	  subjects.	  	  As	  another	  
check,	  a	  sample	  of	  observations	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  resident	  group	  that	  reflected	  similar	  
amounts	  of	  active	  service	  and	  joint	  experience	  as	  satellite	  students,	  and	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
treatment	  means	  calculated	  for	  comparison.	  	  The	  means	  of	  this	  sample	  closely	  tracked	  those	  of	  
the	  resident	  group	  and	  offered	  no	  further	  clarity	  regarding	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  satellite	  
group	  means	  and	  those	  of	  the	  other	  two	  groups.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  observed	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difference	  in	  the	  satellite	  group	  means	  from	  those	  of	  the	  other	  two	  treatment	  groups	  may	  be	  
due	  to	  environmental	  factors.	  	  Based	  on	  available	  data	  and	  discussion	  with	  the	  teaching	  team	  
members	  of	  the	  satellite	  seminars,	  a	  key	  difference	  setting	  the	  satellite	  subjects	  apart	  from	  
those	  in	  both	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  programs	  is	  that	  they	  are	  all	  presently	  serving	  in	  a	  joint	  
assignment	  prior	  to	  receiving	  JPME	  II	  and	  they	  are	  all	  at	  their	  joint	  command	  while	  receiving	  
treatment.	  	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  subjects	  where	  at	  least	  20	  percent	  and	  
40	  percent	  of	  the	  subjects,	  respectively,	  have	  yet	  to	  accrue	  joint	  experience,	  and	  where	  they	  all	  
attend	  in	  a	  culturally	  neutral	  location—whether	  in	  Norfolk	  or	  at	  home,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  
hybrid	  students.6	  	  	  
	  
Analysis	  of	  Differences	  Between	  Delivery	  Methods	  
At	  this	  point,	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  set	  turns	  to	  address	  more	  squarely	  and	  definitively	  the	  
hypotheses	  proposed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter—the	  results	  of	  which	  will	  help	  in	  answering	  the	  
research	  question	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  study.	  	  While	  appearing	  on	  the	  surface	  to	  provide	  some	  
clarity	  regarding	  the	  answers	  sought,	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  only	  deliver	  a	  general	  
characterization	  of	  the	  data	  and	  little	  substance	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  more	  important	  
conclusions.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  means	  of	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  
groups	  appear	  similar,	  but	  are	  they	  in	  fact	  statistically	  the	  same?	  	  And	  are	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  
satellite	  method	  truly	  starting	  and	  ending	  in	  a	  statistically	  different	  place	  than	  subjects	  in	  the	  
resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups?	  	  For	  these	  questions,	  the	  analysis	  uses	  an	  inferential	  statistical	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Several	  informal	  discussions	  with	  the	  satellite	  program	  director	  and	  the	  faculty	  members	  executing	  the	  satellite	  
seminars	  considered	  by	  this	  study	  failed	  to	  reveal	  any	  clear	  reason	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  pre-­‐course	  starting	  means	  
beyond	  the	  fact	  the	  all	  of	  the	  subjects	  had	  already	  reported	  to	  their	  joint	  assignment	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  accrued	  
substantial	  experience	  in	  their	  job	  prior	  to	  attending	  the	  satellite	  program.	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determine	  if	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  group	  means	  of	  the	  different	  
methods.	  	  Here,	  one-­‐way	  type	  III	  sum	  of	  squares	  ANOVA	  is	  the	  technique	  of	  choice.7	  	  The	  
selection	  of	  this	  method	  of	  ANOVA	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  further	  guard	  against	  any	  potential	  
influence	  of	  the	  unequal	  sample	  sizes	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data,	  as	  the	  method	  does	  not	  
assume	  equal	  sample	  sizes	  and	  factorial	  ANOVA	  is	  unnecessary.	  	  ANOVA	  has	  two	  associated	  
assumptions	  of	  the	  data	  on	  which	  it	  is	  performed—first,	  that	  homogeneity	  of	  variance	  exists	  
between	  the	  observations	  in	  each	  group,	  and,	  second,	  that	  the	  data	  is	  normally	  distributed.	  	  
Regarding	  the	  first	  assumption,	  Christ	  and	  Wagner	  state	  that	  longitudinal	  studies	  should	  include	  
an	  analysis	  of	  whether	  measurement	  invariance	  exists	  as	  it	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  making	  
comparisons	  of	  subject	  responses	  to	  the	  same	  question	  over	  time.8	  	  It	  is	  also	  acknowledged	  
that	  extreme	  differences	  in	  sample	  size	  can	  make	  ANOVA	  more	  sensitive	  to	  violations	  of	  
homogeneity	  of	  variance	  assumption,	  and	  so	  differences	  in	  the	  variance	  of	  each	  treatment	  
group	  should	  be	  as	  small	  as	  possible.	  	  	  
Levene’s	  test,	  a	  technique	  to	  test	  for	  equal	  variance,	  determined	  that,	  indeed,	  a	  
statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  treatment	  group	  variances	  for	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  
results	  exists	  (p	  <	  0.01	  and	  p	  =	  0.03,	  respectively).	  	  However,	  with	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  
results,	  the	  largest	  group	  variance	  is	  not	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  size	  of	  the	  smallest	  group	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  With	  ANOVA,	  the	  different	  sample	  sizes	  between	  methods	  represent	  a	  slight	  concern	  in	  that	  the	  extreme	  
differences	  (n	  =	  641/54/150)	  will	  reduce	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  the	  technique	  and	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  for	  Type	  
II	  errors.	  	  	  The	  alternative	  of	  creating	  equal	  sample	  sizes	  (n	  =	  54/54/54)	  from	  the	  larger	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  
samples	  for	  analysis	  was	  rejected	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  establishing	  one	  that	  reflected	  the	  same	  composition,	  
variance,	  and	  group	  mean	  of	  their	  larger	  respective	  samples.	  	  The	  alternative	  was	  also	  rejected	  because	  the	  small	  
sample	  from	  the	  satellite	  method	  by	  itself	  limited	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  analysis	  to	  the	  detection	  of	  only	  medium	  
and	  large	  effects.	  	  However,	  to	  guard	  against	  any	  possibility	  of	  errors,	  this	  study	  employed	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  
technique,	  Welch’s	  ANOVA,	  to	  confirm	  the	  results	  produced	  by	  the	  ANOVA	  techniques	  employed.	  
8	  Oliver	  Christ	  and	  Ulrich	  Wagner,	  "10	  Methodological	  Issues	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact,"	  in	  Advances	  in	  
Intergroup	  Contact,	  eds.	  Gordon	  Hodson	  and	  Miles	  Hewstone	  (New	  York:	  Psychology	  Press,	  2013),	  243.	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variance.	  	  According	  to	  Dean	  and	  Voss,	  if	  the	  ratio	  of	  largest	  group	  variance	  to	  smallest	  group	  
variance	  is	  less	  than	  three	  then	  the	  assumption	  of	  homogeneity	  of	  variance	  is	  likely	  satisfied.9	  	  
However,	  this	  study	  acknowledges	  that	  because	  the	  largest	  variance	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  
largest	  sample	  (resident)	  the	  statistical	  power	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  reduced—ANOVA	  will	  tend	  to	  
be	  more	  conservative	  in	  identifying	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  group	  means.	  	  For	  the	  
second	  assumption—the	  normal	  distribution	  of	  data—visual	  examination	  of	  the	  histograms	  
charting	  the	  distribution	  of	  subject	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  responses	  for	  each	  method	  
revealed	  some	  negative	  skewing	  in	  post-­‐course	  data.	  	  This	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  censoring/ceiling	  
effect	  of	  the	  survey	  instrument.	  	  However,	  because	  ANOVA	  is	  considered	  moderately	  robust	  to	  
violations	  to	  normality,	  the	  data	  were	  not	  transformed	  for	  analysis.	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  data,	  the	  analysis	  employed	  one-­‐way	  ANOVA	  to	  test	  the	  first	  
hypothesis,	  which	  is:	  
H1:	  	  The	  Resident	  method	  will	  achieve	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  the	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods.	  
As	  a	  first	  step,	  ANOVA	  was	  performed	  on	  the	  pre-­‐course	  results	  for	  the	  subjects	  in	  each	  
treatment	  method.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  knowing	  if	  the	  groups	  are	  starting	  treatment	  
from	  different	  points	  is	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  where	  they	  finish	  treatment,	  particularly	  if	  
each	  group	  ends	  in	  a	  different	  place.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  
the	  treatment	  groups	  and	  their	  pre-­‐course	  means	  at	  the	  p	  <	  .05	  level	  for	  the	  three	  conditions	  
[F(2,	  852)	  =	  21.16,	  p	  =	  0].	  	  To	  add	  a	  measure	  of	  confidence,	  the	  analysis	  also	  employed	  Welch’s	  
one-­‐way	  ANOVA,	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  technique,	  to	  corroborate	  these	  results	  given	  that	  a	  small	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Angela	  Dean	  and	  Daniel	  Voss,	  Design	  and	  Analysis	  of	  Experiments	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  1999),	  112.	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difference	  in	  group	  variances	  is	  known	  to	  exist.	  	  This	  technique	  also	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  a	  
significant	  difference	  exists	  somewhere	  between	  the	  group	  means	  (p	  =	  0).	  	  To	  identify	  where	  
the	  difference	  exists	  between	  groups,	  a	  Tukey	  HSD	  post-­‐hoc	  test	  produced	  the	  graphic	  
representation	  of	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  pre-­‐course	  group	  means	  shown	  in	  figure	  7.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  7.	  Differences	  in	  Pre-­‐Course	  Group	  Means	  
	  
In	  this	  graph,	  any	  “whisker”	  crossing	  the	  vertical	  dotted	  line	  at	  “0.0”	  indicates	  that	  a	  
statistically	  significant	  difference	  does	  not	  exist	  between	  the	  pre-­‐course	  means	  of	  the	  two	  
corresponding	  treatment	  groups.	  	  Here,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  (p	  =	  0.46)	  between	  the	  starting	  
group	  means	  for	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  methods	  (M	  =	  3.97,	  SD	  =	  0.57,	  and	  M	  =	  3.91,	  SD	  =	  
0.51,	  respectively).	  	  However,	  the	  subjects	  attending	  the	  satellite	  do	  indeed	  begin	  the	  course	  at	  
a	  much	  lower	  and	  statistically	  significant	  point	  than	  the	  other	  two	  groups	  (M	  =	  3.48,	  SD	  =	  0.43,	  
p	  =	  0),	  indicating	  that	  they	  harbored	  a	  more	  negative	  attitude	  toward	  members	  of	  other	  
services.	  	  This	  is	  reflective	  of	  greater	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  
Next,	  and	  more	  specifically	  related	  to	  the	  first	  hypothesis,	  the	  analysis	  compared	  the	  
post-­‐course	  group	  means	  for	  each	  method	  to	  establish	  which	  treatment	  achieved	  the	  highest	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reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  As	  with	  pre-­‐course	  results,	  a	  one-­‐way	  between-­‐group	  
ANOVA	  was	  conducted	  to	  compare	  the	  post-­‐course	  results	  for	  the	  subjects	  in	  each	  treatment	  
method.	  	  Again,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  post-­‐course	  means	  of	  the	  treatment	  
groups	  at	  the	  p<.05	  level	  for	  the	  three	  conditions	  [F(2,	  852)	  =	  17.64,	  p	  =	  0].	  	  Welch’s	  ANOVA	  
also	  corroborated	  this	  result	  (p=0).	  	  To	  illustrate	  where	  the	  differences	  exist	  between	  the	  
groups,	  the	  graph	  of	  Tukey	  post-­‐hoc	  test	  results	  of	  post-­‐course	  group	  means	  is	  shown	  below.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8.	  Differences	  in	  Post-­‐Course	  Group	  Means	  
	  
Figure	  8	  indicates	  that,	  as	  with	  the	  pre-­‐course	  means,	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  (p	  =	  
0.21)	  does	  not	  exist	  between	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  post-­‐course	  means,	  (M	  =	  4.26,	  SD	  =	  0.62	  and	  
M	  =	  4.35,	  SD	  =	  0.5,	  respectively).	  	  Also,	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  post-­‐course	  group	  mean	  of	  the	  
satellite	  method	  (M	  =	  3.81,	  SD	  =	  0.53)	  from	  the	  other	  two	  remains	  substantial	  and	  statistically	  
significant	  (p	  =	  0).	  	  Without	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  existing	  between	  the	  resident	  
and	  hybrid	  post-­‐course	  group	  means,	  resident	  method	  cannot	  claim	  to	  achieve	  the	  lowest	  level	  




Analysis	  now	  turns	  to	  addressing	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  posed	  by	  this	  study,	  which	  is:	  
H2:	  	  Hybrid	  students	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  self-­‐reported	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  relative	  to	  resident/satellite	  students.	  	  
The	  same	  statistical	  approach	  applied	  to	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  is	  applied	  to	  test	  whether	  any	  
difference	  exists	  between	  groups	  regarding	  attitudinal	  change	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  
post-­‐course	  and	  pre-­‐course	  group	  means.	  	  This	  study	  expects	  treatment	  to	  account	  for	  much	  of	  
any	  observed	  attitudinal	  change.	  	  However,	  the	  compositional	  differences	  distinguishing	  hybrid	  
subjects	  from	  the	  others	  are	  postulated	  to	  incline	  hybrid	  subjects	  to	  more	  readily	  dispose	  of	  
any	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  they	  harbor.	  	  
Levene’s	  test	  on	  the	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐course	  difference	  (delta)	  scores	  confirmed	  that	  statistically	  
significant	  differences	  in	  group	  variances	  do	  not	  exist	  (p	  =	  0.25)	  and	  we	  can	  assume	  the	  
variance	  between	  the	  three	  groups	  is	  the	  same.	  	  To	  test	  the	  second	  hypothesis,	  one-­‐way	  
ANOVA	  was	  applied	  to	  the	  dataset	  and	  indicated	  that	  a	  significant	  difference	  exists	  between	  
the	  delta	  means	  of	  the	  treatment	  groups	  at	  the	  p	  <	  .05	  level,	  [F(2,	  852)	  =	  4.36,	  p	  =	  0.013].	  	  
Tukey	  post-­‐hoc	  test	  results	  of	  group	  delta	  means	  show	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  (p	  <	  
0.009)	  between	  the	  delta	  group	  means	  of	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  treatments	  (M	  =	  0.29,	  SD	  =	  
0.58	  and	  M	  =	  0.44,	  SD	  =	  0.51,	  respectively),	  and	  this	  indicates	  that	  the	  hybrid	  subjects	  do	  
demonstrate	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  change	  than	  those	  in	  the	  resident	  group.	  	  Conversely,	  there	  is	  
not	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  delta	  mean	  of	  the	  satellite	  treatment	  group	  (M	  =	  .33,	  
SD	  =	  0.46)	  and	  those	  of	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups	  (p	  =	  0.83	  and	  p	  =	  0.47	  respectively).	  	  
These	  results	  mean	  that	  while	  a	  difference	  seems	  clear	  between	  the	  changes	  achieved	  by	  the	  
hybrid	  and	  resident	  groups,	  neither	  demonstrates	  a	  difference	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  satellite	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group.	  	  The	  hybrid	  group	  cannot	  claim	  that	  its	  reserve	  component	  subjects	  achieve	  the	  greatest	  
pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐course	  change.	  
	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  Influence	  of	  Professional	  Background	  Factors	  on	  Inter-­‐service	  Prejudice	  
Chapter	  III	  discussed	  the	  potential	  influence	  of	  professional	  background	  factors	  on	  the	  
attitudinal	  change	  experienced	  by	  subjects	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  treatment.	  	  Differences	  exist	  
between	  the	  treatment	  groups	  in	  terms	  of	  active	  and	  joint	  duty	  experience,	  age,	  and	  level	  of	  
education,	  and	  this	  is	  particularly	  so	  between	  the	  hybrid	  group	  and	  the	  other	  two.	  	  In	  addition,	  
the	  hybrid	  group	  includes	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  military	  rank.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
examine	  the	  relationship	  and	  influence	  these	  factors	  may	  have	  on	  the	  attitudinal	  change	  
experienced	  by	  subjects	  as	  a	  result	  of	  treatment.	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  employed	  multiple	  
regression	  analysis	  on	  the	  dataset,	  but	  this	  required	  additional	  cleaning	  of	  data	  in	  advance.	  	  A	  
review	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  invalid	  responses	  for	  some	  of	  the	  survey	  questions	  intended	  to	  
collect	  professional	  background	  data.	  	  These	  errors	  included	  highly	  improbable	  results	  for	  age	  
and	  active	  duty	  experience	  (n	  =	  13)	  and	  the	  associated	  observations	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  
dataset.	  	  Many	  subjects	  also	  failed	  to	  report	  their	  level	  of	  education	  (n	  =	  47)	  and	  these	  
observations	  were	  also	  excluded.	  	  The	  remaining	  dataset	  included	  observations	  from	  594	  
resident,	  54	  satellite,	  and	  147	  hybrid	  subjects	  (n	  =	  795).	  	  	  
This	  study	  employed	  two	  different	  regression	  models	  to	  analyze	  the	  data.	  	  The	  first	  
model	  used	  the	  professional	  background	  factors	  as	  a	  means	  to	  predict	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  score	  
of	  subjects	  while	  controlling	  for	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  score	  as	  well	  as	  class,	  seminar,	  and	  
treatment	  method.	  	  This	  model	  attempted	  to	  assess	  the	  relationship	  and	  influence	  of	  the	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factors	  on	  the	  attitudinal	  change	  experienced	  by	  subjects	  as	  a	  result	  of	  receiving	  one	  of	  the	  
treatments—resident,	  satellite,	  and	  hybrid.	  	  The	  equation	  for	  this	  model	  is	  expressed	  as:	  
Cog.Post	  ~	  ActExp	  +	  JtExp	  +	  Age	  +	  Education	  +	  Rank	  +	  Service	  +	  Cog.Pre	  
In	  this	  equation,	  Cog.Post	  represents	  the	  post-­‐treatment	  cognitive	  index	  score,	  ActExp	  is	  total	  
active	  service	  in	  years,	  JtExp	  is	  total	  joint	  experience	  in	  months,	  education	  is	  the	  highest	  college	  
degree	  earned,	  and	  Cog.Pre	  is	  the	  pre-­‐course	  cognitive	  index	  score.	  	  The	  table	  below	  
summarizes	  the	  regression	  results	  for	  the	  independent	  variables	  of	  professional	  background	  
factors	  and	  also	  the	  control	  variable	  of	  treatment	  method.10	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.	  Results	  of	  Regression	  Model	  1	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Additional	  analysis	  included	  testing	  for	  interaction	  effect	  between	  the	  pre-­‐course	  cognitive	  index	  score	  and	  the	  
treatment	  method.	  	  This	  analysis	  yielded	  no	  indication	  of	  statistical	  significance	  between	  these	  scores	  and	  
treatment.	  	  	  
Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err
Intercept 	  1.510	  *** 0.256 	  	  	  1.163	  *** 0.351 	  	  	  0.956 1.245 	  	  	  2.393	  *** 0.464
Active	  Service 	  0.001 0.005 	  	  -­‐0.005 0.009 	  	  	  0.005 0.036 	  	  	  0.001 0.005
Joint	  Experience -­‐0.001 0.001 	  	  -­‐0.001 0.011 	  	  -­‐0.006 0.004 	  	  	  0.002 0.002
Age 	  0.013	  * 0.006 	  	  	  0.018	  . 0.009 	  	  	  0.033 0.031 	  	  	  0.013 0.010
Education 	  0.032 0.055 	  	  	  0.083 0.077 	  	  	  0.040 0.193 	  	  -­‐0.074 0.085
Rank -­‐0.000 0.033 	  	  -­‐0.015 0.048 	  	  -­‐0.236 0.147 	  	  -­‐0.049 0.058
USN 	  0.033 0.050 	  	  	  0.038 0.060 	  	  	  0.140 0.181 	  	  -­‐0.060 0.105
USAF 	  0.039 0.044 	  	  -­‐0.014 0.052 	  	  	  0.169 0.169 	  	  	  0.135 0.094
USMC -­‐0.051 0.084 	  	  	  0.046 0.060 	  	  -­‐0.247 0.324 	  	  -­‐0.280	  . 0.148
Cog.Pre 	  0.543	  *** 0.034 	  	  	  0.582	  *** 0.040 	  	  	  0.645	  *** 0.151 	  	  	  0.437	  *** 0.075
Resident -­‐0.077 0.091
Satellite -­‐0.244	  ** 0.017
Multiple	  R 2	   =
p	  =
n	  =	  
Significance	  codes:	  	  	  	  	  '	  ***	  '	  =	  .001	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  **	  '	  =	  .01	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  *	  '	  =	  .05	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  .	  '	  =	  0.1












The	  R2,	  or	  “goodness	  of	  fit”	  of	  the	  model,	  for	  each	  sample	  leaves	  quite	  a	  bit	  to	  be	  desired	  (R2	  <=	  
0.41)	  in	  that	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  results	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  independent	  
variables	  considered.	  	  According	  to	  Gujarati,	  this	  is	  not	  unexpected	  in	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  study	  
where	  there	  may	  be	  a	  high	  level	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units.	  	  What	  is	  important	  is	  
that	  the	  model	  is	  correctly	  articulated	  and	  that	  regressors	  demonstrate	  statistical	  significance	  
(p	  <=	  0.05),	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  although	  the	  model	  is	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  much	  variation	  in	  
the	  predicted	  variable,	  it	  can	  still	  articulate	  the	  relationship	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  independent	  
variables	  on	  the	  predicted	  post-­‐treatment	  cognitive	  index	  score	  where	  they	  are	  shown	  to	  have	  
statistical	  significance.11	  	  Here,	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  score	  for	  each	  group	  is	  highly	  significant	  (p	  <=	  
0.001)	  and	  it	  also	  appears	  to	  exert	  the	  strongest	  influence	  on	  the	  predicted	  score,	  suggesting	  
that	  where	  one	  ends	  up	  after	  treatment	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  where	  they	  started.	  	  Of	  the	  
professional	  background	  factors,	  however,	  age	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  show	  significance	  (p	  =	  0.05)	  
and	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  entire	  data	  set.	  	  Consistent	  with	  the	  ANOVA	  findings,	  the	  model	  
indicates	  with	  the	  entire	  data	  set	  that	  the	  satellite	  method	  is	  significantly	  (p	  =	  0.01)	  and	  
negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  predicted	  post-­‐course	  score,	  and	  its	  influence	  is	  also	  relatively	  
substantial.	  	  This	  is	  not	  unexpected	  given	  the	  significantly	  lower	  group	  means	  of	  the	  satellite	  
sample	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  groups.	  	  The	  low	  R2	  indicates	  that	  most	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  
predicted	  scores	  is	  unexplained	  by	  the	  independent	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  model,	  so	  it	  seems	  
clear	  that	  other	  unknown	  variables	  are	  likely	  at	  play.	  	  Neither	  does	  this	  model	  specifically	  
consider	  treatment	  as	  an	  independent	  variable.	  	  However,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  significance	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Damodar	  N.	  Gujarati,	  Basic	  Econometrics,	  4th	  Edition	  ed.	  (Boston:	  McGraw	  Hill,	  2003),	  260.	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influence	  in	  most	  of	  the	  independent	  variables,	  we	  are	  left	  to	  assume	  the	  change	  in	  pre-­‐	  to	  
post-­‐treatment	  scores	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  treatment	  received.	  	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  regression	  model,	  which	  used	  the	  same	  professional	  
background	  factors	  to	  predict	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  cognitive	  index	  scores	  for	  subjects	  
while	  controlling	  for	  treatment	  as	  well	  as	  class	  and	  seminar.	  	  This	  model	  attempts	  to	  gauge	  the	  
relationship	  and	  influence	  of	  these	  independent	  variables	  on	  subject	  cognitive	  index	  scores	  
before	  and	  after	  receiving	  one	  of	  the	  treatments.	  	  The	  equation	  for	  this	  model	  is	  expressed	  as:	  
Cog	  ~	  ActExp	  +	  JtExp	  +	  Age	  +	  Education	  +	  Rank	  +	  Service	  +	  Treatment	  
Where	  Cog	  represents	  cognitive	  index	  score	  (pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course)	  and	  treatment	  is	  the	  




Table	  6.	  Results	  of	  Regression	  Model	  2	  
	  
Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err
Intercept 	  	  3.395	  *** 0.175 	  	  3.444	  *** 0.252 	  	  4.411	  *** 0.711 	  	  3.308	  *** 0.464
Active	  Service 	  	  0.007	  . 0.004 	  -­‐0.015	  * 0.007 	  	  0.051	  * 0.025 	  	  0.001 0.005
Joint	  Experience -­‐0.001 0.001 	  -­‐0.001 0.001 	  -­‐0.005	  . 0.003 	  	  0.000 0.002
Age 	  0.013	  ** 0.005 	  	  0.008 0.007 	  	  0.005 0.023 	  	  0.015	  . 0.010
Education 	  0.058 0.044 	  	  0.103	  . 0.061 	  	  0.046 0.143 	  -­‐0.031 0.085
Rank -­‐0.057	  * 0.028 	  -­‐0.059 0.039 	  -­‐0.345	  ** 0.105 	  -­‐0.040 0.058
USN -­‐0.044 0.040 	  -­‐0.055 0.047 	  -­‐0.031	   0.134 	  	  0.007 0.105
USAF -­‐0.123	  *** 0.034 	  -­‐0.129	  ** 0.041 	  -­‐0.086	   0.123 	  -­‐0.076 0.094
USMC -­‐0.266	  *** 0.066 	  -­‐0.244	  ** 0.083 	  -­‐0.621	  ** 0.228 	  -­‐0.268	  * 0.148
Treatment 	  0.329	  *** 0.030 	  	  0.297	  *** 0.034 	  	  0.334	  *** 0.088 	  	  0.508	  *** 0.075
Multiple	  R 2	   =
p	  =
n	  =	  
Significance	  codes:	  	  	  	  	  '	  ***	  '	  =	  .001	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  **	  '	  =	  .01	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  *	  '	  =	  .05	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  .	  '	  =	  0.1
795 594 54 147
ENTIRE	  DATASET RESIDENT SATELLITE HYBRID
0 0 <	  0.01 0
0.15 0.10 0.25 0.25
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Here	  again,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  very	  little	  variation	  is	  explained	  (R2	  <=	  0.25)	  by	  the	  model	  when	  
applying	  it	  to	  each	  group.	  	  Yet,	  the	  relationship	  of	  several	  professional	  background	  factors	  on	  
the	  predicted	  scores	  becomes	  more	  evident	  as	  well	  as	  the	  differences	  between	  groups.	  	  Active	  
service	  time	  is	  significant	  within	  the	  two	  groups	  where	  subjects	  have	  the	  most—resident	  and	  
satellite—though	  with	  slight	  influence	  and	  differing	  directionality	  for	  each.	  	  From	  the	  discussion	  
in	  Chapter	  II,	  this	  result	  does	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  greater	  active	  service	  time	  
would	  be	  negatively	  and	  significantly	  associated	  with	  subject	  scores.	  	  Yet,	  its	  influence	  with	  
hybrid	  subjects,	  who	  possess	  much	  less	  on	  average,	  is	  expectedly	  less	  than	  with	  those	  in	  the	  
resident	  and	  satellite	  groups.	  	  	  The	  amount	  of	  joint	  experience	  and	  education	  possessed	  by	  
subjects	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  predicting	  subject	  scores.	  	  Neither	  does	  
role	  of	  age	  seem	  clear	  as	  its	  only	  significant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  entire	  data	  set,	  and	  its	  
influence	  across	  the	  board	  is	  minimal.	  	  Rank	  is	  statistically	  significant	  only	  for	  the	  entire	  group	  
and	  the	  satellite	  where	  it	  is	  more	  highly	  significant	  and	  negatively	  and	  disproportionately	  
influential,	  exceeding	  even	  that	  of	  treatment.	  	  Across	  the	  board,	  however,	  rank	  is	  negatively	  
associated	  with	  subject	  scores	  and,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  social	  status	  within	  the	  military,	  this	  seems	  
consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  view	  that	  higher	  social	  status	  leaves	  subjects	  less	  inclined	  to	  
relinquish	  the	  prejudices	  they	  harbor	  while	  undergoing	  treatment.	  
In	  most	  instances,	  the	  service	  componency	  of	  subjects	  exerts	  a	  substantive,	  negative,	  
and	  statistically	  significant	  influence	  on	  subject	  scores,	  and	  such	  is	  particularly	  evident	  with	  
Marine	  Corps	  officers.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  surprising,	  as	  the	  significance	  and	  influence	  of	  service	  
componency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  model	  signals	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  underlying	  prejudice	  
towards	  the	  other	  services.	  	  Additionally,	  because	  the	  Marine	  Corps	  is	  the	  smallest	  service,	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Marine	  Corps	  officers	  are	  grossly	  underrepresented	  in	  the	  seminar	  environment	  relative	  to	  the	  
officers	  from	  other	  services,	  and	  this	  inequality	  may	  leave	  these	  officers	  especially	  reluctant	  to	  
adopt	  a	  different	  attitude	  toward	  officers	  of	  other	  service	  in	  an	  intergroup	  contact	  experience.	  	  	  
In	  all	  four	  groupings,	  treatment	  shows	  high	  statistical	  significance	  (p	  =	  0.001)	  and,	  with	  
the	  exception	  of	  the	  satellite	  group,	  the	  largest	  positive	  influence	  in	  each.	  	  This	  supports	  what	  
could	  only	  be	  assumed	  from	  the	  first	  model—that	  treatment	  matters	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  Resident	  subjects	  demonstrate	  a	  substantial	  and	  significant	  
benefit	  from	  treatment,	  with	  scores	  primarily	  affected	  by	  service	  componency	  as	  with	  the	  other	  
two	  methods.	  	  However,	  the	  hybrid	  group	  demonstrates	  the	  greatest	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
treatment	  and	  this	  may	  be	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  greater	  duration	  of	  the	  hybrid	  treatment	  (40	  
weeks)	  relative	  to	  the	  resident	  program	  (10	  weeks).	  	  Another	  possibility	  suggested	  by	  the	  
absence	  of	  significance	  in	  the	  influence	  by	  professional	  background	  factors	  on	  predicted	  scores	  
is	  that	  hybrid	  students,	  on	  the	  whole,	  possess	  less	  deeply	  rooted	  prejudices.	  	  Hybrid	  students	  
do	  not	  appear	  to	  harbor	  any	  more	  or	  any	  less	  prejudice	  toward	  other	  services	  than	  resident	  
students	  given	  the	  similarity	  in	  pre-­‐course	  group	  means.	  	  The	  greater	  change	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐
treatment	  may	  indeed	  be	  because	  they	  are	  less	  beholden	  to	  them.	  	  This	  would	  make	  them	  
more	  susceptible	  to	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  contact	  provided	  through	  their	  particular	  treatment	  
method.	  	  If	  true,	  this	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  of	  the	  second	  hypothesis.	  
Satellite	  subjects	  demonstrate	  the	  second	  greatest	  effect	  from	  treatment,	  yet	  for	  many	  
this	  benefit	  is	  offset	  partially	  or	  completely	  by	  the	  influence	  of	  rank	  relative	  to	  the	  resident	  and	  
hybrid	  subjects.	  	  The	  model	  indicates	  that	  a	  subject’s	  prejudice	  toward	  those	  from	  other	  
services	  increases	  with	  rank,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  explanation	  for	  this	  relationship.	  	  It	  seems	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clear,	  however,	  that	  the	  reason	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  treatment,	  given	  that	  satellite	  subjects	  
begin	  treatment	  at	  lower	  starting	  points	  than	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  subjects,	  yet	  demonstrate	  
comparable	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  treatment.	  	  This	  circumstance	  may	  relate	  to	  the	  earlier	  
discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  regarding	  the	  substantially	  lower	  group	  means	  for	  the	  satellite	  and	  
how	  environmental	  differences	  may	  be	  responsible.	  	  Rank	  is	  an	  inherent	  measure	  of	  social	  
status	  in	  the	  military	  and	  no	  more	  so	  than	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  work	  place	  where	  superior-­‐
subordinate	  relationships	  are	  the	  norm.	  	  Satellite	  students	  receive	  treatment	  proximate	  to	  their	  
workplace	  and,	  sometimes,	  as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  III,	  with	  their	  rating	  superiors	  or	  rated	  
subordinates.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that,	  while	  generally	  conducted	  offsite	  from	  the	  work	  place	  proper,	  
the	  satellite	  venue	  may	  not	  be	  a	  neutral	  one	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  rank.	  	  This	  possibility	  is	  
supported	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  rank	  as	  a	  significant	  background	  factor	  in	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  
treatments,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  highly	  work-­‐neutral	  environments	  and	  structure.	  	  	  
	  
Summary	  
This	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  establish	  a	  basis	  for	  answering	  the	  principle	  research	  question	  
concerning	  how	  the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  course	  delivery	  methods	  influence	  self-­‐
reported	  perceptions	  of	  service	  prejudice	  among	  military	  officers,	  and	  it	  also	  aimed	  to	  test	  the	  
hypotheses	  concerning	  which	  method	  achieves	  the	  highest	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  
among	  its	  subject	  and	  also	  which	  group	  would	  demonstrate	  the	  greatest	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
having	  received	  treatment.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  results	  of	  analysis	  are	  mixed.	  	  We	  cannot	  establish	  
statistically	  that	  a	  difference	  exists	  between	  the	  final	  levels	  of	  self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  achieved	  by	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  methods,	  so	  we	  cannot	  say	  with	  any	  certainty	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that	  the	  resident	  method	  produced	  the	  lowest	  level.	  	  However,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  
satellite	  method,	  with	  substantially	  lower	  and	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  both	  pre-­‐	  
and	  post-­‐course	  group	  means	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  two	  methods,	  had	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  
self-­‐reported	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  H2	  stated	  the	  hybrid	  group	  would	  demonstrate	  the	  
greatest	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment	  change	  overall,	  and	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  comparison	  
with	  the	  resident	  group.	  	  Yet,	  the	  satellite	  failed	  to	  demonstrate	  any	  difference	  statistically	  from	  
either	  resident	  or	  hybrid	  groups.	  	  This	  outcome	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  hybrid	  group	  
showed	  the	  greatest	  change	  in	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment	  means	  among	  the	  three	  treatment	  
groups.	  	  
These	  results	  raise	  some	  important	  questions.	  	  What	  do	  these	  results	  mean	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  different	  methods	  and	  compositionally	  different	  group	  associated	  with	  each?	  	  Do	  
meaningful	  differences	  really	  exist	  between	  the	  resident,	  satellite,	  and	  hybrid	  methods?	  	  And,	  if	  
so,	  what	  are	  they	  and	  what	  do	  they	  mean	  in	  practice?	  	  Finally,	  why	  is	  there	  such	  a	  large	  and	  
significant	  difference	  between	  the	  satellite	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  group	  means	  and	  those	  of	  the	  
resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups?	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  considers	  the	  results	  of	  the	  statistical	  analysis	  
presented	  here	  and	  attempts	  to	  address	  these	  questions.	  
	  





“Prejudice	  is	  a	  great	  time	  saver.	  	  You	  can	  form	  opinions	  without	  having	  to	  get	  the	  facts.”	  
-­‐	  E.	  B.	  White	  
	  
For	  more	  than	  70	  years,	  the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  military	  officers	  has	  served	  as	  the	  
mechanism	  to	  enhance	  joint	  operational	  efficacy	  of	  the	  nation’s	  armed	  forces,	  and	  since	  the	  
landmark	  reforms	  under	  GNA,	  JPME	  II	  has	  remained	  the	  principal	  means	  by	  which	  to	  
acculturate	  military	  officers	  to	  perform	  more	  effectively	  in	  the	  joint	  environment.	  	  Joint	  
acculturation	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  partial	  tradeoff	  of	  one’s	  own	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  values	  for	  
ones	  transcending	  those	  of	  any	  particular	  service,	  and	  this	  leads	  officers	  from	  different	  services	  
to	  adopt	  a	  joint	  perspective	  and	  attitude.	  	  The	  efficacy	  of	  JPME	  II	  to	  foster	  joint	  acculturation	  in	  
military	  officers	  is	  contingent,	  however,	  on	  reducing	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  inculcated	  in	  
officers	  by	  their	  respective	  service	  culture	  and	  also	  accumulated	  through	  personal	  and	  
professional	  experience.	  	  Such	  prejudice	  toward	  members	  of	  other	  services	  is	  detrimental	  to	  
the	  condition	  of	  jointness,	  and	  optimal	  joint	  acculturation	  through	  JPME	  II	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  
minimization	  of	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  harbored	  by	  officers	  through	  greater	  understanding	  
and	  respect	  towards	  other	  service	  cultures.	  	  The	  approach	  of	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  
JFSC	  is	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  where	  students	  achieve	  greater	  understanding	  of,	  and	  respect	  
for,	  members	  of	  different	  service	  cultures	  within	  a	  rigorous	  academic	  setting	  as	  intended	  by	  the	  
Skelton	  Panel.	  	  This	  is	  the	  mechanism	  for	  minimizing,	  or	  even	  eliminating,	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  among	  military	  officers.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  such	  an	  environment	  of	  minimal	  prejudice	  
fosters	  greater	  joint	  acculturation	  as	  officers	  develop	  more	  trust	  in	  officers	  from	  different	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services	  and	  become	  more	  open-­‐minded	  to	  perspectives	  and	  beliefs	  beyond	  those	  of	  their	  own	  
service.	  
Historically,	  the	  primary	  means	  of	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  was	  through	  in-­‐residence	  
attendance	  to	  the	  JFSC.	  	  Considerations	  relating	  to	  increased	  throughput,	  reduced	  cost,	  and	  
enhanced	  accessibility	  have	  since	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  satellite	  and	  hybrid	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  
approaches.	  	  However,	  the	  true	  efficacy	  of	  these	  methods	  in	  reducing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  
and	  consequently	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  fostering	  joint	  acculturation,	  was	  completely	  unknown.	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  three	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  offered	  by	  the	  JFSC	  
with	  regard	  to	  their	  effect	  on	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  and	  within	  the	  context	  of	  ICT.	  	  While	  
prejudice	  has	  both	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  dimensions,	  this	  study	  was	  limited	  to	  assessment	  of	  
the	  cognitive	  outcomes	  only.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  research	  outcomes	  of	  this	  study	  fall	  regrettably	  
short	  in	  assessing	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  outcome	  of	  inter-­‐group	  contact	  and	  that	  is	  the	  
development	  of	  meaningful	  and	  lasting	  friendships	  between	  members	  of	  different	  service	  
cultures.	  	  This	  study	  was	  longitudinal	  in	  design,	  occurring	  over	  11	  months,	  and	  analyzed	  the	  
performance	  of	  the	  populations	  attending	  each	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  by	  their	  
responses	  to	  pre-­‐course	  and	  post-­‐course	  surveys.	  	  	  
	  
Summary	  of	  Findings	  
To	  establish	  a	  basis	  by	  which	  to	  answer	  the	  primary	  research	  question,	  the	  analysis	  
tested	  two	  hypotheses	  related	  to	  the	  theoretical	  “strength”	  of	  each	  delivery	  method	  to	  reduce	  
prejudice	  and	  to	  the	  proclivity	  of	  each	  group	  to	  dispense	  of	  service-­‐specific	  stereotypes	  and	  
beliefs	  toward	  others	  to	  accept	  a	  uniquely	  joint	  ethos.	  	  In	  addition,	  this	  study	  analyzed	  the	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effect	  exerted	  by	  the	  professional	  background	  of	  each	  subject	  on	  their	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐course	  
responses.	  	  These	  factors	  included	  accumulated	  active	  service,	  joint	  experience,	  and	  education,	  
as	  well	  as	  age,	  rank,	  and	  service	  branch.	  	  Social	  science	  theorizes	  that	  such	  factors	  are	  
influential	  in	  maintaining,	  and	  also	  dispensing	  with,	  individual	  prejudices.	  	  	  
Though	  the	  analysis	  failed	  to	  produce	  clear	  support	  for	  either	  hypothesis,	  it	  does	  
provide	  new	  insight	  regarding	  the	  research	  question	  and	  the	  differences	  existing	  between	  the	  
delivery	  methods	  and	  the	  populations.	  	  The	  principle	  finding	  is	  that,	  to	  a	  varying	  degree,	  each	  
delivery	  method	  is	  indeed	  substantially	  and	  significantly	  associated	  with	  improvement	  in	  
subject	  attitude	  toward	  officers	  in	  other	  services.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  substantially	  lower	  group	  
means	  of	  the	  satellite,	  there	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  sizable	  difference	  in	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
attitudinal	  change	  achieved	  by	  each	  of	  the	  three	  methods.	  	  A	  second	  important	  finding	  relates	  
to	  the	  influence	  of	  professional	  background	  factors	  in	  the	  context	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  and	  
JPME	  II.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  these	  factors,	  while	  substantial	  and	  statistically	  significant	  in	  some	  cases,	  
seem	  largely	  implicit	  in	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  condition	  of	  subjects	  and	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  exert	  
influence	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  treatment.1	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  interaction	  effect	  
between	  the	  professional	  background	  factors	  and	  the	  treatment	  methods.	  	  Of	  the	  three	  
treatment	  groups,	  the	  attitudes	  of	  hybrid	  subjects	  were	  less	  governed	  by	  the	  professional	  
background	  factors	  considered	  by	  this	  study	  than	  the	  attitudes	  of	  subjects	  in	  the	  resident	  and	  
satellite	  groups.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  first	  regression	  model	  indicated	  that	  post-­‐treatment	  scores	  are	  influenced	  primarily	  by	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  
score	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  so	  with	  the	  satellite.	  	  The	  only	  factor	  to	  show	  any	  influence	  on	  post-­‐treatment	  scores	  
was	  age.	  	  This	  leaves	  us	  to	  infer	  that	  treatment	  is	  largely	  responsible	  for	  achieving	  the	  change	  in	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐	  
cognitive	  index	  scores	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  professional	  background	  factors	  largely	  insignificant.	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Implications—Findings	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  ICT	  
The	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  corroborate	  the	  theoretical	  proposition	  of	  Pettigrew	  and	  
Tropp	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  contact	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  improves	  their	  
attitude	  toward	  each	  other.	  	  This	  means	  contact	  in	  the	  broadest	  possible	  sense,	  where	  the	  
facilitating	  conditions	  represent	  circumstances	  that	  serve	  to	  enhance	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  
contact.	  	  Building	  upon	  the	  traditional	  forms	  of	  prejudice—racial,	  ethnic,	  and	  the	  elderly	  and	  
disabled—considered	  by	  the	  hundreds	  of	  studies	  informing	  ICT,	  this	  study	  broadens	  the	  notion	  
of	  prejudice	  to	  include	  inter-­‐organizational	  antipathy.	  	  Specifically,	  it	  examines	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
JPME	  II	  In	  the	  context	  of	  prejudice	  between	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  services.	  	  	  
Each	  delivery	  method	  affected	  measurable	  and	  positive	  change	  in	  the	  cognitive	  
attitudes	  of	  their	  respective	  group,	  despite	  significant	  differences	  existing	  between	  them	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  manner	  and	  degree	  they	  embody	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  
prejudice.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  amount	  of	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  change	  resulting	  from	  treatment	  was	  
not	  strikingly	  different	  across	  the	  methods.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  differences	  in	  
the	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  intergroup	  contact	  across	  the	  delivery	  methods	  were	  of	  little	  or	  no	  
consequence	  to	  subject	  outcomes.	  	  Rather,	  it	  may	  be	  evidence	  of	  the	  association	  or	  correlation	  
each	  facilitating	  condition	  may	  have	  to	  attitudinal	  changes	  in	  either	  the	  cognitive	  or	  affective	  
attitudinal	  domains.	  	  ICT	  does	  not	  explicitly	  correlate	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  with	  any	  
particular	  domain.	  	  There	  is	  a	  slight	  exception	  with	  the	  condition	  of	  friendship	  potential,	  which	  
is	  not	  a	  formal	  condition	  within	  ICT	  but	  borrowed	  from	  earlier	  work	  by	  Pettigrew	  for	  use	  in	  this	  
study.	  	  This	  condition	  is	  primarily,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  associated	  with	  the	  affective	  domain.	  	  In	  
fact,	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  were	  careful	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  interaction	  between	  the	  cognitive	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and	  affective	  domains	  is	  highly	  complex	  and	  that	  you	  cannot	  easily	  consider	  one	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  the	  other.	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  JPME	  II	  and	  the	  results	  of	  this	  
study,	  it	  may	  provide	  some	  explanatory	  value	  if	  some	  correlation	  were	  made	  between	  the	  
facilitating	  conditions	  and	  a	  particular	  mental	  domain.	  	  That	  is,	  through	  a	  closer	  examination	  we	  
may	  discern	  how	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  may,	  or	  may	  not	  have,	  influenced	  attitudinal	  change	  
in	  a	  particular	  attitudinal	  domain.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  III,	  similarities	  and	  difference	  exist	  
between	  the	  methods	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  facilitating	  conditions.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  similarity,	  
each	  enjoys	  common	  institutional	  support.	  	  But	  it	  is	  perhaps	  more	  interesting	  that	  they	  all	  
employ	  similar	  curricula	  to	  prescribe	  common	  intergroup	  goals	  for	  their	  groups	  that	  in	  turn	  
require	  substantial	  intergroup	  cooperation	  for	  those	  groups	  to	  succeed.	  	  The	  similar	  curricula	  
are	  modeled	  primarily	  on	  taxonomy	  of	  cognitive	  learning	  objectives,	  and	  where	  there	  may	  be	  
differences	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  curriculum	  between	  methods,	  there	  are	  few	  differences	  in	  the	  
cognitive	  learning	  objectives.2	  	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  this	  study	  remains	  limited	  to	  analysis	  of	  
outcomes	  in	  the	  cognitive	  domain—measuring	  and	  analyzing	  changes	  in	  the	  self-­‐reported	  
stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  of	  subjects.	  	  With	  similar	  curriculum	  and	  cognitive	  learning	  objectives,	  
the	  conditions	  of	  common	  intergroup	  goals	  and	  intergroup	  cooperation	  remain	  comparable	  
across	  the	  three	  methods.	  	  While	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  exceptions	  exist	  in	  the	  hybrid	  program,	  
each	  method	  has	  students	  doing	  the	  same	  things.	  	  So,	  the	  similarity	  in	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  
change	  across	  treatment	  methods	  seems	  logical.	  	  Through	  close	  interaction	  in	  the	  seminar	  
room	  and	  especially	  during	  myriad	  practical	  exercises,	  subjects	  in	  each	  method	  gain	  increasing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Specifically,	  JCWS	  curriculum	  is	  modeled	  primarily,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  on	  Bloom’s	  Taxonomy	  of	  learning	  
objectives	  in	  the	  cognitive	  domain;	  See	  Bloom,	  Benjamin	  Samuel,	  David	  R.	  Krathwohl,	  and	  Bertram	  B.	  Masia,	  
Taxonomy	  of	  educational	  objectives:	  the	  classification	  of	  educational	  goals.	  New	  York:	  Longman.	  1986	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knowledge	  and	  awareness	  not	  only	  of	  joint	  matters	  but	  of	  each	  other’s	  service	  culture	  and	  
capabilities,	  and	  this	  helps	  in	  offsetting	  previously	  held	  convictions	  regarding	  other	  service	  
components	  and	  their	  members.	  	  According	  to	  the	  measures	  used	  by	  this	  study,	  it	  should	  not	  
be	  surprising	  that,	  when	  learning	  and	  interacting	  together	  through	  common	  subject	  matter	  and	  
exercises,	  each	  group	  demonstrates	  a	  similar	  degree	  of	  positive	  change	  in	  cognitive	  attitude	  
towards	  officers	  from	  other	  services.	  
However,	  it	  is	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  of	  equal	  status	  and	  friendship	  potential	  in	  
particular	  where	  the	  delivery	  methods	  exhibit	  greater	  differences,	  and	  these	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  
have	  much	  influence	  in	  effecting	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  change—at	  least	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  study.	  	  With	  a	  greater	  disparity	  in	  rank	  and	  occasional	  preponderance	  by	  a	  single	  service,	  
the	  seminar	  environs	  of	  the	  hybrid	  and	  satellite	  methods	  provide	  a	  less	  neutral	  venue	  in	  terms	  
of	  equal	  status	  than	  the	  resident	  program.	  	  Proximity	  to	  the	  workplace	  may	  further	  detract	  
from	  satellite	  student	  perceptions	  of	  equality.	  	  If	  this	  condition	  had	  substantive	  cognitive	  
influence	  during	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  respective	  groups,	  then	  it	  should	  manifest	  in	  a	  smaller	  
change	  in	  hybrid	  and	  satellite	  group	  means	  pre-­‐to-­‐post	  treatment	  than	  with	  the	  resident.	  	  As	  it	  
was,	  these	  changes	  were	  statistically	  the	  same,	  or	  larger	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  hybrid.	  	  Also,	  
friendship	  potential	  is	  particularly	  associated	  with	  the	  affective	  domain,	  and	  so	  the	  lower	  
friendship	  potential	  of	  the	  hybrid	  and	  satellite	  methods	  relative	  to	  the	  resident	  should	  not	  be	  of	  
consequence	  to	  the	  cognitive	  outcomes	  considered	  by	  this	  study.	  	  As	  it	  was,	  the	  cognitive	  
attitudinal	  changes	  produced	  by	  the	  three	  methods	  remain	  highly	  comparable.	  	  	  
Yet,	  we	  should	  not	  dismiss	  the	  magnitude	  of	  impact	  by	  these	  facilitating	  conditions	  on	  
officer	  attitudes.	  	  ICT	  states	  that	  prejudice-­‐reduction	  methods	  must	  employ	  both	  affective	  and	  
161	  
	  
cognitive	  approaches,	  and	  of	  the	  two	  the	  affective	  is	  more	  important.	  	  It	  is	  in	  affective	  domain	  
where	  the	  greatest	  change,	  and	  therefore	  greatest	  reduction,	  in	  prejudice	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
intergroup	  contact.	  3	  	  This	  means	  we	  should	  expect	  a	  much	  more	  pronounced	  change	  in	  a	  
subject’s	  affective	  attitude	  than	  is	  seen	  in	  their	  cognitive	  attitude.	  	  That	  is,	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  
JPME	  II,	  officers	  should	  feel	  much	  more	  differently	  and	  positively	  toward	  members	  of	  services	  
than	  in	  what	  they	  think	  about	  them.	  	  Yet,	  the	  contribution	  each	  by	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  
to	  affective	  attitudinal	  change	  remains	  unknown,	  and	  this	  likely	  represents	  the	  much	  larger	  
portion	  of	  the	  iceberg	  that	  is	  underwater	  and	  unseen.	  	  Indeed,	  profound	  and	  consequential	  
differences	  may	  exist	  between	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  three	  delivery	  methods	  on	  the	  emotions	  and	  
favorability	  of	  officers	  toward	  those	  belonging	  to	  different	  services.	  	  Without	  knowing	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  each	  method	  facilitates	  the	  establishment	  of	  affective	  ties	  between	  students	  in	  
each	  seminar,	  such	  a	  joint	  group	  will	  likely	  remain,	  at	  best,	  in	  stage	  two	  of	  Schein’s	  culture	  
model.	  	  This	  means	  the	  group	  may	  not	  achieve	  the	  functional	  familiarity	  and	  behavioral	  norms	  
to	  enable	  members	  to	  consistently	  achieve	  common	  goals.4	  	  The	  group	  would	  be	  joint	  only	  in	  
appearance.	  
	  
Implications—The	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Organizational	  Process	  Model	  
Returning	  to	  Allison’s	  organizational	  process	  model	  as	  a	  means	  for	  understanding	  
organizational	  behavior,	  its	  value	  lies	  much	  more	  in	  its	  explanatory,	  rather	  than	  predictive,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Thomas	  F.	  Pettigrew	  and	  Linda	  R.	  Tropp,	  When	  Groups	  Meet:	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Intergroup	  Contact	  (New	  York:	  
Psychology	  Press,	  2011),	  95,	  98.;	  Gordon	  Willard	  Allport,	  The	  Nature	  of	  Prejudice	  (New	  York:	  Addison-­‐Wesley,	  
1979),	  13,	  268.;	  This	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  James	  M.	  Olson	  and	  Mark	  P.	  Zanna,	  "Attitudes	  and	  Attitude	  Change,"	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Psychology	  44,	  no.	  1	  (1993):	  121.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Edgar	  H.	  Schein,	  Organizational	  Culture	  and	  Leadership,	  3rd	  Edition	  (San	  Francisco:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2004).,	  79,	  
82-­‐3.	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power.	  	  However,	  some	  downplay	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  model	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
articulation	  of	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables	  within	  a	  causal	  model.5	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  
this	  study	  the	  model	  offers	  some	  value	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  another	  lens	  by	  which	  to	  view	  the	  
different	  service	  cultures	  and	  how	  their	  interaction	  in	  a	  joint	  context	  can	  produce	  less-­‐than-­‐
optimal	  outcomes.	  	  Yetiv	  advocates	  an	  integrated	  approach	  to	  understanding	  such	  behavior	  as	  
using	  many	  perspectives	  can	  create	  an	  exploratory	  tension	  that	  yields	  a	  better	  understanding	  
and	  perspective.6	  	  However,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  model	  in	  understanding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  various	  
JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  to	  instill	  in	  officers	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  is	  arguable.	  	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  model	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  impact	  or	  role	  of	  individuals,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  
organization	  and	  its	  competition	  or	  rivalries	  with	  others.7	  	  JPME	  II	  is	  intended	  to	  overcome	  
powerful	  organizational	  constraints	  to	  change	  the	  individual	  officer.	  	  It	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  change	  
the	  culture	  of	  the	  officer,	  but	  the	  culture	  in	  the	  officer	  so	  as	  to	  promote	  better	  understanding	  
and	  more	  positive	  behavior	  when	  the	  individual	  works	  with	  members	  of	  other	  organizations	  in	  
a	  joint	  context	  and	  toward	  a	  common	  joint	  goal.	  	  
	  
Implications—Mitigating	  and	  Leveraging	  Cognitive	  Biases	  
From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  implicit	  cognitive	  biases,	  which	  can	  cripple	  the	  decision	  making	  
of	  officers	  working	  within	  a	  joint	  context,	  JPME	  II	  offers	  a	  means	  to	  overcome	  or	  mitigate	  some	  
of	  the	  more	  salient	  cultural	  biases	  that	  may	  be	  of	  consequence	  to	  joint	  planning	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	  David	  A.	  Welch,	  "The	  Organizational	  Process	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  Paradigms:	  Retrospect	  and	  Prospect,"	  
International	  Security	  17,	  no.	  2	  (1992):	  115.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Steve	  A.	  Yetiv,	  Explaining	  Foreign	  Policy:	  US	  Decision	  Making	  in	  the	  Gulf	  Wars,	  First	  Edition	  (March	  22,	  2004)	  ed.	  
(Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  2-­‐3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Ibid.,	  136-­‐7.	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operations.	  	  The	  value	  of	  JPME	  II	  in	  instilling	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  
simply	  getting	  officers	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  positive	  attitude	  toward	  those	  of	  other	  services.	  	  
Rather,	  the	  desired	  outcome	  is	  for	  the	  same	  officers	  to	  make	  better	  judgments	  and	  decisions	  
when	  operating	  as	  part	  of	  a	  joint	  team.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  II,	  an	  explicit	  aim	  of	  JPME	  II	  is	  
to	  condition	  officers	  to	  avoid	  defaulting	  to	  certain	  military	  solutions	  simply	  because	  they	  favor	  
their	  own	  service	  or	  represent	  a	  culturally	  specific	  way	  of	  doing	  things.	  	  Through	  joint	  education	  
and	  acculturation,	  officers	  become	  exposed	  to	  the	  capabilities	  and	  competencies	  of	  the	  other	  
services	  and	  their	  members,	  and	  this	  provides	  a	  more	  expansive	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  
of	  the	  valuable	  contributions	  other	  services	  can	  make.	  	  By	  effecting	  positive	  attitudinal	  change,	  
as	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  demonstrate,	  the	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  foster	  a	  new	  joint	  norm	  
that	  works	  to	  overcome	  the	  effect	  of	  status	  quo	  bias.	  	  By	  considering	  the	  capabilities	  and	  
cooperation	  with	  members	  from	  different	  services	  as	  the	  norm	  rather	  than	  the	  exception,	  
officers	  demonstrate	  less	  cognitive	  rigidity	  and	  more	  willingly	  adopt	  or	  favor	  joint	  approaches.	  
We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  a	  positive	  JPME	  II	  experience	  gained	  by	  an	  officer	  in	  advance	  
of	  his	  first	  joint	  assignment	  can	  also	  positively	  leverage	  the	  bias	  created	  by	  the	  availability	  
heuristic	  described	  by	  Kahneman	  and	  Tversky.	  	  This	  heuristic	  operates	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ease	  
to	  which	  instances	  and	  experiences	  come	  to	  mind,	  meaning	  that	  experiences	  that	  are	  more	  
salient	  and	  more	  recent	  are	  also	  more	  retrievable.8	  	  It	  is	  this	  implicit	  retrievability	  that	  
influences	  human	  decision	  making.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  decisions	  and	  behaviors	  by	  officers	  with	  
little	  joint	  experience	  should	  tend	  to	  reflect	  their	  most	  recent	  joint	  experience—JPME	  II—in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  Amos	  Tversky,	  "Judgement	  Under	  Uncertainty:	  Heuristics	  and	  Biases,"	  Science	  185,	  no.	  
4157	  (1973):1127.	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their	  subsequent	  joint	  duty	  assignment.9	  	  This	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  with	  officers	  already	  
possessing	  considerable	  joint	  experience	  before	  attending	  JPME	  II.	  	  But	  these	  individuals	  will	  
undoubtedly	  have	  accumulated	  many	  cognitively	  salient	  experiences	  from	  previous	  joint	  
assignments—each	  processed	  and	  categorized	  without	  the	  depth	  of	  awareness	  and	  
understanding	  of	  other	  service	  cultures	  that	  JPME	  II	  provides.	  	  It	  is	  arguable	  how	  cognitive	  
attitudinal	  change	  produced	  by	  attendance	  at	  a	  JPME	  II	  program	  may	  correct	  or	  offset	  the	  
salience	  or	  retrievability	  of	  those	  experiences	  and	  any	  bias	  to	  which	  they	  may	  contribute.	  	  	  	  
The	  reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in,	  and	  joint	  acculturation	  of,	  officers	  achieved	  
by	  attendance	  to	  JPME	  II	  also	  relates	  to	  another	  bias	  identified	  by	  Kahneman,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
one	  created	  when	  a	  subject	  has	  a	  feeling	  of	  like	  or	  dislike	  toward	  a	  social	  object.	  	  The	  “affect	  
heuristic”	  induces	  a	  proclivity	  by	  subjects	  to	  make	  favorable	  or	  unfavorable	  judgments	  with	  
little	  reasoning	  or	  deliberation.10	  	  Through	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  and	  joint	  acculturation,	  
officers	  achieve	  a	  better	  understanding	  and	  appreciation	  for	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  other	  
services,	  and	  this	  increase	  in	  appreciation	  should	  accordingly	  incline	  them	  to	  display	  less	  bias	  
toward	  their	  own	  service	  and	  more	  toward	  the	  others	  when	  working	  in	  a	  joint	  context.	  	  The	  
limitations	  of	  this	  study	  prevent	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  affective	  realm	  where	  such	  
emotion	  lies,	  and	  therein	  lies	  an	  extremely	  important	  question	  regarding	  the	  significance	  of	  
JPME	  II	  in	  creating	  a	  “favorability	  bias”	  away	  from	  service	  parochialism	  and	  toward	  jointness.	  	  
Indeed,	  given	  the	  importance	  placed	  by	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  on	  the	  affective	  domain,	  such	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  Thinking,	  Fast	  and	  Slow,	  1st	  Edition	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Farrar,	  Straus	  and	  Giroux,	  2011),	  499,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99-­‐100;	  See	  also	  Amos	  Tversky	  and	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  "Availability:	  A	  Heuristic	  for	  Judging	  Frequency	  and	  
Probability,"	  Cognitive	  Psychology	  5,	  no.	  2	  (1973):	  207-­‐232.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Kahneman,	  Thinking,	  Fast	  and	  Slow,	  6.	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question	  asks	  again	  if	  there	  is	  a	  larger	  and	  more	  important	  distinction	  between	  the	  outcomes	  of	  
the	  three	  delivery	  methods.	  	  
It	  remains,	  however,	  that	  correcting	  existing	  cognitive	  biases	  may	  be	  easier	  said	  than	  done.	  	  
First,	  comparatively	  little	  is	  understood	  about	  debiasing	  than	  what	  is	  known	  of	  cognitive	  biases	  
in	  general.	  	  Mustata	  observes	  that	  debiasing	  decision	  making	  remains	  an	  under-­‐researched	  area	  
of	  study	  that	  complicates	  the	  development	  of	  effective	  cognitive	  debiasing	  approaches.	  	  This	  
circumstance	  is	  also	  aggravated	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  theoretical	  construct	  and	  
inconsistent	  results	  among	  and	  between	  debiasing	  approaches.11	  	  Secondly,	  debiasing	  requires	  
effort.	  	  For	  example,	  Kahneman	  argues	  that	  such	  correction	  is	  a	  task	  for	  System	  2	  thinking	  and	  
this	  requires	  sufficient	  cause	  or	  motivation	  reject	  the	  “cognitive”	  ease	  afforded	  by	  System	  1	  
thinking	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  slower,	  more	  deliberate	  and	  orderly	  thinking	  process.12	  	  In	  his	  
analysis	  of	  heuristic	  and	  debiasing	  research	  conducted	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Mustata	  
reaches	  a	  conclusion	  that	  seemingly	  echoes	  Kahneman	  –	  that	  biases	  could	  indeed	  be	  overcome	  
by	  exercising	  critical	  thinking	  in	  advance	  of	  decisions.	  	  Techniques	  such	  as	  reexamination	  of	  
assumptions,	  evaluating	  arguments,	  and	  consideration	  of	  potential	  advantages	  and	  
disadvantages	  were	  seen	  to	  lead	  to	  improve	  decision	  making.	  	  Disordered	  or	  conflicting	  
information	  was	  also	  seen	  to	  more	  often	  trigger	  the	  engagement	  of	  such	  critical	  –	  or	  “system	  2”	  
–	  thinking	  by	  military	  officers.13	  	  	  In	  a	  related	  sense,	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  understanding	  and	  
appreciation	  afforded	  by	  structured	  intergroup	  contact	  results	  in	  what	  others	  call	  “perspective-­‐
taking”,	  which	  is	  when	  a	  member	  of	  one	  group	  entertains	  the	  perspective	  of	  another	  belonging	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Mustata,	  Marinel-­‐Adi.	  "Debiasing	  Judgements	  and	  Decisions	  in	  the	  Military."	  In	  International	  Scientific	  
Conference	  "Strategies	  XXI",	  vol.	  3.	  (2017):	  265.	  
12	  Kahneman,	  Thinking,	  Fast	  and	  Slow,	  155.	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Mustata,	  "Debiasing	  Judgements	  and	  Decisions	  in	  the	  Military.",	  266.	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to	  a	  different	  group.	  	  Recent	  studies	  by	  Galinsky	  and	  Moskowitz	  strongly	  support	  the	  argument	  
that	  such	  perspective-­‐taking	  inhibits	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  cognitive	  biases	  by	  diminishing	  the	  
effect	  of	  stereotypes	  and	  by	  reducing	  their	  accessibility.14	  
Yet,	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  debiasing	  approaches	  over	  time.	  	  While	  
there	  is	  support	  for	  arguments	  that	  debiasing	  is	  possible,	  achieving	  and	  lasting	  and	  meaningful	  
outcome	  such	  as	  that	  for	  prejudice	  reduction	  strategies	  will	  not	  likely	  come	  quickly	  or	  easily.	  	  In	  
this	  regard,	  the	  elimination	  of	  cognitive	  bias	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  harmful	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  share	  some	  commonality	  in	  their	  respective	  approaches.	  	  Where	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  
highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  greater	  duration	  and	  intensity	  in	  contact	  approaches	  to	  achieve	  
greater	  and	  more	  lasting	  positive	  attitudinal	  change,	  such	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  with	  
disabusing	  military	  officers	  of	  the	  cognitive	  biases	  they	  may	  harbor.	  	  Mustata	  acknowledges	  
that	  there	  is	  “no	  easy	  solution”	  to	  debiasing.	  	  
	  
Implications—Findings	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  JPME	  II	  
The	  findings	  suggest	  some	  similarity	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  outcomes	  of	  the	  
resident	  and	  hybrid	  delivery	  methods	  in	  the	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  domain.	  	  It	  would	  be	  facile,	  
however,	  to	  conclude	  on	  this	  basis	  alone	  that	  no	  difference	  exists	  between	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  
two	  methods	  because	  their	  efficacy	  in	  achieving	  substantive	  and	  positive	  affective	  attitudinal	  
change	  is	  unknown.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  methods	  in	  this	  regard	  could	  be	  
considerable.	  	  Further,	  a	  clear	  explanation	  for	  the	  apparent	  similarity	  in	  cognitive	  outcomes	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Galinsky,	  Adam	  D.,	  and	  Gordon	  B.	  Moskowitz.	  "Perspective-­‐Taking:	  Decreasing	  Stereotype	  Expression,	  




difficult.	  	  We	  cannot	  be	  certain	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  greater	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment	  change	  of	  the	  
hybrid	  group	  relative	  to	  the	  resident	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  treatment	  or	  the	  type	  of	  student,	  or	  
both.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  similarities	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  compositional	  differences	  
between	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups,	  whereby	  hybrid	  students	  are	  less	  beholden	  to	  service-­‐
cultural	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs	  than	  their	  active	  component	  counterparts	  in	  the	  resident	  
program.	  	  Adding	  to	  this	  notion	  is	  that,	  as	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  III,	  an	  inherent	  bias	  exists	  
among	  the	  hybrid	  group	  in	  that	  these	  students	  are	  all	  volunteers	  for	  treatment	  whereas	  
resident	  students	  are	  often	  involuntary	  participants,	  directed	  instead	  by	  their	  service	  or	  
command	  to	  attend	  treatment	  and	  often	  at	  a	  personally	  inopportune	  time.	  	  This	  creates	  the	  
condition	  of	  selection	  bias,	  where	  less-­‐prejudiced	  officers	  more	  willingly	  volunteer	  for	  contact	  
with	  members	  from	  other	  services	  than	  those	  harboring	  greater	  and	  deeper	  prejudice.	  	  In	  
effect,	  we	  should	  expect	  that	  a	  group	  composed	  of	  eager	  volunteers	  to	  demonstrate	  greater	  
attitudinal	  change	  because	  they	  tend	  to	  harbor	  fewer	  and	  less	  deeply	  seated	  prejudices,	  
especially	  within	  a	  seminar	  of	  like-­‐minded	  officers	  from	  other	  services.	  	  It	  remains	  a	  possibility	  
that	  these	  compositional	  differences	  interact	  with	  the	  specific	  treatment	  methods	  as	  well.	  	  	  
This	  study	  acknowledged	  in	  an	  earlier	  chapter	  the	  limitation	  to	  inarguably	  attribute	  
attitudinal	  changes	  to	  either	  method	  or	  student—that	  the	  inability	  to	  randomly	  assign	  students	  
from	  each	  population	  to	  the	  different	  treatment	  methods	  creates	  a	  second	  form	  of	  selection	  
bias	  that	  obscures	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  true	  effects	  of	  each	  treatment.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  
seemingly	  comparable	  performance	  by	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  programs	  is	  indeed	  due	  to	  
cultural	  and	  experiential	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups,	  then	  it	  remains	  possible	  that	  
where	  one	  method	  is	  effective	  with	  one	  type	  of	  student	  it	  may	  be	  quite	  unsuitable	  for	  the	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other.	  	  The	  results	  could	  be	  substantially	  different	  in	  terms	  of	  residual	  levels	  of	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice	  and,	  consequently,	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  achieved.	  	  Only	  through	  
careful	  study	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  hybrid	  program	  with	  active	  component	  officers	  and	  the	  
efficacy	  of	  the	  resident	  program	  with	  officers	  from	  the	  reserve	  components	  will	  our	  
understanding	  become	  clearer.	  	  Given	  the	  intent	  of	  legislation	  and	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  of	  the	  
JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  JFSC,	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  consider	  these	  programs	  equally	  
effective	  and	  interchangeable	  until	  we	  can	  accumulate	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  and	  
understanding	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  methods	  in	  the	  affective	  attitudinal	  domain	  and	  
with	  different	  populations.	  	  	  
	  Another	  surprising	  finding	  is	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  
means	  of	  the	  satellite	  method	  and	  those	  of	  the	  resident	  program,	  which	  it	  so	  closely	  resembles	  
in	  terms	  of	  format	  and	  student	  population.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  satellite	  group	  means	  are	  lower	  
than	  those	  of	  the	  resident	  group.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  differences	  statistically	  significant	  and	  
substantial,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  consistent	  across	  all	  four	  satellite	  seminars—each	  conducted	  at	  a	  
different	  location,	  joint	  command,	  and	  timeframe	  as	  well	  as	  with	  a	  different	  faculty	  team.	  	  As	  
well,	  the	  professional	  background	  factor	  of	  rank	  matters	  among	  satellite	  subjects	  while	  
remaining	  unimportant	  among	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups.	  	  Given	  the	  strength	  and	  
significance	  of	  this	  independent	  variable,	  it	  suggests	  a	  possible,	  if	  not	  partial,	  explanation	  for	  
why	  satellite	  subjects	  start	  and	  finish	  treatment	  at	  much	  lower,	  and	  more	  prejudicial	  points,	  
than	  those	  in	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  groups.	  	  While	  rank	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  influence	  the	  
effect	  of	  treatment—the	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐course	  change	  is	  consistent	  with	  that	  of	  the	  resident	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group—its	  influence	  could	  be	  a	  manifestation	  of	  satellite	  students	  preserving	  work	  
relationships	  and	  attitudes	  while	  in	  the	  seminar	  environment.	  	  	  
However,	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  establish	  why	  the	  factor	  of	  rank	  is	  consequential	  to	  the	  
cognitive	  index	  scores	  of	  satellite	  students.	  	  The	  clearest	  distinguishing	  aspects	  of	  the	  satellite	  
group	  from	  the	  resident	  group,	  which	  it	  closely	  resembles,	  are	  that	  students	  of	  the	  satellite	  
method	  are	  both	  in	  their	  joint	  assignment	  prior	  to	  treatment	  and	  at	  their	  joint	  command	  while	  
receiving	  treatment.	  	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  ICT,	  the	  workplace	  is	  not	  a	  neutral	  intergroup	  
contact	  venue	  because	  it	  is	  hierarchical	  in	  nature,	  organized	  to	  accomplish	  military	  missions	  
rather	  than	  to	  foster	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  understanding	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  inter-­‐service	  
prejudice.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  rather	  than	  alleviating	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  harbored	  by	  officers,	  the	  
work	  environment	  may	  actually	  serve	  to	  instill	  additional	  prejudices	  and	  reinforce	  pre-­‐existing	  
ones.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  satellite	  seminars	  are	  conducted	  away	  from	  the	  specific	  workplaces	  of	  the	  
students,	  but,	  by	  design,	  satellite	  locations	  remain	  geographically	  proximate	  to	  the	  commands	  
they	  serve.	  	  Additionally,	  Chapter	  III	  noted	  that	  satellite	  students	  could	  be	  prone	  to	  continue	  
formal	  work	  relationships	  while	  in	  attendance.	  	  This	  may	  provide	  some	  explanation	  regarding	  
the	  consistently	  lower	  cognitive	  index	  scores	  of	  satellite	  students	  relative	  to	  those	  attending	  
the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  programs,	  which	  maintain	  highly	  work-­‐neutral	  environments.	  	  It	  also	  
strongly	  suggests	  that	  one	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  adopt	  a	  joint	  attitude	  and	  perspective	  strictly	  
through	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  training,	  especially	  given	  the	  higher	  average	  level	  of	  joint	  experience	  among	  
satellite	  subjects.	  	  Such	  officers	  are	  exposed	  to	  an	  environment	  of	  inherently	  unequal	  status	  
without	  the	  understanding	  of	  other	  service	  cultures	  provided	  by	  JPME	  II	  that	  might	  otherwise	  
serve	  as	  a	  coping	  mechanism.	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Another	  possibility	  that	  may	  help	  in	  clarifying	  the	  substantially	  lower	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
treatment	  satellite	  group	  means	  is	  that,	  like	  the	  hybrid	  group,	  a	  selection	  bias	  exists	  among	  
satellite	  students	  as	  well.	  	  It	  remains	  unknown	  how	  the	  commands	  served	  by	  the	  satellite	  
program	  selected	  the	  officers	  who	  would	  attend,	  but	  Chapter	  III	  highlighted	  that	  student	  
convenience	  is	  a	  central	  consideration	  for	  conducting	  a	  satellite	  method—to	  eliminate	  the	  need	  
for	  attending	  the	  resident	  method	  in	  Norfolk,	  where	  the	  student	  would	  endure	  family	  
separation.	  	  Selection	  bias	  results	  if	  more	  deeply	  prejudiced	  officers	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  
opportunity	  provided	  by	  the	  satellite	  method	  to	  avoid	  the	  more	  immersive	  and	  less-­‐
homogeneous	  intergroup	  experience	  provided	  by	  the	  resident	  program.	  	  Additionally,	  if	  officers	  
opt	  to	  attend	  the	  satellite	  method	  purely	  for	  reasons	  of	  convenience	  then	  it	  is	  arguable	  they	  are	  
also	  less	  invested	  or	  committed	  as	  students	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  treatment,	  which	  is	  attitudinal	  
change.	  
In	  comparison	  to	  the	  resident	  method,	  which	  is	  the	  principle	  means	  of	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  
to	  active	  component	  officers,	  the	  satellite	  approach	  produced	  much	  lower	  results	  in	  the	  
cognitive	  attitudinal	  domain.	  	  If	  these	  differences	  stem	  from	  the	  accessibility	  considerations	  of	  
location	  and	  timing,	  it	  may	  very	  well	  be	  that	  the	  satellite	  method	  is	  incapable	  of	  producing	  
cognitive	  outcomes	  comparable	  to	  the	  resident	  or	  hybrid	  programs.	  	  This	  is	  because	  
accessibility	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  satellite	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II,	  as	  the	  method	  is	  predicated	  on	  
providing	  JPME	  II	  to	  officers	  at	  their	  home	  station	  and	  while	  they	  are	  serving	  in	  their	  joint	  
assignment.	  
An	  important	  question	  regarding	  the	  lower	  group	  means	  of	  the	  satellite	  method	  is	  how	  
meaningful	  is	  this	  difference	  in	  practice.	  	  The	  answer	  lies	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study,	  but	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the	  higher	  levels	  of	  prejudice	  at	  post-­‐treatment	  are	  very	  likely	  indicative	  of	  lower	  degrees	  of	  
joint	  acculturation	  among	  satellite	  subjects.	  	  Without	  an	  objective	  standard	  for	  the	  joint	  
acculturation	  or	  attitudinal	  outcomes	  of	  JPME	  II	  programs	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  metric	  by	  which	  to	  
say	  the	  satellite	  method	  is	  successful.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  not	  very	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  higher	  levels	  of	  
inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  in	  the	  joint	  workplace	  would	  harm	  operational	  efficacy	  rather	  than	  help	  
it.	  	  And,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  historical	  examples	  in	  Chapter	  II,	  the	  consequences	  of	  greater	  inter-­‐
service	  prejudice	  and	  lower	  joint	  acculturation	  in	  an	  operational	  setting	  can	  be	  severe.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  at	  this	  point	  to	  devote	  some	  discussion	  to	  relate	  these	  findings	  back	  to	  
the	  departmental	  considerations	  driving	  changes	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  JPME	  II	  by	  the	  JFSC,	  which	  
are	  the	  desires	  to	  increase	  student	  throughput,	  to	  reduce	  costs,	  and	  to	  make	  it	  more	  accessible	  
to	  officers.	  	  As	  currently	  executed,	  neither	  the	  recently	  accredited	  hybrid	  program	  nor	  the	  
satellite	  program	  reflect	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  active	  component	  officers	  
receiving	  JPME	  II	  through	  the	  JFSC	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  hybrid	  program	  
presently	  delivers	  JPME	  II	  exclusively	  to	  officers	  in	  the	  reserve	  components,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  
serving	  in	  the	  reserve	  components	  means	  that	  many	  of	  these	  graduates	  are	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  
to	  readily	  fulfill	  a	  full-­‐time	  joint	  duty	  assignment.	  	  Even	  if	  active	  component	  officers	  are	  
admitted	  to	  the	  hybrid	  program	  in	  the	  future,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  could	  amount	  to	  a	  
substantive	  increase	  without	  offsetting	  the	  number	  of	  reserve	  component	  officers	  attending	  or	  
without	  additional	  investment	  to	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  program.	  	  Neither	  does	  the	  
satellite	  program	  contribute	  additional	  student	  throughput	  because	  these	  graduates	  are	  offset	  
by	  a	  like	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  graduates	  of	  the	  resident	  program.	  	  Under	  the	  current	  
arrangement	  and	  joint	  education	  policies,	  any	  increase	  in	  capacity	  of	  the	  satellite	  program	  to	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produce	  graduates	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  capacity	  in	  the	  resident	  program.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  
see	  how	  to	  increase	  the	  throughput	  of	  these	  active-­‐component	  JPME	  II	  programs	  without	  
additional	  investment	  to	  increase	  their	  capacity	  or	  by	  reducing	  the	  requirements	  and	  in	  turn	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  programs.	  
This	  study	  did	  not	  explicitly	  consider	  cost	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  three	  
delivery	  methods.	  Yet,	  two	  observations	  seem	  appropriate	  and	  stem	  from	  discussion	  of	  
distance-­‐learning	  approaches	  in	  Chapter	  II	  and	  the	  findings	  in	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  unknown	  
whether	  the	  distance-­‐learning	  approach	  in	  the	  hybrid	  program	  represents	  a	  fiscal	  cost-­‐savings	  
over	  attendance	  to	  the	  resident	  program,	  though	  it	  remains	  possible,	  if	  not	  likely.	  	  What	  seems	  
much	  clearer	  is	  that	  an	  additional	  and	  possible	  substantial	  “cost”	  may	  be	  incurred	  by	  the	  active-­‐
component	  officer	  attending	  the	  program.	  	  Chapter	  II	  cited	  a	  2010	  Congressional	  report	  
articulating	  concern	  over	  notions	  of	  active	  component	  officers	  completing	  JPME	  II	  though	  a	  
lengthy	  distance-­‐learning	  program	  in	  addition	  to	  fulfilling	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  their	  primary	  
duty	  assignment.	  	  Though	  some	  active	  component	  officers	  will	  undoubtedly	  prefer	  a	  distance-­‐
learning	  approach	  for	  receiving	  JPME	  II,	  compelling	  attendance	  to	  such	  a	  long	  program	  without	  
consideration	  of	  an	  officer’s	  professional	  circumstances	  and	  personal	  preferences	  could	  prove	  
counterproductive	  to	  reaching	  the	  desired	  attitudinal	  outcome.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  satellite	  
program,	  Pisel	  states	  that	  the	  approach	  represents	  cost	  transference	  more	  than	  cost	  
avoidance.15	  	  While	  the	  satellite	  program	  could	  indeed	  cost	  less,	  it	  also	  appears	  to	  produce	  less	  
from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  outcomes	  reported	  by	  the	  students.	  	  As	  stated	  
earlier,	  students	  attending	  the	  satellite	  program	  start	  and	  end	  at	  a	  lower	  point	  than	  students	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Kenneth	  Pisel,	  Director,	  Non-­‐Resident	  Satellite	  Program,	  Joint	  Forces	  Staff	  College.	  Interview	  by	  Author.	  Digital	  
Recording.	  Norfolk,	  May	  23,	  2016.	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attending	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  programs.	  	  It	  remains	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  to	  
suggest	  whether	  any	  actual	  tradeoff	  between	  cost	  and	  outcome	  is	  acceptable.	  
From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  accessibility,	  the	  hybrid	  and	  satellite	  programs	  can	  
unquestionably	  increase	  the	  accessibility	  of	  JPME	  II	  for	  active	  component	  officers	  who	  may	  
have	  personal	  or	  professional	  circumstances	  prohibiting	  or	  complicating	  attendance	  of	  the	  
resident	  program.	  	  We	  should	  consider	  this	  advantage	  not	  purely	  on	  its	  own	  merit,	  however,	  
but	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  any	  potential	  disadvantages	  each	  program	  poses	  with	  respect	  to	  
achieving	  desired	  attitudinal	  outcomes.	  	  The	  convenience	  of	  receiving	  JPME	  II	  while	  remaining	  
proximate	  to	  family	  and	  the	  workplace	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  important	  consideration	  by	  
Skelton	  when	  conceiving	  what	  JPME	  II	  should	  be	  and	  what	  it	  must	  accomplish	  in	  furthering	  the	  
aims	  of	  the	  GNA	  reforms.	  	  	  
	  
Pragmatic	  Considerations	  for	  the	  Joint	  Staff	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  extensive	  review	  by	  this	  study	  of	  the	  history	  and	  course	  of	  JPME	  II	  since	  
the	  GNA,	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  provide	  some	  considerations	  stemming	  from	  this	  review	  
regarding	  the	  present	  and	  future	  of	  this	  particularly	  key	  phase	  of	  joint	  education.	  	  Now,	  more	  
than	  30	  years	  since	  the	  original	  reforms,	  the	  importance	  of	  jointness	  and	  associated	  gains	  made	  
in	  and	  by	  the	  force	  appear	  widely	  acknowledged	  within	  the	  department.	  	  Yet,	  the	  nature	  of	  
jointness	  is	  often	  misunderstood—it	  is	  an	  ongoing	  journey	  and	  not	  a	  destination	  as	  some	  have	  
implied	  or	  stated	  in	  the	  past.16	  	  Secretary	  Mattis	  keenly	  observed	  that	  “jointness	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  
state,”	  meaning	  that	  the	  service	  parochialism	  will	  slowly	  and	  ultimately	  erode	  any	  gains	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  .	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Goldwater-­‐Nichols	  Working	  Group	  Recommendations	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  [March	  9,	  2016]):	  3.	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jointness	  without	  continual	  external	  pressure	  driving	  the	  services	  to	  be	  interdependent.17	  	  
Claims	  that	  the	  services	  now	  understand	  and	  value	  jointness	  more	  than	  ever	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
protracted	  military	  operations	  since	  2001	  are	  particularly	  beguiling,	  and	  suggest	  a	  diminished	  
need	  to	  continue	  applying	  this	  pressure.	  	  However,	  such	  assertions	  ring	  hollow	  without	  the	  
empirical	  data	  and	  formal	  analyses	  to	  support	  notions	  that	  officers	  today	  command	  a	  better	  
grasp	  of	  joint	  matters	  than	  their	  predecessors,	  much	  less	  that	  they	  now	  feel	  much	  more	  
positively	  toward	  those	  from	  other	  services.18	  	  As	  long	  as	  members	  of	  service	  promotion	  boards	  
continue	  to	  clone	  themselves	  through	  the	  selections	  they	  make,	  there	  is	  the	  imperative	  to	  
cultivate	  joint	  perspectives	  and	  attitudes	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  military	  officers.	  
The	  department	  faces	  certain	  fiscal	  austerity	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  and,	  while	  under	  
tremendous	  pressure	  to	  do	  more	  with	  less,	  the	  joint	  staff	  must	  continue,	  if	  not	  increase,	  the	  
emphasis	  on	  high-­‐quality	  JPME	  II	  programs	  by	  improving	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  capacity.	  	  The	  
first	  and	  most	  important	  step	  to	  improving	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  JPME	  II	  is	  to	  seek	  better	  
assurance	  that	  officers	  attend	  JPME	  II	  in	  advance	  of	  their	  initial	  joint	  assignment	  and	  avoid	  
situations	  where	  they	  must	  acquire	  the	  requisite	  service	  cultural	  awareness	  and	  appreciation	  
through	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  training.	  	  The	  need	  to	  prepare	  officers	  for	  joint	  duty	  is	  discussed	  throughout	  
the	  report	  by	  the	  Skelton	  panel,	  and	  the	  first	  common	  educational	  standard	  in	  the	  Chairman’s	  
OPMEP	  for	  all	  JPME	  programs	  highlights	  the	  need	  to	  “prepare	  graduates	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  joint,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  U.S.	  Joint	  Forces	  Command,	  Command	  Briefing	  (Norfolk,	  VA,	  June	  18,	  2010,	  [2010]).	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  1998	  DoD	  IG	  Review	  of	  JPME	  II	  report	  made	  the	  assertion	  of	  “Joint	  Maturation”	  resulting	  from	  participation	  
in	  previous	  joint	  operations	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  recommendation	  to	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  JPME	  II.	  	  AFSC	  refuted	  this	  
claim	  with	  empirical	  data	  demonstrating	  that	  officers	  attending	  JPME	  II	  had	  not	  mastered	  broad	  knowledge	  of	  joint	  
matters.	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Evaluation	  Report	  on	  Joint	  Professional	  Military	  Education	  Phase	  II	  (Report	  
no.	  98-­‐156)	  (Arlington,	  VA:	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Inspector	  General,	  [1998]).:	  11,	  48.	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interagency,	  intergovernmental,	  and	  multinational	  environment.”19	  	  Yet,	  fewer	  than	  40	  percent	  
of	  the	  students	  attending	  the	  resident	  program	  are	  bound	  for,	  or	  serving	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of,	  
their	  first	  joint	  assignment.20	  	  Given	  that	  many	  officers,	  if	  not	  most,	  receive	  only	  a	  single	  joint	  
assignment	  during	  their	  career,	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  to	  them	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  joint	  assignment	  
or	  afterwards	  is	  akin	  to	  giving	  a	  physician	  his	  medical	  education	  only	  after	  he	  has	  already	  
started	  or	  has	  finished	  his	  practice.	  	  Not	  only	  must	  there	  be	  increased	  focus	  and	  pressure	  for	  
officers	  to	  receive	  JPME	  II	  in	  advance	  of	  joint	  duty,	  the	  joint	  staff	  must	  correspondingly	  invest	  
in,	  rather	  than	  divest	  from,	  the	  capacity	  of	  effective	  JPME	  II	  programs	  to	  accommodate	  greater	  
throughput.21	  
Plausibly,	  “flexible	  and	  tailorable	  approaches”	  for	  delivering	  JPME	  II	  may	  help	  to	  address	  
“right	  student,	  right	  time”	  concerns,	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  enable	  students	  to	  achieve	  the	  
goals	  or	  expectations	  regarding	  the	  social	  psychological	  outcomes	  unique	  to	  JPME	  II.	  	  In	  light	  of	  
the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  department	  should	  carefully	  and	  comprehensively	  review	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  satellite	  program	  as	  an	  approach	  for	  delivering	  JPME	  II.	  	  Foremost	  among	  
the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Skelton	  panel	  for	  JPME	  II	  was	  to	  foster	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  officers	  the	  cross-­‐
cultural	  awareness	  and	  appreciation	  critical	  to	  jointness—an	  outcome	  distinct	  to	  social	  
psychology.	  	  Yet,	  situational	  constraints	  appear	  to	  limit	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  satellite	  
program	  to	  much	  lower	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  outcomes	  among	  the	  officers	  attending.	  	  
Notwithstanding	  is	  that	  the	  principle	  concern	  of	  the	  Skelton	  panel	  was	  not	  the	  personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  See	  the	  Skelton	  Report;	  Also,	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  Chairman,	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Instruction	  1800.01E	  Officer	  
Professional	  Military	  Education	  Policy	  (OPMEP)	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  2015),	  E-­‐1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Process	  for	  Accreditation	  of	  Joint	  Education	  (PAJE)	  Self-­‐Study	  Report:	  Joint	  Advanced	  Warfighting	  School	  (JAWS)	  
and	  Joint	  and	  Combined	  Warfighting	  School	  (JCWS).	  (Norfolk,	  VA,	  [March	  2014]).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Due	  to	  faculty	  manpower	  cuts,	  the	  size	  and	  composition	  of	  JCWS	  classes	  by	  2019	  will	  have	  decreased	  from	  255	  
students	  to	  198	  –	  a	  reduction	  in	  throughput	  of	  22%.	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convenience	  of	  the	  officers	  to	  receive	  JPME	  II,	  but	  rather	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  education.	  	  
Likewise,	  proposals	  for	  attendance	  by	  active	  component	  officers	  to	  the	  hybrid	  program	  
represent	  another	  matter	  for	  careful	  and	  deliberate	  consideration.	  	  Given	  the	  compositional	  
differences	  between	  these	  populations	  and	  the	  reservations	  expressed	  by	  several	  studies	  
regarding	  distance	  education	  approaches	  for	  active	  component	  officers,	  shoe-­‐horning	  active	  
component	  officers	  into	  a	  distance	  learning	  program	  may	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  	  The	  joint	  
staff	  should	  take	  a	  “go	  slow”	  approach	  and	  carefully	  study	  the	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  
attitudinal	  performance	  of	  active	  component	  officers	  attending	  the	  hybrid	  program	  as	  this	  
should	  logically	  compare	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  active	  component	  officers	  attending	  the	  
resident	  program.	  	  	  
Finally,	  the	  joint	  staff	  must	  remain	  vigilant	  in	  avoiding	  pressures	  for	  “diploma-­‐mill”	  
approaches	  to	  JPME	  II,	  of	  which	  the	  Skelton	  panel	  warned.22	  	  Rather	  than	  to	  create	  a	  deeper	  
pool	  of	  truly	  joint-­‐minded	  warriors,	  many	  decisions	  in	  the	  past	  to	  accredit	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  
institutions	  to	  deliver	  JPME	  II	  were	  motivated	  by	  desires	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  joint-­‐
qualified	  officers	  on	  the	  books,	  to	  provide	  a	  greater	  pool	  of	  officers	  from	  which	  the	  services	  
could	  promote,	  or	  to	  protect	  particular	  programs	  from	  the	  chopping	  block.	  	  Jointness	  and	  joint	  
acculturation	  have	  sometimes	  taken	  a	  back	  seat.	  	  Reflecting	  back	  to	  the	  explicit	  and	  paramount	  
intent	  of	  the	  Skelton	  panel	  when	  they	  created	  JPME	  II,	  the	  cornerstone	  for	  any	  JPME	  II	  program	  
is	  the	  inculcation	  of	  greater	  understanding	  and	  appreciation	  for	  the	  cultures	  of	  the	  services	  and	  
especially	  their	  members	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  their	  students.	  	  Doing	  this	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  U.S.	  Congress.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  Military	  Education	  of	  the	  One	  Hundredth	  
Congress	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  [1989]).:	  112.	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meaningful	  in	  the	  increasingly	  complex	  joint	  operational	  environment	  will	  take	  time	  and	  
resources—it	  cannot	  be	  accomplished	  quickly	  or	  cheaply.	  
	  
Limitations	  of	  this	  Study	  
Certain	  limitations	  do	  exist	  regarding	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  first	  among	  these	  is	  
their	  generalization—we	  cannot	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  for	  other	  JPME	  II-­‐
accredited	  programs	  outside	  of	  JFSC	  because	  these	  programs	  employ	  different	  methods.	  	  Each	  
differs	  in	  OPMEP	  mission	  statement	  and	  objectives,	  lesson	  content,	  instructional	  approach,	  
duration,	  and	  student	  population.	  	  Compositional	  differences	  in	  the	  treatment	  groups	  
presented	  a	  limitation	  that	  was	  difficult	  to	  overcome	  as	  random	  assignment	  of	  subjects	  among	  
three	  delivery	  methods	  was	  not	  possible.	  	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  treatment	  
cannot	  be	  clearly	  attributed	  to	  the	  particular	  delivery	  employed	  or	  to	  the	  type	  of	  student	  
attending	  it.	  	  The	  comparatively	  small	  sample	  size	  of	  the	  satellite	  group	  also	  represents	  a	  
limitation	  not	  only	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  statistical	  analysis,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  true	  
representation	  of	  the	  population	  it	  reflects.	  	  A	  much	  larger	  and	  balanced	  sample	  size	  would	  
improve	  the	  confidence	  in	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  and	  could	  conceivably	  deliver	  substantially	  
different	  results.	  	  Limitations	  were	  also	  present	  in	  the	  survey	  instrument	  in	  that	  it	  only	  
measured	  cognitive	  attitudinal	  outcomes,	  leaving	  the	  affective	  dimension	  of	  prejudice	  
unassessed.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  are	  incomplete	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
reduction	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  achieved	  by	  each	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  method,	  and	  subsequent	  
evaluations	  of	  the	  comparability	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  resident,	  hybrid,	  and	  satellite	  
methods	  should	  be	  circumspect.	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Recommendations	  and	  Areas	  for	  Further	  Research	  
This	  study	  described	  the	  close	  and	  inversely	  proportional	  relationship	  existing	  between	  
joint	  acculturation	  and	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice,	  where	  achieving	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  the	  former	  
requires	  the	  minimization	  of	  the	  latter	  within	  a	  JPME	  II	  contact	  experience.	  	  But	  simply	  
minimizing	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  by	  itself	  does	  not	  assure	  optimal	  acculturation.	  	  At	  best,	  
measuring	  the	  reduction	  of	  prejudice	  provides	  only	  a	  very	  indirect	  indication	  of	  the	  joint	  
acculturation	  that	  may	  be	  occurring	  as	  a	  result	  of	  attending	  the	  JPME	  II	  methods.	  	  Again,	  this	  
represents	  a	  valuable	  area	  worthy	  of	  further	  research	  and	  would	  require	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
assessment	  instrument	  specifically	  designed	  to	  measure	  the	  shift	  in	  officer	  beliefs	  and	  values	  
from	  service-­‐centrism	  toward	  a	  joint	  perspective.	  	  Yet,	  it	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  simply	  
develop	  an	  instrument	  that	  can	  measure	  joint	  acculturation	  because	  measurement	  for	  its	  own	  
sake	  is	  of	  little	  value.	  	  The	  measure	  must	  apply	  to	  an	  objective	  outcome	  for	  joint	  acculturation	  if	  
the	  measure	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  meaningful.	  	  However,	  no	  standard—objective	  or	  subjective—
exists	  regarding	  the	  level	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  that	  JPME	  II	  graduates	  should	  reach	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  attending	  one	  of	  the	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods.	  	  The	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  such	  a	  
joint	  acculturation	  objective	  is	  a	  necessary	  first	  step	  for	  any	  determination	  regarding	  the	  length	  
or	  duration	  of	  any	  particular	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  method.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  achievement	  of	  
a	  joint	  acculturation	  objective	  that	  is	  both	  meaningful	  and	  lasting	  will	  unquestionably	  take	  time	  
and	  emphasis.23	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Consider	  the	  lack	  of	  specificity	  in	  the	  JCWS	  Student	  Outcome	  with	  respect	  to	  Joint	  Attitudes	  and	  Perspective.	  	  
This	  points	  to	  the	  acculturation	  that	  must	  occur	  during	  JPME	  II	  and	  this	  is	  essential	  to	  creating	  truly	  joint-­‐minded	  
officers.	  	  Without	  such	  specificity,	  the	  Student	  Outcome	  statement,	  which	  represents	  what	  the	  course	  is	  supposed	  
to	  achieve,	  is	  characterized	  only	  by	  cognitive-­‐aspect	  education	  and	  implies	  that	  such	  can	  be	  effectively	  achieved	  by	  
any	  delivery	  means,	  including	  approaches	  comprised	  entirely	  of	  distance	  learning.	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Additionally,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  JFSC	  Joint	  Acculturation	  Survey	  instrument	  effectively	  
confined	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  to	  the	  cognitive	  dimension	  of	  prejudice,	  and	  so	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  various	  JFSC	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods	  in	  the	  affective	  attitudinal	  domain	  remains	  unknown.	  	  
Yet,	  this	  domain	  is	  where	  Pettigrew	  and	  Tropp	  argue	  the	  greatest	  change	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
intergroup	  contact.	  	  Success	  in	  this	  domain	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  development	  of	  meaningful	  
and	  lasting	  professional	  relationships	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups—the	  officers	  from	  
the	  different	  services	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Likewise,	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  attitudes	  
and	  perspectives,	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  II	  as	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  JPME	  II,	  also	  hinge	  on	  
affective	  attitudinal	  change.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  full	  impact,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  most	  substantial	  
and	  valuable	  contribution	  by	  each	  of	  the	  JPME	  II	  programs	  offered	  by	  JFSC,	  remains	  unknown.	  	  
It	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  area	  for	  further	  research	  and	  would	  require	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
new	  survey	  tool	  that	  can	  measure	  the	  affective	  attitudinal	  change	  experienced	  by	  officers	  
attending	  any	  of	  the	  JPME	  II	  delivery	  methods.	  
Finally,	  to	  better	  resolve	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  type	  of	  student	  matters	  within	  the	  
various	  JPME	  II	  methods	  employed	  by	  the	  JFSC,	  additional	  research	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  
cognitive	  and	  affective	  performance	  of	  active	  component	  officers	  within	  the	  distance-­‐learning	  
structure	  of	  the	  hybrid	  method.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  it	  would	  be	  simplistic	  to	  
assume	  the	  resident	  and	  hybrid	  methods	  are	  comparable	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
treatment	  group	  means	  because	  the	  interaction	  between	  method	  and	  subject	  is	  complex.	  	  
Placing	  active	  component	  officers	  holding	  more	  deeply	  instilled	  prejudices	  into	  a	  longer	  but	  
much	  less	  intensive	  program	  may	  deliver	  disappointing	  or	  unacceptable	  results.	  	  This	  may	  be	  
especially	  so	  if	  active	  component	  officers	  receiving	  hybrid	  treatment	  remain	  entrenched	  in	  a	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highly	  service-­‐centric	  environment	  during	  the	  distance-­‐learning	  portions	  of	  the	  program.	  	  This	  is	  
notwithstanding	  the	  undesirable	  implications	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  II	  that	  a	  distance	  learning	  
approach	  may	  carry	  for	  active	  component	  officers	  serving	  in	  demanding	  assignments.	  	  In	  short,	  
it	  would	  be	  simplistic	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  hybrid	  approach	  is	  a	  universally	  effective	  method	  for	  
delivering	  JPME	  II.	  
	  
Final	  Thoughts	  
There	  are	  two	  contributions	  by	  this	  study	  that	  are	  considered	  the	  most	  valuable.	  	  First	  is	  
that	  this	  study	  represents	  one	  of	  very	  few,	  if	  any,	  works	  explicitly	  linking	  the	  field	  of	  social	  
psychology	  to	  the	  importance	  and	  understanding	  of	  jointness	  and	  joint	  acculturation.	  	  Within	  
the	  hundreds	  of	  reports,	  studies,	  and	  articles	  on	  jointness	  and	  joint	  professional	  military	  
education	  produced	  since	  1989,	  any	  consideration	  of	  the	  psychology	  involved	  in	  the	  mental	  
transformation	  that	  is	  joint	  acculturation	  remains	  virtually	  absent.	  	  Consequently,	  this	  means	  a	  
broad	  understanding	  of	  joint	  acculturation	  within	  the	  defense	  establishment	  and	  the	  JPME	  II	  
approaches	  developed	  to	  achieve	  it	  have	  been	  under-­‐informed.	  	  The	  consideration	  and	  
understanding	  of	  human	  psychology	  is	  indispensable	  when	  seeking	  to	  instill	  the	  joint	  attitudes	  
and	  perspectives	  that	  comprise	  jointness.	  
A	  second	  contribution	  considered	  especially	  important	  is	  the	  clarification	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  process	  of	  cultural	  change,	  which	  is	  joint	  acculturation,	  and	  that	  of	  
reducing	  prejudice	  between	  members	  of	  different	  groups,	  which	  is	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  reality	  of	  inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  has	  been	  around	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  but	  hidden	  within	  
euphemisms	  such	  as	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  and	  service	  parochialism.	  	  Inter-­‐service	  prejudice	  is	  an	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anathema	  to	  a	  joint	  perspective	  and	  attitude,	  and	  its	  minimization	  is	  a	  necessary	  antecedent	  to	  
the	  joint	  acculturation	  of	  officers	  belonging	  to	  different	  service	  cultures.	  	  JPME	  II	  approaches,	  
long	  thought	  to	  cause	  joint	  acculturation,	  can	  only	  set	  the	  conditions	  for	  optimal	  acculturation	  
to	  occur,	  and	  these	  must	  do	  this	  by	  minimizing	  the	  inter-­‐service	  prejudices	  harbored	  by	  the	  
officers	  attending	  them.	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  Acculturation	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  (Post)	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
Please	  complete	  the	  below	  survey	  in	  its	  entirety.	  It	  is	  estimated	  to	  take	  approximately	  30	  minutes.	  The	  
survey	  is	  designed	  to	  assess	  your	  perceptions	  of	  the	  US	  military	  Services	  and	  other	  organizations. 
 
"Acculturation"	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  of	  understanding	  the	  separate	  Service	  cultures	  (and	  other	  
organizations)	  resulting	  in	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  common	  beliefs,	  and	  trust,	  which	  occurs	  
when	  diverse	  groups	  come	  into	  continuous	  direct	  contact.	  Acculturation	  occurs	  during	  activities	  
involving	  members	  of	  Services,	  agencies,	  and/or	  countries	  other	  than	  one's	  own.
	  
 
General	  Service	  Values 
	  
Along	  each	  continuum	  please	  rate	  your	  perceptions	  of	  the	  respective	  Services,	  as	  you	  believe	  their	  





 Discouraging	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Motivating 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
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U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 Subdued	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Enthusiastic 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 Callous	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Empathetic 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 
 
m m m m m m m 
 
4.	   
 Less	  Skilled	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Competent	   
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 Abrupt	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Respectful	   
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
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U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   m m m m m m m 
6.	   
 Timid	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Bold 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 	  Unfaithful	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Loyal 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 	  Egocentric	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Selfless 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 




 Dishonorable	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Principled 




U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   m m m m m m m 
***page	  break***	  
 
"Acculturation"	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  of	  understanding	  the	  separate	  Service	  cultures	  (and	  other	  
organizations)	  resulting	  in	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  common	  beliefs,	  and	  trust,	  which	  occurs	  
when	  diverse	  groups	  come	  into	  continuous	  direct	  contact.	  Acculturation	  occurs	  during	  activities	  





Please	  rate	  your	  perception	  of	  the	  joint	  attributes	  listed	  below.	  
	  
10.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  you	  believe	  each	  Service/organization	  values	  joint	  operations.	  	  
 
 
 Not	  at	  all	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  –	  Very	  much 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Navy	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Air	  Force	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Government	  Agencies m m m m m m m 
Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations m m m m m m m 
Multinational	  Partners m m m m m m m 
 
 




 Not	  at	  all	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  –	  Very	  much 
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U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Navy	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Air	  Force	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
	   
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	  	  
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Government	  Agencies m m m m m m m 
Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations m m m m m m m 
Multinational	  Partners m m m m m m m 
 
 
12.	  Your	  ability	  to	  work	  with	  each	  Service/organization.	  	  
 
 
 Not	  at	  all	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  –	  Very	  much 
U.S.	  Army	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Navy	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Air	  Force	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Marine	  Corps	   
 
m m m m m m m 
U.S.	  Government	  Agencies m m m m m m m 
Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations m m m m m m m 
Multinational	  Partners m m m m m m m 
 
 
13.	  Your	  ability	  to	  substantially	  and	  effectively	  contribute	  to	  a	  joint	  team.	  	  
 
 Not	  at	  all	  -­‐	  1 2 3 4 5 6 7	  -­‐	  Very	  much 
Prior	  to	  attending	  this	  class	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
m m m m m m m 
Upon	  completion	  of	  this	  class	  
	  
m m m m m m m 
 
 
"Acculturation"	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  of	  understanding	  the	  separate	  Service	  cultures	  (and	  other	  
organizations)	  resulting	  in	  joint	  attitudes	  and	  perspectives,	  common	  beliefs,	  and	  trust,	  which	  occurs	  
when	  diverse	  groups	  come	  into	  continuous	  direct	  contact.	  Acculturation	  occurs	  during	  activities	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involving	  members	  of	  Services,	  agencies,	  and/or	  countries	  other	  than	  one's	  own.
	  
 
14.	  Please	  answer	  the	  following	  acculturation	  questions.	  	  
 
 Strongly	  
Disagree	  -­‐	  1 
2 3 4	  -­‐	  Strongly	  
Agree 
As	  a	  result	  of	  my	  JFSC	  attendance,	  my	  perceptions	  of	  other	  
Services,	  agencies,	  and/or	  countries	  changed.	  	  	  	  
m m m m 
Acculturation	  at	  JFSC	  contributed	  to	  my	  professional	  growth	  
and	  development	  during	  the	  program.	  
m m m m 
My	  seminar	  faculty	  encouraged	  or	  facilitated	  acculturation.	   m m m m 
My	  seminar	  worked	  well	  together.	  	  	   m m m m 
 
	  
15.	  Please	  select	  the	  acculturation	  activities	  you	  participated	  in	  outside	  of	  the	  classroom	  while	  
enrolled	  at	  JFSC.	  Check	  all	  that	  apply. 
   q Professional	  discourse	  with	  faculty	  that	  enhanced	  my	  appreciation	  of	  other	  Services	  and/or	  
understanding	  of	  the	  joint	  force 
   q Professional	  discourse	  with	  other	  students	  that	  enhanced	  my	  appreciation	  of	  other	  Services	  and/or	  
understanding	  of	  the	  joint	  force 
   q Living	  in	  on-­‐campus	  housing	  with	  other	  students 
   q Required	  softball/volleyball 
   q Non-­‐mandatory	  group	  sports/exercise 
   q Non-­‐mandatory	  social	  events 
   q Non-­‐mandatory	  offsite	  learning	  activities	  (e.g.,	  ship/museum	  visits) 
   q Study	  sessions	  with	  other	  students 
	  
16.	  On	  average,	  how	  often	  did	  you	  participate	  in	  acculturation	  activities	  outside	  of	  the	  classroom?	   
   m Never 
   m A	  few	  times	  during	  the	  class 
   m Once	  a	  week 
   m A	  few	  times	  a	  week 
   m Every	  day 
 
 
17.	  Total	  years	  of	  military	  service	  while	  in	  active	  duty	  status	  (Title	  10) 
	  
18.	  Total	  months	  served	  in	  active	  duty	  status	  at	  a	  unified	  or	  sub-­‐unified	  command,	  Joint	  Task	  Force,	  or	  
other	  joint	  operational	  headquarters	  (e.g.,	  USCENTCOM,	  USFK,	  JTF-­‐HOA) 
 




20.	  If	  you	  have	  any	  additional	  comments	  regarding	  your	  acculturation	  experience	  while	  enrolled	  at	  
JFSC,	  please	  provide	  them	  below.	  
	  	  	  ________________________________________________________________	  
   ________________________________________________________________ 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end,	  students	  will	  not	  see) 
 
School	  –HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end) 
   m JAWS 
   m JCWS 
   m AJPME 
 
Seminar	  –HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end) 
   m 1 
   m 2 
   m 3 
   m 4 
   m 5 
   m 6 
   m 7 
   m 8 
   m 9 
   m 10 
   m 11 
   m 12 
   m 13 
   m 14 
   m 15 
   m Tampa 
   m NORTHCOM 
   m TRANSCOM 
   m AFRICOM 
   m EUCOM 
   m PACOM 
   m SOUTHCOM 
   m STRATCOM 
 
Service	  –HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end)	   
   m U.S.	  Air	  Force  
   m U.S.	  Army  
   m U.S.	  Coast	  Guard  
   m U.S.	  Marine	  Corps  
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   m U.S.	  Navy  
   m DoD	  Civilian  
   m Non-­‐DoD	  Civilian  
   m International	  Officer  
   m International	  Civilian 
 
Affiliation	  –HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end)	   
   m Active 
   m Guard 
   m Reserve 
   m Civilian 
   m International 
 
Grade	  (or	  equivalent	  grade)	  –HIDDEN	  (pre-­‐populated	  on	  back	  end)	   
   m O-­‐3 
   m O-­‐4 
   m O-­‐5 
   m O-­‐6 
   m O-­‐7 
   m O-­‐8 
   m GS-­‐13 
   m GS-­‐14 
   m GS-­‐15 


















COMPUTATION	  OF	  METHOD-­‐SPECIFIC	  FACTOR	  WEIGHTS	  
	  
	   	  
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11
RESIDENT	  (n	  =	  645)
USA 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.8 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.68 0.63
USN 0.83 0.81 0.73 0.8 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.8 0.78 0.73 0.62
USAF 0.81 0.8 0.6 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.7 0.66
USMC 0.71 0.68 0.56 0.75 0.64 0.65 0.72 0.67 0.76 0.58 0.63
AVERAGE 0.79 0.76 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.64
SATELLITE	  (n	  =	  57)
USA 0.79 0.65 0.64 0.79 0.7 0.66 0.7 0.73 0.72 0.55 0.65
USN 0.83 0.8 0.72 0.61 0.75 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.68 0.59 0.57
USAF 0.86 0.81 0.64 0.73 0.58 0.86 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.44 0.58
USMC 0.75 0.67 0.38 0.66 0.56 0.79 0.73 0.62 0.77 0.2 0.61
AVERAGE 0.81 0.73 0.60 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.45 0.60
HYBRID	  (n	  =	  153 )
USA 0.81 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.75 0.64 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.67 0.56
USN 0.82 0.8 0.7 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.55
USAF 0.8 0.75 0.47 0.66 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.64
USMC 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.71 0.58 0.56 0.7 0.67 0.72 0.6 0.54
AVERAGE 0.78 0.74 0.62 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.66 0.57




STATISTICAL	  ANALYSIS	  WITH	  EXCLUSION	  OF	  OUTLIER	  OBSERVATIONS	  
	  







ANOVA	  Results	  -­‐	  Differences	  in	  Pre-­‐Course	  Group	  Means	  
	  
	  
ANOVA	  Results	  -­‐	  Differences	  in	  Pre-­‐Course	  Group	  Means	  
	  
	  









Regression	  Results	  –	  Predicting	  Cognitive	  Index	  Scores	  Pre-­‐	  and	  Post-­‐Treatment	  
	   	  
Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err
Intercept 	  1.614	  *** 0.252 	  	  	  1.133	  *** 0.343 	  	  	  1.222 1.300 	  	  	  2.880	  *** 0.474
Active	  Service 	  0.003 0.005 	  	  -­‐0.007 0.009 	  	  	  0.022 0.039 	  	  	  0.004 0.006
Joint	  Experience -­‐0.001 0.001 	  	  -­‐0.001 0.001 	  	  -­‐0.006 0.004 	  	  	  0.001 0.003
Age 	  0.012	  * 0.006 	  	  	  0.020	  * 0.009 	  	  	  0.024 0.032 	  	  	  0.009 0.010
Education 	  0.060 0.054 	  	  	  0.087 0.074 	  	  	  0.019 0.210 	  	  -­‐0.033 0.088
Rank -­‐0.003 0.032 	  	  -­‐0.002 0.046 	  	  -­‐0.281 0.147 	  	  -­‐0.049 0.059
USN 	  0.001 0.049 	  	  	  0.011 0.058 	  	  	  0.174 0.191 	  	  -­‐0.105 0.102
USAF 	  0.023 0.042 	  	  -­‐0.011 0.051 	  	  	  0.183 0.174 	  	  	  0.041 0.092
USMC -­‐0.054 0.085 	  	  	  0.010 0.103 	  	  -­‐0.304 0.392 	  	  -­‐0.298	  . 0.159
Cog.Pre 	  0.523	  *** 0.035 	  	  	  0.560	  *** 0.040 	  	  	  0.666	  *** 0.183 	  	  	  0.354	  *** 0.078
Resident -­‐0.100	  . 0.061
Satellite -­‐0.275	  ** 0.089
Multiple	  R 2	   =
p	  =
n	  =	  
Significance	  codes:	  	  	  	  	  '	  ***	  '	  =	  .001	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  **	  '	  =	  .01	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  *	  '	  =	  .05	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  .	  '	  =	  0.1
0 0 0.02 <	  0.001
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ENTIRE	  DATASET RESIDENT SATELLITE HYBRID
0.29 0.31 0.38 0.28
Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err Estimate Std	  Err
Intercept 	  	  3.438	  *** 0.168 	  	  3.432	  *** 0.242 	  	  3.771	  *** 0.703 	  	  3.619	  *** 0.287
Active	  Service 	  	  0.006 0.004 	  -­‐0.010	   0.007 	  	  0.043	  . 0.025 	  	  0.003 0.004
Joint	  Experience -­‐0.001 0.001 	  -­‐0.001 0.001 	  -­‐0.006	  * 0.003 	  	  0.001 0.002
Age 	  0.014	  ** 0.004 	  	  0.011 0.007 	  	  0.005 0.022 	  	  0.015	  . 0.007
Education 	  0.051 0.043 	  	  0.071 0.058 	  	  0.171 0.140 	  -­‐0.022 0.067
Rank -­‐0.069	  * 0.027 	  -­‐0.058 0.037 	  -­‐0.313	  ** 0.102 	  -­‐0.080	  . 0.046
USN -­‐0.074	  . 0.038 	  -­‐0.076	  . 0.046 	  -­‐0.102 0.127 	  -­‐0.052 0.078
USAF -­‐0.112	  *** 0.033 	  -­‐0.106	  ** 0.040 	  -­‐0.073 0.115 	  -­‐0.146	  * 0.069
USMC -­‐0.268	  *** 0.066 	  -­‐0.281	  *** 0.080 	  -­‐0.206	   0.263 	  -­‐0.288	  * 0.122
Treatment 	  0.357	  *** 0.028 	  	  0.328	  *** 0.033 	  	  0.343	  *** 0.085 	  	  0.543	  *** 0.087
Multiple	  R 2	   =
p	  =
n	  =	  
Significance	  codes:	  	  	  	  	  '	  ***	  '	  =	  .001	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  **	  '	  =	  .01	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  *	  '	  =	  .05	  	  	  	  	  	  '	  .	  '	  =	  0.1
764 573 51 140
0.18 0.12 0.26 0.31
0 0 <	  0.01 0





CHARLES	  MARK	  DAVIS	  
Graduate	  Program	  for	  International	  Studies	  




Experienced	   educator	   and	   career	   military	   officer	   possessing	   knowledge	   and	   expertise	   in	  
graduate-­‐level	   leader	   education	   in	   Strategic	   and	   Operational-­‐level	   planning,	   as	   well	   as	  
coordinating	   Joint,	   Multinational,	   and	   Interagency	   operations;	   Also	   possessing	   secondary	  
knowledge	   in	   planning,	   implementation,	   and	   operation	   of	   Department	   of	   Defense	  





Civilian	  (2010	  –	  Present)	  
Serving	  as	  Assistant	  Professor	  in	  the	  Joint	  and	  Combined	  Warfighting	  School	  (JCWS)	  of	  the	  Joint	  
Forces	  Staff	  College;	  Responsible	  for	  educating	  career	  military	  officers	  and	  national	  security	  
leaders	  in	  National	  Strategy	  and	  joint,	  multinational	  and	  interagency	  planning	  and	  warfighting.	  
• Educated	  more	  than	  800	  military	  officers	  and	  civilians	  on	  joint	  and	  combined	  
matters	  across	  more	  than	  40	  seminars.	  
• Conducted	  extensive	  JFSC	  outreach	  activity	  including	  activities	  supporting	  US	  
Strategic	  Command,	  US	  Joint	  Forces	  Command,	  and	  NATO.	  




Career	  Army	  Officer	  with	  over	  24	  years	  of	  in-­‐depth	  experience	  in	  the	  communications	  field,	  
serving	  virtually	  every	  level	  of	  military	  command;	  Held	  positions	  of	  responsibility	  ranging	  from	  
Platoon	  Leader	  up	  to	  Division	  Chief	  and	  Deputy	  Director	  in	  joint	  military	  organizations;	  
Managed	  organizations	  numbering	  over	  580	  personnel	  and	  budgets	  exceeding	  $3M	  annually.	  
• Planned	  and	  executed	  communications	  operations	  for	  several	  operational-­‐level	  
exercises	  sponsored	  by	  U.S.	  Pacific	  Command	  and	  U.S.	  Northern	  Command.	  
• Collaborated	  with	  local	  and	  state	  governments	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  agencies	  and	  
commercial	  service	  providers	  to	  address	  Critical	  Infrastructure	  Protection	  activities.	  	  
• Conducted	  the	  delivery	  of	  advanced	  Command	  and	  Control	  systems	  to	  the	  highest	  





Master	  of	  Science	  Degree,	  Business	  Organizational	  Management,	  University	  of	  La	  Verne,	  La	  
Verne,	  California	  2002.	  	  Graduated	  Magna	  Cum	  Laude.	  
	  
Bachelor	  of	  Science	  Degree,	  Electronics	  Engineering	  Technology,	  DeVry	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  
Columbus,	  Ohio	  1986.	  	  Graduated	  Cum	  Laude.	  
